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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over 
Perkins's appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) on the 
basis that the judgments and order from which Perkins seeks relief 
are final orders issued by the Third District Court and on the 
basis that the Utah Court of Appeals does not have original 
appellate jurisdiction over these judgments and order. This Court, 
however, obtained jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2) (k) and Rule 42, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. The final order of the district court, following post-
trial motions, was entered on September 3, 1993. Appellant First 
General Services filed a timely Notice of Appeal on October 4, 
1993. Perkins's Cross Appeal was timely filed on October 18, 1993, 
pursuant Rule 4(d), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Jurisdiction therefore lies with this Court. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Issue 1: Did the trial court err (1) in permitting the 
introduction of evidence of a prior fire in January, 1987, at 
Perkins's Hillsden residence and (2) in permitting the introduction 
of evidence that the May 1990 fire in her Murray home may have been 
intentionally set? 
Standard of Review; A trial court's decision regarding 
admission of evidence is reviewed to determine whether the court 
abused its discretion. Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile 
Institution, 605 P.2d 314, 322-323 (Utah 1979); Allstate Ins. Co. 
v. James, 845 F.2d 315, 320 (11th Cir. 1988). 
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Issue Preserved on Appeal: Prior to trial, Perkins filed a 
Motion in Limine to exclude evidence of prior criminal convictions, 
including any evidence of Perkins's 1987 conviction for reckless 
burning. Perkins also filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
to exclude any evidence that the fire on May 19, 1990 (the "May 
1990 Fire") in her Murray home, which gave rise to this action, may 
have been intentionally started. (R. 794-796, 2760-2774; 01043-
01046, 2788-2794). Although excluding evidence of the conviction 
itself, the court ruled that "evidence that Perkins set her 
Hillsden house on fire in January, 1987 is admissible." With 
respect to evidence that the May 1990 Fire was intentionally 
caused, the trial court ordered that "no evidence shall be allowed 
from any source as to who may have caused the fire at the Perkins 
home on May 19, 1990" (emphasis added). The court, however, 
permitted introduction of evidence that the May 1990 Fire was 
intentionally caused (R. 1193, see also March 27, 1993 Transcript, 
R. 2747 and 2749). 
The court's ruling on the Motion in Limine was premised on 
representations by opposing counsel that Perkins, during her 
deposition, purportedly admitted that she intentionally set her 
Hillsden house on fire. Before opening argument to the jury, 
Perkins's counsel read to the court, in chambers, that portion of 
Perkins's deposition transcript to which opposing counsel had 
referred. What Perkins actually stated during her deposition was 
that she did not know why the fire was intentionally set (R. 5278-
5286). 
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Perkins also objected during trial when opposing counsel 
referred to Perkins's "intentional" setting of the 1987 fire, when 
witnesses testified as to the previous fires or when they referred 
to the suspicious nature of the May 1990 Fire (R. 2834, 2854, 5184-
5185, 5277-5286, 5324-5326, 3172-3175, 3499-3501, 4291-4292, 4420-
4423) . 
Perkins moved for directed verdict and filed, pursuant to 
Rules 50(b) and 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for New 
Trial (R. 1613-1616; see also August 5, 1993 Hearing Transcript, R. 
5116-5128). 
Issue 2: (1) Did the trial court err in permitting Bear 
River's counsel, in opening argument, to imply that one of the 
issues in this case was insurance fraud and that Zandra Perkins 
committed insurance fraud; and (2) did the court compound this 
error by confusing the jury as to the issues "fraud" and of 
"insurance fraud?" 
Standard of Review; The decision of the trial court regarding 
improper comments by counsel is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
Donohue v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc.. 748 P. 2d 1067 (Utah 
1987); Allstate Ins. Co. v. James, 845 F.2d 315 (11th Cir. 1988). 
Issue Preserved on Appeal: Counsel for Bear River continually 
referred to insurance fraud on the part of Perkins in opening 
argument (R. 2838-2852) . Perkins's counsel objected, pointing out 
to the court that such references bordered on mistrial (R. 2852, 
2854). Perkins's counsel also presented in camera arguments 
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regarding such statements by opposing counsel (R. 5326-5334) and 
moved for mistrial (R. 5327) . Perkins's counsel informed the court 
later during trial that it wished to continue its motion regarding 
the issue of insurance fraud (R. 2966-2977). The court granted 
Perkins's motion with respect to the use of the term "fraud" (R. 
3110-3116) , but refused to give an advisory instruction to the jury 
regarding "insurance fraud" (R. 3112). The court requested counsel 
to agree upon language to be read to the jury (R. 3114-3115) and 
the agreed-upon statement was read (3221-3222). The trial court, 
however, reversed itself, stating that it would allow the issue of 
fraud to be submitted to the jury (R. 4679-4680). 
Jury Instruction No. 10, as read to the jury, stated that 
"there was an alleged fraudulent conduct on behalf of or on the 
part of Ms. Perkins as far as making an insurance claim." After 
reading the instructions to the jury, however, the court corrected 
itself, indicating to the jury that Instruction No. 10 had to do 
with "burden of proof" and further that "there is no allegation 
that there was any fraudulent conduct on her (Ms. Perkins's) part 
as far as making any type of insurance claim. That has been 
cleared up before, and that should not have been read to you" (R. 
4694; see also, Instructions to the Jury, R. 1420-1488). 
Issue 3; Did the trial court err by not limiting the 
attorneys' fees award to First General to those allowed by Utah's 
Mechanic's Lien Statute and/or to those specified by the contract 
between First General and Perkins? 
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Standard of Review: The amount of an award of attorneys' fees 
is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. Turtle Management, 
Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982). 
Issue Preserved on Appeal: In her Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative Motion for New 
Trial, Perkins raised the issue of the reasonableness of the 
attorneys' fees award to First General and argued that First 
General was only entitled to an award of fees incurred in 
prosecuting its claim against Perkins, as provided for by contract 
or statute, and not fees incurred in defending counterclaims. 
Perkins further argued that because First General had failed to 
separate fees and costs incurred in prosecuting its claim, it was 
not entitled to any award of attorneys' fees. (R. 1633-1636.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case. 
In the early morning hours of May 19, 1990, a fire at 
Perkins's home in Murray, Utah damaged and partially destroyed the 
house and contents. The fire essentially destroyed the carport, a 
major part of the roof and the north wall of the house. Smoke and 
water damage effected nearly the entire home and most of the 
fixtures and contents. At the time of the fire, Perkins was in 
Arizona on a work-related trip. A neighbor called Perkins within 
minutes of the fire and Perkins arrived in Salt Lake City later 
that day. Perkins immediately notified her homeowners insurance 
company, Bear River. Perkins met with Bear River's claims adjuster 
at her residence on May 21, 1990. The claims adjuster recommended 
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that Perkins hire First General to do the cleanup and 
reconstruction work. 
The next day, Perkins met with First General's owner, Gene 
Peterson ("Peterson"). Peterson assured Perkins that he would 
return the home to the same condition it was in prior to the fire 
and assured Perkins he could have the entire restoration job 
completed by July 1, 1990. Perkins asked Peterson for a written 
bid and signed an "Access and Authorization" card (Trial Exhibit 2, 
attached hereto in the Addendum) authorizing Peterson to begin the 
cleanup and debris removal. Perkins returned to Arizona, leaving 
her sister, Marsha Smith ("Smith") to act as her agent overseeing 
negotiations with Bear River and the restoration work to her home. 
The cleanup and reconstruction did not take place as promised 
by Peterson. Besides the fact that little progress was made during 
June, the work which was done by First General was shoddy. Other 
problems existed because of the quality of the work, including the 
failure to properly clean the home's contents. By the end of July, 
First General still had not completed its work in a satisfactory 
manner. Because of First General's substandard work, its attempts 
to downgrade the quality of materials used in restoration, and the 
slow pace of restoration, Perkins dismissed First General on July 
30. Perkins notified Bear River and instructed it not to authorize 
additional payments to First General without Perkins's approval. 
By this time, Bear River had already paid $20,000 to First General. 
Approximately three weeks after dismissing First General, 
Perkins hired a new general contractor, Leo Thorup ("Thorup"). 
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Thorup completed the cleaning and restoration of Perkins's home and 
did over again some of the work improperly done by First General. 
Thorup estimated the value of First General's work to be far less 
than the $20,000 paid to First General by Bear River. 
Nevertheless, First General sent Perkins a bill for amounts over 
and above the $20,000 already paid to First General by Bear River. 
After protracted negotiations, First General lowered its final bill 
to $10,658.47. 
During and after the reconstruction of her home, Perkins had 
considerable ongoing problems with Bear River's adjustment of her 
claim, including coverage of contents, as well as reconstruction 
costs. Because of continued difficulties in settling Perkins's 
claims, Bear River brought in a second independent adjuster to 
assist with claims settlement. Perkins's claim, however, was never 
settled satisfactorily and mechanics liens were filed against her 
home. 
II. Course of Proceedings. 
On October 18, 1990, First General filed this action against 
Perkins for breach of contract and to foreclose its mechanics lien 
(R. 2-9), seeking recovery of $10,658.47. Perkins denied any 
liability and filed counterclaims against First General seeking 
damages of approximately $111,000 for breach of contract, fraud, 
negligent misrepresentation, slander of title, conversion, unjust 
enrichment and constructive trust. Perkins also filed a Third 
Party Complaint against Bear River alleging negligent 
misrepresentation, negligence, breach of the duty of good faith and 
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fair dealing, breach of contract, indemnification, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and conversion. Perkins sought 
damages of approximately $450,000, plus punitive damages (R. 14-
83) . 
Because Perkins had instructed Bear River not to pay First 
General additional funds without her approval, First General 
refused to pay some of its subcontractors, referring them instead 
to Perkins. First General, and at least two of the subcontractors, 
filed mechanics liens against Perkins's home. One of these 
subcontractors, Frampton Air Conditioning and Heating ("Frampton") , 
installed a new swamp cooler in Perkins's home. When First General 
refused to pay Frampton's final bill ($426.21), Frampton brought 
suit against First General and Perkins in circuit court to 
foreclose its lien. The Frampton foreclosure was later 
consolidated with the claims filed in district court by First 
General and Perkins. After consolidation, the two cases were tried 
concurrently (R. 371-396). Perkins denied all liability to 
Frampton and asserted a counterclaim against Frampton for water 
damages resulting from Frampton's negligent installation of the 
swamp cooler. 
A. Frampton's Claims Against First General and Perkins. 
Frampton filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to foreclose its 
mechanics lien. The trial court granted Frampton's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, awarding Frampton $426.21 plus attorneys fees in 
the amount of $4,557.00 pursuant to Utah's Mechanic's Lien Statute. 
Two signed Judgment were entered—one on January 28, 1993 and a 
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second on March 22, 1993 which superseded the first Judgment (R. 
1856-1860). However, the court stayed collection of the judgment 
and fee award pending resolution of Perkins's negligence claims 
against Frampton at trial (R. 813, 886-891, 114-118, 1196-1199). 
B. Perkins's Claims Against First General. 
Prior to trial, the trial court, based upon stipulation of the 
parties, granted First General's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and found that the technical requirements for perfecting 
and enforcing First General's mechanics lien had been met. Issues 
remaining for trial included (1) whether First General breached its 
contract with Perkins; (2) whether First General acted in bad faith 
in adjusting Perkins's claim; (3) whether First General made 
negligent misrepresentations to Perkins; (4) whether First General 
committed fraud against Perkins; (5) whether First General 
slandered Perkins's title; (6) whether Perkins breached her 
contract with First General; (7) whether Perkins owed First General 
additional amounts for labor and materials and if so, the amount; 
and (8) whether either party was entitled to attorneys' fees and 
costs against the other. 
C. Perkins's Claims Against Bear River. 
Prior to trial, Perkins filed a Motion in Limine to exclude 
certain evidence Bear River intended to introduce showing that 
Perkins had been convicted of reckless burning of her former home 
on Hillsden Drive in Salt Lake City in 1987. Perkins also filed a 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment requesting the court to strike 
Bear River's affirmative defense on the issue of causation of the 
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May, 1990 Fire (R. 1043-1089, 2788-2794). The purpose of the 
motion was to prevent Bear River from introducing evidence that the 
May, 1990 Fire was intentionally caused and, by implication, that 
it was intentionally caused by Perkins. Bear River contended that 
the evidence was relevant to its defense against Perkins's claim of 
bad faith. 
At a March 26, 1993 hearing (R. 2744-2799), the trial court 
granted Perkins's motion regarding exclusion of prior criminal 
convictions but denied her motion to exclude evidence of the 
Hillsden fire and of the fact that Perkins caused that fire. In 
other words, the trial court believed that the fact of setting the 
1987 fire was relevant to Bear River's defense. The court also 
denied Perkins's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to exclude 
evidence that the May, 1990 Fire was intentionally set. The court 
ruled that opposing counsel could not ask Perkins whether she 
intentionally set the May, 1990 Fire and further, that opposing 
counsel could not ask the fire chief, Keith W. Hall, Jr., who he 
thought started the fire. The court stated that "the only thing I 
would allow, and I am allowing it because there is a claim in there 
for bad faith; as far as evidence of 'was that fire intentionally 
set?' but we need not to be inferring that anybody did set the 
fire.11 (R. 2749-2750). 
D. Jury Trial. 
A jury trial was conducted from April 19, 1993 through April 
30, 1993. The jury returned a Special Verdict (R. 1577-1599), 
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separately responding to questions regarding the case between First 
General and Perkins and Perkins against Bear River. 
With respect to claims between First General and Perkins, the 
jury responded as follows: 
First General's claims: 
(1) Perkins breached her contract with First 
General; 
(2) Perkins was not unjustly enriched by First General; 
(3) The reasonable value of cleaning and 
restoration due First General from Perkins is 
$10,658.47; and 
(4) Reasonable attorneys' fees and costs due First 
General from Perkins is $52,522.53. 
Perkins's Claims: 
(1) First General did not breach its contract with 
Perkins; 
(2) First General did not make negligent 
misrepresentations to Perkins; 
(3) First General did not commit fraud against 
Perkins; and 
(4) First General did not commit slander of title 
against Perkins. 
The jury found with respect to the claims of Perkins against 
Bear River that: 
(1) Bear River owed $5,100.00 to Perkins for 
damages resulting from the May, 1990 Fire; 
(2) Bear River did not breach its contract with 
Perkins; 
(3) Bear River did not act in bad faith; and 
(4) Bear River did not overpay monies to or on 
behalf of Perkins. 
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At the close of Perkins's case in chief, Frampton moved for 
directed verdict on Perkins's negligence claims against it. 
Frampton's motion was granted and judgment was entered in favor of 
Frampton against Perkins (R. 1257, 1305-1308). After trial, at a 
hearing on August 5, 1993 where the parties' post trial motions 
were heard, the trial court ordered First General to indemnify 
Perkins for Frampton's judgment, including attorneys' fees (R. 
5163-5166). 
E. Post Trial Motions. 
On July 6, 1993, after hearing objections to the form of the 
proposed judgment by Perkins, the court entered two Judgments based 
on the jury's Special Verdict. One Judgment related to the claims 
between First General and Perkins (R. 1573-1576) and the second 
Judgment related to claims between Perkins and Bear River (R. 1569-
1572) . 
The parties filed various post-trial motions and papers, 
including the following: 
1. Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or 
in the Alternative, a Motion for New Trial (R. 1613-1616), 
filed by Perkins; 
2. Motion to Amend the Judgment in Favor of Frampton to 
Include Additional Attorneys' Fees (R. 1309-1311), filed by 
Frampton; and 
3. Supplemental Affidavit of Attorney Fees (R. 1497-
1501), filed by First General requesting attorneys' fees and costs 
in addition to those awarded by the jury. 
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A hearing on all post-trial motions, including the award of 
fees and costs to First General, was held on August 5, 1992 (R. 
5112-5172) . At the end of oral argument, the trial court ruled on 
each of the motions from the bench, finding that: 
1. Perkins's Motion for a New Trial was 
denied; 
2. Perkins's Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict was granted in part and 
denied in part; 
3. The jury award of $52,522.53 against 
Perkins in favor of First General for attorneys' 
fees and costs was reduced to $10,658.47; 
4. First General's Motion to Amend the 
Judgment to include additional attorneys' fees was 
denied; 
5. First General was ordered to pay the 
judgment entered in favor of Frampton and against 
Zandra Perkins, including attorneys' fees under the 
mechanic's lien statute; 
6. Frampton's Motion to Amend his judgment 
to include additional attorneys' fees incurred in 
defending against Perkins's claims for negligence 
was denied; and 
7. Costs were to be limited to filing fees 
and deposition costs for opposing parties and 
opposing parties' expert witnesses. 
R. 1774-1779, 5168. 
The trial court entered a Final Order and Judgment 
incorporating its bench ruling, over objections of First General, 
on September 3, 1993 (R. 1774-1779). First General appealed from 
that order (R. 1796-1799). Both Perkins and Frampton filed timely 
cross appeals on October 6, 1993 and October 18, 1993 respectively 
(R. 1801-1803, 1809-1813). 
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III. Statement of Facts, 
A. Comments on First General's Statement of Facts, 
First General, in its appellate brief, sets forth certain 
facts in 27 numbered paragraphs. Perkins objects to the following 
of those facts. 
1. Paragraphs 8 through 10 of First General's Facts 
imply that Perkins's complaints regarding First General's work were 
directly tied to First General's alleged refusal to comply with 
Perkins's request to convert the carport to a garage and bill the 
insurance company for that work. The facts do not bear this out. 
Much earlier in the project, Perkins's sister, Smith, expressed 
concern on a number of occasions about the quality and price of 
wallpaper and carpeting which First General proposed to put in the 
remodelled house (R. 2883-2885). Moreover, work in earnest did not 
begin until July. First General's president and owner, Peterson, 
testified that he did not secure a building permit until June 8 or 
9 and that he did not begin work on Perkins's home until he knew 
that Bear River would pay for the work (R. 2890) . It stands to 
reason, therefore, that the majority of complaints did not occur 
until the last part of July. 
2. First General, in Paragraph 13 of its Facts, claims 
that Perkins instructed Bear River "to not pay any additional 
monies to First General." This statement is incorrect and 
misleading. Perkins and her sister informed Bear River that it 
should not pay any contractors without their authorization (R. 
3958-3959). 
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3. First General, in a footnote to Paragraph 19, 
provides a compendium of anecdotes regarding previous litigation 
involving Perkins which was tried before Judge Wilkinson• None of 
the information in the footnote is relevant to this action and, 
accordingly, should be ignored by this Court. 
4. In Paragraph 22, First General represents that the 
sole reason for providing testimony to the jury on attorneys' fees 
was because of Perkins's insistence. This is incorrect. Counsel 
for the parties acknowledged that any award of attorneys' fees made 
pursuant to the contract between First General and Perkins should 
go to the jury (R. 3492-3496). 
B. Statement of Undisputed Material Facts Regarding Issues 
Raised by Perkins. 
5. On the first morning of trial, counsel for Perkins, 
Robert Campbell ("Campbell"), again raised the issue set forth in 
the Motion in Limine, namely, whether the court would allow 
statements to be made to the jury about Perkins intentionally 
setting fire to her previous home (R. 5184-5185). After the jury 
was impanelled, Campbell brought up this problem for a second time 
(R. 5278-5286). In response to Campbell's objections regarding 
such testimony, Henry Heath ("Heath"), counsel for Bear River 
stated: 
First of a i l , we do not intend to ask her or to say, in 
opening statement, that she has ever admitted that she 
intentionally set the fire, but we intend to ask questions 
exactly as they are on the deposition. 
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6. Bear River's counsel, in opening argument, then 
proceeded to do exactly what he said he would not do: 
She [Perkins] did work selling Living Scriptures in 
California and in Arizona in '89 and '90, and she 
was in Arizona selling Living Scriptures at the 
time of this fire. 
So this is one picture, one snippet of information 
concerning Zandra Perkins. 
There's also another Zandra Perkins who also admitted in 
her deposition that she set a home on fire on Hillsden 
Drive, a home she owned at the time, in 1987, and that 
she had a fire that she was not involved in in March of 90 
in the same area. Actually it was a shed off the side of 
this carport. 
I don't want you to misconstrue what I have just told you. 
It's not Bear River's position, never has been its position, 
that they had evidence that Zandra Perkins set this fire 
involving this case. The evidence is she was in Arizona at 
the time. 
7. After opening statements, Campbell objected to 
Heath's statements regarding the previous fire: 
Your honor, with regard to the statement of Mr. 
Heath to the jury, as it relates to the contention 
that Ms. Perkins had set a fire earlier at a 
different house, at an earlier time in 1987, Mr. 
Heath did exactly what we had suggested to the court that 
we were fearful they were going to do: number one, raise 
the issue; then secondly say it had nothing to do with any 
issue in the case. 
And what Mr. Heath said is very clear, 
Judge: There's no doubt, it was not equivocal. He 
stated that there was a statement by Ms. Perkins with 
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regard to setting a fire on a Hillsden Drive home in 1987, 
but he said Bear River — and this is almost a quote, 
. . . but "Bear River set aside this 1987 fire and 
adjusted this claim as any other claim." 
R. 5324. 
8. In opening argument, Bear River's counsel also 
claimed that Perkins was guilty of fraud, leaving the jury with the 
impression that insurance fraud was an issue in this case: 
Then we get into an area of fraud, and we maintain in this 
area that in fact some of that happened . . . and we 
believed that that demonstrated actual fraud on her 
[Perkins's] part and an attempt to defraud the insurance 
company. 
R. 2 8 3 8 . 
. . . She [Perkins] knew that she was doing something that 
was fraudulent, and the court will instruct you as 
to what our burden of proof is and just what we 
have to do to convince you of that fact. 
R. 2840. 
Let me mention to you, if I may, an area where we believe 
the real fraud exists in this case, not that it doesn't in 
others. . . . 
Now with regard to the dwelling, we believe there is 
significant fraudulent claims with regard to the dwelling. 
• • • 
R. 2 8 4 6 . 
But the evidence will show that Bear River has not 
received, in any form of documentation, even from Mr. 
Rasmussen who's going t o come in here and t e s t i f y 
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what he believes the value of the claim is, a claim 
which is free of fraud, . . . 
R. 2848. 
9. Counsel for First General, during cross examination 
of Perkins, asked the following question: 
Ms. Perkins, you had a fire in your home on 
Hillsden, the home you owned on Hillsden drive in 
Salt Lake City, didn't you, in or about 1987? 
R. 3172-3173. 
After an objection by Perkins's counsel and a discussion between 
the judge and counsel out of the hearing of the jury (R. 3173-
3175), the court overruled the objection and had Bostwick restate 
the question: 
Q: (by Mr. Bostwick) In or about 1987, you had a 
fire at your home that you owned on Hillsden Drive 
in Salt Lake City, Utah didn't you? 
R. 3175. 
10. Later, Bear River's counsel, Heath, asked Perkins 
about her role in the Hillsden fire: 
Q: Now also in your deposition, you recall admitting 
that you had a prior fire in 1987 at another residence; is 
that right? 
A: Y e s . 
Q: That you admitted you set the fire on that residence on 
Hillsden Drive? 
R. 3499. 
Perkins's counsel again objected to the question but was overruled. 
Heath continued with his questioning: 
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Q: Didn't you admit in your deposition that you set the 
fire in '87? 
A: That fire was caused by some carelessness by 
me. 
Q: Didn't you in fact say in your deposition that you set 
the fire? 
A: I don't recall the words. 
Q: You were asked why you set the fire and you said, "I 
don't know"? 
A: The fire wasn't intentional, if that's your 
question. 
Q: That's not my question. I never asked that question. 
I asked if you didn't say, in your deposition, that you 
didn't know why you set the fire. 
A: I could have, I don't recall. 
Q: Now Bear River's never claimed that you set the fire 
in May of '90 have they? 
Perkins's counsel objected and was sustained. Heath, in response, 
asked essentially the same question yet again: 
Q: Well, has Bear River ever said anything to you that 




11. Richard Dio ("Dio"), Bear River's first adjuster on 
Perkins's claim, was asked about the relationship of the origin of 
the May 1990 Fire to his adjustment of the claim: 
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Q: Now it's true . . . there was not any aspect of 
this question as to how the fire started; in other 
words, the origin of the fire that was playing a 
part of [sic] your adjustment of this claim, was 
there? 
A: No, 
Q: And that remained the same all the way from the 
end of May all the way up through the time when you 
left this job; isn't that true? 
A: That's right. 
Q: In other words, the question of how the fire started or 
who started it did not play—have anything to do with the 
efficiency or time frame in which you adjusted this claim, 
true? 
A: That's true. 
12. During Bear River's case in chief, Heath called 
Donald M. White, the former loss services manager for Bear River, 
and asked the following series of questions: 
Q: Did information come to you the very next day [May 
25, 1990] that the insured had had a prior fire? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did that fact affect the manner in which Bear River 
handled this claim? 
A: No. 
Q: Did they consider the fact there was an 
insurance—excuse me, a fire investigation taking 
place? Did they consider that either rejecting or 
denying or reducing the claim of Zandra Perkins? 
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A: I do not believe so. 
R. 4288, 4291-4292. 
13. On the ninth day of trial (April 30) Bear River's 
counsel called Keith W. Hall, Jr. ("Hall") to the stand. Hall, a 
Captain with the Murray City Fire Department, was involved in 
investigating the May 1990 Fire (R. 4419-4420). Heath questioned 
Hall as follows: 
Q: Moving quickly along, did you determine that origin 
of the fire was of a suspicious nature? 
A: That's correct. 
R. 4420. 
Perkins's counsel immediately objected on the basis that neither 
the origin of the fire nor who set the fire were at issue. The 
objection was overruled (R. 4421). Heath continued his 
questioning: 
Mr. Heath: . . . Was this fire investigated as a suspicious 
fire? 
A: After I had—did the initial investigation, I did list it as 
a suspicious fire yes. 
Q: Did that cause a period of time for your 
investigation to proceed? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: Did you learn as a part of your investigation, 
Captain Hall, that in fact at the time of the fire 
that Zandra Perkins was in Tempe, Arizona? 
A: Yes, I learned from a next door neighbor that 
she was in Tempe, Arizona at the time. 
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Q: . • . Did you have communications with Mr, Dick 
Dio [the first adjuster on Perkins's claim] of Bear 
River concerning the owner of the premises? 
A: I did talk to Mr. Dio. I'm not absolutely sure 
on the date, but it was in that time frame, yes. 
Q: Did you have occasion to inform him that Zandra 
Perkins had a record of a previous fire—. 
Mr. Campbell: Wait a minute. I object to that, 
your Honor, and would ask that that question be 
stricken and the jury admonished to disregard it. 
That is not within the prism of what this court 
talked about, and I want to make a motion in 
connection with it outside the presence of the 
jury. 
The Court: I have ruled on this matter. I would 
overrule the objection. 
Q: (by Mr. Heath) Do you recall the question? 
A: Yes. Yes, I did hear there was a previous fire. 
R. 4421-4423. Heath did not question Hall further regarding 
previous fires. 
14. During closing argument, counsel for First General, 
Bostwick, gratuitously reminded the jury of the previous fire in 
Perkins,s Hillsden home, ostensibly to argue that First General had 
not breached its contract with Perkins when it failed to obtain a 
construction bond (R. 4697). 
15. At the August 5, 1993 hearing on post-trial motions, 
the court, in discussing the admission of evidence on the Hillsden 
Fire, stated as follows: 
I don't know what impact that [the admission of 
evidence regarding the Hillsden fire] had on the 
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jury. I do know that, as it came in, the impact it 
had on the court was a lot less than this court 
anticipated it would be, the way Mr. Heath went at it 
and passed Over it; that it almost, to this court— 
this court did not have—it did not have any impact 
at all. . . . 
. . . I probably also would state that under the small 
area that it was brought in on, if I had known that that's 
all they were going to use it for, I probably wouldn't have 
allowed it, because to me it was just not significant. 
R. 5160-5161. 
C. Statement of Undisputed Material Facts Regarding Issues 
Raised by First General. 
The following additional facts are relevant to First General7s 
appeal of the award by the trial court of attorneys' fees: 
16. The "Access and Authorization" card signed by 
Perkins contained the following provision: 
I hereby agree that if it is necessary for First 
General Services to pursue legal action to collect the 
above amount, I assume liability for any and all 
reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs. 
(Emphasis added.) 
(R. 1708.) 
17. In assessing the reasonableness of First General's 
request for attorneys' fees, the trial court reviewed the affidavit 
of First General's counsel in which he set forth the number of 
hours worked by each attorney and paralegal in his office (R. 
5159) . After reviewing the affidavit, the court expressed that it 
had considerable concern regarding the expenditure of so many hours 
on the case (R. 5159, 5162). 
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18. The court emphatically stated that the fees 
requested by First General's counsel were "just not reasonable." 
In support of this conclusion, the court noted that it did not 
believe the attorneys' fees testified to during trial were 
reasonable, particularly in light of the amount of First General's 
claim at issue (R. 5163, 5170). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion when it permitted 
counsel for Bear River and First General to introduce evidence (1) 
that a 1987 fire at Perkins's Hillsden residence had been 
intentionally set by Perkins; (2) that the May 1990 Fire was 
suspicious in nature and/or had been intentionally set; and (3) 
that one of the issues in this case was insurance fraud and that 
Perkins had committed fraud during her dealings with Bear River. 
This evidence, in addition to be irrelevant, was highly 
inflammatory and introduced for improper purposes. When considered 
collectively, these cumulative errors not only confused the jury as 
to the issues before it, but had an unfairly prejudicial effect on 
the jury. Because of the impact this evidence must have had on the 
jury, this Court should remand for a new trial. 
The trial court also erred when it did not limit the award of 
attorneys' fees to First General to those fees associated solely 
with its principal cause of action. Under Utah law, attorneys' 
fees may only be award if provided for by statute or by contract, 
and then only in accordance with the terms of the contract or the 
statutory language. Here, neither the contract nor the Mechanic's 
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Lien Statute allowed First General to seek and attorneys' fee award 
for defense of counterclaims. Rather, it was only entitled to 
those fees and costs associated with foreclosure of its lien and/or 
collection of amounts due under its contract. Because First 
General failed to meet its burden of proof of separating fees 
associated with prosecuting its principal claim, it is not entitled 
to any fee award at all. Accordingly, this Court should hold that 
First General is not entitled to any award of costs and fees. 
Finally, assuming, for the sake of argument, that First 
General is entitled to attorneys' fees, the trial court properly 
used its discretion to reduce the jury award of fees and costs of 
$52,522.53 to $10,658.47. In making this reduction, the trial 
court acted within its discretion, evaluated relevant factors in 
making the reduction and made the requisite findings to support its 
decision to reduce the jury award. This Court should hold that if 
First General is entitled to an award of fees and costs at all, it 
is only entitled to the $10,658.47 awarded by the trial court. 
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PERKINS'S APPEAL: 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF A 
PRIOR FIRE IN 1987 AT PERKINS'S HILLSDEN RESIDENCE AND 
EVIDENCE THAT THE MAY 1990 FIRE WAS INTENTIONALLY SET 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Allowing Evidence of the 1987 
Hillsden Fire. 
The trial court permitted Bear River to introduce evidence 
that a 1987 fire at Perkins's Hillsden residence had been 
intentionally set by Perkins, ruling that this evidence constituted 
a defense to Perkins's claim of bad faith. The trial court's 
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ruling depended, however, on Bear River's representations that the 
sole purpose for the introduction of this evidence was to show that 
Bear River had not acted in bad faith in adjusting Perkins's 
claims. This ruling was in error and the error was exacerbated by 
Bear River's disingenuous failure to use the evidence for the 
purpose which it assured the trial court it would use it. Indeed, 
the trial court acknowledged that had it known how the evidence 
would be used, it probably would not have allowed its introduction 
(Perkins Facts 5 11). 
1. Evidence of the Hillsden Fire Was Irrelevant and 
Should Have Been Excluded By the Trial Court. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence permit the admission of any 
relevant evidence, except as otherwise provided by the United 
States Constitution, by the Constitution of the State of Utah, by 
statute or by the rules of evidence or other applicable rules. 
Utah R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probably than it 
would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. 
Both Bear River and First General advanced several reasons why 
evidence of the previous fire and Perkins's involvement with 
causing it was relevant. All are specious. Bear River first 
claims that it had knowledge of the previous fire and that this 
knowledge, in light of the fact that it adjusted Perkins's claim 
the same as any other claim (Perkins's Facts fj[ 11-12) shows it 
acted in good faith. But this defense is based on the unstated 
assumption that Bear River, after learning of the previous fire, 
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made a conscious decision to discount the fact of that fire. This 
is not what happened at all. The first adjuster on Perkins's 
claim, Richard Dio, testified that his knowledge that Perkins's 
Hillsden home had been damaged by fire in 1987 was essentially 
ignored and that it did not affect the manner in which he adjusted 
the claim (Perkins's Facts J 11). This was confirmed by First 
General's former loss services manager, Donald White (Perkins Facts 
5 12). Neither testified that they discussed the earlier fire with 
anyone in the company and then decided to process Perkins's claim 
like any other. 
Bear River also argued at one point that evidence of the 
Hillsden fire was admissible to prove that Perkins is not a novice 
to fire litigation. Yet Perkins's Hillsden home was not insured 
for fire in 1987 and restoration of the home did not involve either 
an insurance company or an insurance claim (R. 974). Thus, this 
previous fire could not in any way show that Perkins somehow knew 
her way around the insurance claim game as Bear River wanted the 
jury to believe. On the other hand, if Bear River and First 
General wanted to show that Perkins had experience dealing with 
contractors and with restoration work, that evidence could have 
appropriately been presented to the jury without any reference to 
the fact that Perkins allegedly admitted starting the fire at her 
Hillsden home. They could have simply asked her about previous 
reconstruction and restoration work on her Hillsden home and about 
her dealings with the contractor who performed that work or, 
alternatively, asked her about restoration work after the Hillsden 
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fire without alluding to the cause of the fire. This, of course, 
was not the real reason why Bear River and First General wanted the 
evidence admitted. Rather, it was admitted for improper purposes, 
that is, for its inflammatory and unfairly prejudicial effect on 
the jury and to suggest that Perkins was an arsonist. This Court 
should hold that evidence of the Hillsden fire was irrelevant to 
the causes of action before the jury and that it was error to admit 
such prejudicial evidence. 
2. Evidence of the Hillsden Fire, Even if Relevant, 
Should Have Been Excluded As Prejudicial and 
Misleading. 
Relevant evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, . . . " Utah R. 
Evid. 403. 
Because most evidence presented by one party will presumably 
be prejudicial to the other, in the sense that it favors the party 
introducing the evidence and damages the opposing party's case, 
Rule 403 requires that the evidence sought to be excluded threaten 
unfair prejudice. Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile 
Institution, 605 P.2d 314, 322-324 (Utah 1979) overruled on other 
grounds; McFarland v. Skaaas Cos.. Inc.. 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984); 
United States v. Medina. 755 F.2d 1269, 1274 (7th Cir. 1985). 
Unfair prejudice is the "likelihood that the evidence will induce 
the jury to decide the case on an improper basis, commonly an 
emotional one, rather than on the evidence presented" that is 
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relevant to the issue properly tie fore the jury. Medina, 755 F 2d 
at 1274, See also, Fed Evid. 403 Advisory Committee note. 
Utah courts have uniformly held that evidence should be 
excluded if it " ' appeals to the ) ury ' s s y uipa th i ef,, a rouses i !;.s 
sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise' 
, , . cause[s] a jur y to base its decision on something other than 
the established propositions in the case.11 ing State v. 
Maurer, 77 0 P. 2d 98.1 984 (Utah 19 89) "Where improper evidence is 
admitted "and there is a reasonable likelihood that in the absence 
of such error a different result would have eventuated, the error 
should be regarded as prejudicial and relief should be granted." 
Joseph v. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 318 P. 2d 3 3 0, 
333 (Utah 1957). 
EiiJ e 4 03 requires the trial court to undertake a balancing 
test: "The balancing test of Rule 403 thus excludes 'matter [sic] 
of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for 
--.;!.• • its prejudicial effect.'11 State v. Bart ley, 784 P. 2d 
1231, 1237 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citation omitted). A better 
example of this sort of evidence than the Hillsden fire is 
difficult. imagine. The probative value of introducing evidence 
of the Hillsden fire was nil. Balanced against this was the danger 
of enormous prejudice. 
inject highly prejudicial evidence into the trial. The ruling was 
in error because even as delineated by Bear River, the evidence did 
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at issue—Bear River's good faith adjustment of the claim—any more 
or less probable. Bear River contended that it had knowledge of 
the Hillsden fire when it was adjusting Perkins's claim from the 
May 1990 Fire. Despite this knowledge, according to Bear River, it 
nevertheless proceeded to adjust Perkins's loss fairly. The 
argument is entirely circular: Bear River claims that the fact of 
the Hillsden fire was immaterial to its conduct, and to prove this, 
it should be allowed to introduce irrelevant evidence. If 
knowledge of the prior fire indeed played no part in Bear River's 
adjustment of Perkins's later claim, then such knowledge, for that 
very reason, was irrelevant. Carried to its logical conclusion, 
Bear River's rationale would permit every litigant in a case where 
the litigant's good faith is at issue to introduce any damaging 
evidence against an opposing party for the purpose of showing that 
such evidence played no part in the litigant's conduct. In other 
words, Bear River sought to introduce evidence of a fact that was 
irrelevant to its conduct in order to prove its irrelevance. This 
"logic" effectively eviscerates the protection offered by Rules 401 
and 402, Utah R. Evid. 
The trial court relied heavily, perhaps exclusively, on Bear 
River's contention that evidence of the Hillsden fire was 
admissible to show an absence of bad faith. As argued above, the 
evidence had no probative value on that particular issue. Even 
accepting, however, that Bear River's assertion that knowledge of 
the previous fire was relevant to the issue of bad faith, Bear 
River never linked this evidence to its defense. Instead, Bear 
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River alluded to the Hillsden fire :i i i openi ng ai: g i iiiiei it (Perkins 
Facts f 2) , elicited certain facts about the fire from Perkins 
during cross-examination (Perkins Facts 55 5-6) and then let i t sit 
before the jury without explanal ion, Lack i nq any t I ear qu i dam • 
regarding the nexus between the use of this inflammatory evidence 
and its relevance to a good faith defense, the jury was left to 
draw wholly impermissible conclusions about Perk i ns :>i it her 
character. 
The fact that both Bear River and First General eluded to the 
Hillsden fire from time to time throughout the jur y tri a] wit" 
ever tying i t I n any specific way to Bear River's defense 
Perkins's bad faith claim can only be construed as attempts on 
part of opposing counsel to insure that the Hillsden fire was never 
fai : from tl le minds of members of the jury (See Perkins's Facts 55 
2, 5, 6, 7, 9, " "M . Furthermore, Bear River-- the party who claimed 
that knowledge ui une Hillsden fire was so important t .< : » :ii ts 
defense—never bothered to mention the fire during closing w h e r e — 
if the evidence had been admitted for proper purposes—it would 
have been appropriate to link Bear River's knowledge of the fire to 
its flefeniae '"Hi is I a i lure confirms that evidence of the previous 
fire had nothing at all to do with Bear River's allegedly good 
faith adjustment <-•! Perkins's claim. 
This Com"! r'ulc I liat evidence of f he Hillsden file was 
highly inflammatory and prejudicial and that the sole purpose for 
introducing it :i nto evidence could only have been . mproper 
purposes Thi s Colli: t shou] d fi 11 ther 1: 10] d that tl: u . :our t 
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committed reversible error in permitting such evidence to be 
presented to the jury and, accordingly, should remand for a new 
trial. 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Allowing Evidence That the May 
1990 Fire was Intentionally Set. 
The trial court further erred in permitting Bear River to 
introduce evidence that the May 1990 Fire was either intentionally 
set or that it was suspicious. Although the trial court properly 
ruled there was no evidence that Perkins had anything to do with 
the May 1990 Fire, it nevertheless permitted Bear River to elicit 
testimony that the May 1990 Fire was "suspicious" as long as it did 
not ask questions about who set the fire. 
That this evidence was gratuitous and without probative value 
is exemplified by the testimony of Keith Hall from the Murray Fire 
Department (R. 4419-4420). Hall was apparently called to testify 
about his recollections of the extent of smoke damage in Perkins's 
home. Yet, before he was questioned about this damage, he was 
asked—for no apparent reason—about the suspicious nature of the 
fire. This evidence was never used in anyway by Bear River 
afterwards in support of its claims or defenses (Perkins's Facts f 
13). In addition, no explanation was given the jury about why the 
evidence was ever permitted to be presented. The jury, we may 
infer, used this evidence (along with the evidence of the Hillsden 
fire) to reach the conclusion Bear River wanted it to reach—that 
Perkins started fires, and that she was responsible for the May 
1990 Fire. Bear River was thus able to neatly circumvent the 
court's ruling that no evidence or testimony regarding Perkins's 
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in vo 1 vemen t i i i 11 i e May 1990 Fire woi 11 ci be a dm i s s i ble. Instead, 
what transpired was precisely what Perkins feared: the introduction 
and subsequent impermissible use of irrelevant, highly prejudicial 
e v i d e n c e by t h e |ury lur ••-, -*•"• . - D D S P S , Tin.' VPI y evidence 1 hie 
court ruled inadmissible got . implication just as Bear River 
and First General hoped• 
Wj^^.j1 ^.jle ^ r^a^ C o u r t # s ruling effectively neutral i zed 11, y 
evidence of the Hi 1] sden fire, along with evidence that the May 
1990 Fire was "suspicious" and therefore probably intentionally 
set, the jury predictably concluded that Perkjns must hav^ been 
involved in setting the May 1990 Fire even though she was not in 
Salt Lake City when the fi re began, even though she was never 
accused of being involved i n star ti 1 lg the f i re arid ev en thoi igl 1 tit le 
suspicious nature of the fire was never an i ssue i 11 this case. 
From this inflammatory evidence, the jury could easily have 
inferred that Perkins lacked credibility with respect ,e 
of; the? Ma^ '" 1-9 9(1 Fire and that she could not be trusted on other 
issues as well 
Evidence that the May 1990 Fire was
 S U Spj_ cj_ o u s o r 
intentionally set was not probative of anv issue before the jury. 
The sole reason for its introduction was *A- prejudice the jury and 
hope that would use the evidence for improper purposes. Thi s is 
precise! - :! t ci i ci Th :i s C01 11: t shou] <l ho J <l that ev 1 dunce of tl: le 
May 1990 Fire was err or and, accordingly, that this case should be 
remanded for a new tr ial. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING BEAR RIVER'S 
COUNSEL TO IMPLY THAT INSURANCE FRAUD ON THE PART 
OF PERKINS WAS AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Permitting Bear River's Counsel 
to Imply that Insurance Fraud was an Issue in this Case 
and that Perkins was Guilty of Insurance Fraud, 
The test for determining whether improper comments by counsel 
mandate reversal or remand is whether the comments are of such a 
nature that they "impair calm and dispassionate consideration by 
the jury." Allstate Ins. Co. v. James, 845 F.2d 315, 318 (11th 
Cir. 1988). "'[P]leas plainly designed to elicit sympathy or to 
inspire passion or prejudice should not be allowed.'" Donohue v. 
Intermountain Health Care. Inc., 748 P.2d 1067, 1068 (Utah 1987), 
citing, Eager v. Willis. 17 Utah 2d 314, 320, 410 P.2d 1003, 1007 
(1966). 
In opening argument, Bear River's counsel made repeated 
statements to the effect that Perkins was guilty of actual fraud, 
that her conduct was fraudulent, that "real fraud" existed in the 
case, that Perkins's claims were "fraudulent claims" and, indeed, 
that all claims submitted by Perkins were fraudulent (Perkins Facts 
f 4) . Counsel went so far as to inform the jury that the court 
would instruct it about Bear River's burden of proof regarding 
Perkins's fraudulent conduct. Perkins's counsel strongly objected 
to the references to fraud and moved for mistrial, pointing out to 
the judge that insurance fraud had never been and was not an issue 
in the case (R. 2852, 2854, 5327). As an alternative but less 
effective remedy for counsel's misstatements regarding issues in 
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^.jie c a s e^ Perkins's C Ounsel requested ai: :i aci'v :i sor y statement to the 
jury instructing i+• +-Q disregard that part of the opening statement 
which discussed insurance fraud and further inform it that no issue 
QL
 i r a u cj had been raised (R. 5 J Z / ) . The cc . J »t i 
for mistrial but expressed concerned over ^ a: trie terms 
"fraud" and "insurance fraud" (R. -.?,*. • ,r4 asked for 
submission of cases and later ruled tnat tne term - •* tot 
to be used" (R. 3112). Nevertheless, the court refused * i dvise 
the jury that insurance fraud was not an issue in the case ''The 
court requested counsel to agree upon language to be read to the 
jury, and an agreed-upon statement was later read in open court (R, 
3221-3222). 
Given the fact that neither fraud nor insurance fraud (a crime 
under Utah s Insurance Fraud Act, Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-31-3 01 et 
seq.) were at issue in this case, counsel 's repeated comments 
during opening statement about fraud, fraudulent conduct and 
insurance fraud were clearly improper. There is little question 
that these comments could have prejudiced the jurors against 
Perkins from the outset, even before she had the opportunity to put 
ier case Coi inseJ Jl" s remarks may be construed as being motivated 
by a desire to Inflame the jury and have it rendei :- emotional 
decision against Perkins. These remarks *a\\ *- 1 within t .he 
def in i f.ioiii of improjMM statements, st f*+-^(»f . ,- . ^signed tc 
elicit sympathy or to inspire passion prejudice" i the minds of 
the jury. The statement read by the court u^ uic. jury tk w ^ ^ J 
.1 a t e i wa s I r »o I i t t \r
 t in >o I a t e. 
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B. The Trial Courts Initial Error was Compounded by Later 
Statements Which Served to Confuse the Jury Regarding the 
Issue of Insurance Fraud, 
Although an allegedly curative statement was read to the jury, 
advising it that the issue of "fraud" was not a part of the trial, 
the court never made clear to the jury that fraud, as a cause of 
action, was legally different from "misrepresentations." By the 
time the curative statement was read (R. 3221-3222), it is highly 
likely that the jury was thoroughly confused about the issues. 
This confusion was later exacerbated when the trial court reversed 
itself, ruling that the issue of fraud should go to the jury—a 
ruling that came only after all testimony had been presented (R. 
4679-4680). This left Perkins without the opportunity to focus on 
the fraud issue and craft questions to elicit facts showing she had 
not committed fraud. More importantly, the reversal by the trial 
court could only have left the jury more confused than before about 
what the issues were in the case. 
To make matters worse, a wrong jury instruction was 
inadvertently read to the jury, stating that "there was alleged 
fraudulent conduct on behalf of or on the part of Ms. Perkins as 
far as making an insurance claim" (R. 4694). After reading all of 
the instructions, the court realized there was a problem with Jury 
Instruction 10 and it corrected itself, indicating to the jury that 
Instruction No. 10 had to do with "burden of proof." The trial 
court further instructed the jury "there is no allegation that 
there was any fraudulent conduct on her [Perkins's] part as far as 
making any type of insurance claim. That has been cleared up 
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b e f o r e, a i i :i 11 i a t s 1 1 o i 1 ] c:i i i o t 1 i a ^  'r e b e e i l r e a d t o y o x I ' * "- ;) . 
Given the level of confusion which must have then existed in ine 
minds of the jury regarding the existence nonexistence of a 
la iin what exact 1 y const i I-uteri " fr a w h e t h e r "fraud" 
was different from "insurance fraud," the court should have granted 
Perkins's motion for a new trial. 
C. Even If Erroneous Evidentiary Rulings, Standing Alone, 
Are Insufficient to Justify Reversal, the Cumulative 
Effect of These Errors Affected Perkins's Substantial 
Rights. 
Even i f this Court were to hold that all of the evidentiary 
rulings discussed above, standing alone, may be insufficient to 
justify reversal, the cumulative effect ot these
 r u i i n g S affected 
the outcome o* tb*> ^ase and,,, swayed the jury to rule against 
Perkins. See, Malek v. Federal Ins. Co. . 994 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 
1993) . Had opposing counsel merely mentioned f r aud or the 
suspicious nature of the May 1990 Fire or the intentional burning 
of Perkins's Hillsden home one time only, the remark may not have 
been error. However, the prejudicial effect of this cumulative 
error was exacerbated by the fact that opposing counsel managed, to 
keep these three matters alive in the minds of the jury throughout 
trial by their continued references to the Hillsden fire, the 
s u s p i c i o u s iiatuiip o! the Hay I "run K i re ami the possibility nl 
insurance fraud. Because counsel dwelled on this evidence, with 
its inferences regarding Perkins's character, her motives and her 
a 1 L e q t M ! C O I J I S I J t»I i :< i n H h i d i m p I y i IKJ ii .son , I'MI k i m . w a s e t f e c t i v e 1 y 
denied the right, to 1 lave the jury wei gh the evidence impartially. 
In many instances, the questions asked about these matters during 
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trial were unsupported by anything except the form and substance of 
the questions themselves. See, State v. Herrera, 8 Utah 2d 188, 
330 P.2d 1086, 1087 (Utah 1958). 
Because of the cumulative error in evidentiary rulings and the 
effect of the evidence introduced pursuant to these rulings, this 
Court should hold that these errors effectively robbed Perkins of 
a fair and impartial trial and, accordingly, should remand to the 
trial court for a new trial. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT LIMIT THE AWARD 
TO FIRST GENERAL OF ATTORNEYS' FEES TO THOSE FEES ASSOCIATED 
WITH ITS PRINCIPAL CAUSE OF ACTION 
A. First General was Entitled Only to Fees and Costs 
Incurred in Prosecuting Its Principal Claim Against 
Perkins. 
Under Utah law, attorneys' fees may only be awarded if 
provided for by statute or by contract. The Utah Supreme Court, in 
Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Cox. 627 P. 2d 62, 66 (Utah 
1981), held that: 
[a] party is therefore entitled only to those fees 
resulting from its principal cause of action for 
which there is a contractual (or statutory) 
obligation for attorneys' fees. (Emphasis added). 
See also, Turtle Management. Inc. v. Haggis Management. Inc., 645 
P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982); Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 
266, 269 (Utah 1992). 
If a fee award is made pursuant to the terms of a contract, 
the award "is allowed only in accordance with the terms of the 
contract." Turtle Management v. Haggis. 645 P.2d at 671; accord 
Cottonwood Mall v. Sine. 830 P.2d at 269; Equitable Life and 
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Casualty Ins, Co, v, Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) . In other words, "the contractual liability for payment of 
attorneys' fees extends only to the amount necessary for the 
enforcement of the contract . . • " Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 
601, 604 (Utah 1978), citing Stubbs v. Hemmert. 657 P.2d 168 (Utah 
1977). See also, Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269-
270 (Utah 1992); Imperial-Yuma Production Credit Ass'n v. Hunter, 
609 P.2d 1329, 1331-1332 (Utah 1980). Only where the explicit 
language of the contract provides that a party is entitled to 
attorneys' fees incurred in the "pursuit or defense of an action" 
can a party be awarded all fees incurred in an action irrespective 
of whether expended in enforcing the contract or defending 
counterclaims. Id. at 1331 (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, any fees awarded by the trial court—if 
awarded pursuant to a contractual provision—had to have been made 
pursuant to the "Access and Authorization" card which contains a 
provision for attorneys' fees. The Access and Authorization card 
states: 
I hereby agree that if it is necessary for First 
General Services to pursue legal action to collect 
the above amounts, I assume liability for any and 
all reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Perkins's Facts 5 12. 
The contract provides only for award of reasonable attorneys' fees 
and costs to First General for pursuing a legal action to collect 
amounts owed or allegedly owed by Perkins. The language does not 
provide for an award of fees and costs incurred in defending 
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counterclaims brought against it by Perkins. Accordingly, under 
well established Utah law, First General is entitled only to 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs directly attributable to time 
spent in collecting amounts owed. 
If a fee is awarded pursuant to statute, the same rule which 
obtains for an award made pursuant to a contract applies, that is, 
the fee award is limited to fees expended to enforce the 
lienholder's rights pursuant to the statute. Utah's Mechanic's 
Lien Statute provides in pertinent part as follows: 
In any action brought to enforce any lien under 
this Chapter the successful party shall be entitled 
to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed 
by the court, which shall be taxed as cost in the 
action. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18. 
The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that the plaintiff in a 
foreclosure action must allocate fees between those for which he is 
entitled to reimbursement pursuant to statute and those incurred in 
defending any counterclaim. Stubbs v. Hemmert. 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 
1977) . A plaintiff cannot recover fees expended in defending a 
counterclaim and, indeed, is entitled to no fees at all where 
plaintiff fails to "provide enough proof to enable the court to 
distinguish the portion of plaintiff's fees in prosecuting the 
complaint from the portion spent in defending the counterclaim." 
Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Vallev Dairy Ass'n. 657 P.2d 1279, 1288 
(Utah 1982), relying upon Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Cox. 
This Court should hold that the trial court erred when it failed to 
base its award on fees and costs directly attributable to those 
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expended to enforce its lienholder's rights pursuant to the 
Mechanic's Lien Statute and/or to time expended in collecting 
amounts owed, pursuant to its contractual arrangement with Perkins. 
B. First General Did Not Provide Competent Evidence As to 
Fees and Costs Expended to Enforce Its Contract and/or 
Lien and. Accordingly, Is Not Entitled to Attorneys' Fees 
and Costs. 
In Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 
(Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court's ruling 
that each party must pay its own attorneys' fees. The basis for 
this holding was the fact that plaintiff failed to meet its burden 
of proof by separating fees expended in prosecuting its complaint 
from those spent in defending counterclaims and failed to present 
competent evidence of hours expended on each. The Cox court held 
that because of this failure, plaintiff was not entitled to any fee 
award. 
In the case now before this Court, First General's claim to 
attorneys' fees derives either from the "Access and Authorization" 
card or the Mechanic's Lien Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18. 
First General, like the plaintiff in Cox, has similarly failed to 
meet its burden of differentiating between fees associated with its 
efforts to foreclose its mechanic's lien and those expended in 
defense of Perkins four counterclaims. First General's counsel, 
Bostwick, merely testified before the jury as to the total fees and 
costs incurred through the second day of trial (R. 4819-4843) . The 
amount given the jury for fees and costs was $50,627.35. No 
attempt was made by counsel to allocate this amount as required by 
Utah law. 
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This failure on the part of First General to meets it 
allocation burden mandates that this Court reverse the trial 
court's determination that First General be awarded $10,627 and 
hold that First General is not entitled to any fee award at all. 
ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO FIRST GENERAL'S APPEAL; 
POINT I 
ASSUMING, FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT, FIRST GENERAL IS 
ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
USED ITS DISCRETION TO REDUCE THE JURY AWARD 
First General's entire appeal of the attorney's fees award is 
premised on the faulty assumption that it is entitled to all fees 
and costs incurred in prosecuting and defending this action. As 
argued above, under Utah law, First General was entitled at most to 
fees and costs incurred in collecting the $10,658.47 allegedly owed 
it by Perkins—whether First General was awarded attorneys' fees 
pursuant to the Mechanic's Lien Statute or the "Access and 
Authorization" card. However, because First General failed to 
allocate fees between its primary cause of action and its defense 
against Perkins's counterclaims, it in effect waived any right to 
fees and costs. 
A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Finding 
That First General's Fees Were Unreasonable and. 
Therefore. Warranted Reduction. 
In Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988-989 (Utah 
1988), the Utah Supreme Court set forth general principles for 
awarding attorneys' fees when authorized by statute or contract. 
The court stated that: 
Part of the trial court's discretion involves 
evaluation of the evidence presented. In Beckstrom 
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v. Beckstrom. 578 P.2d 520 (Utah 1978), the 
attorney testified that the fees were approximately 
$800, but the trial court awarded only $500• On 
appeal, we upheld the award and explained: "Even 
though that evidence is undisputed, the trial judge 
was not necessarily compelled to accept such self-
interested testimony whole cloth and make such an 
award; and in the absence of patent error or clear 
abuse of discretion, this court will not disturb 
his findings and judgment." Id. at 523-24 In 
addition, the trial court is allowed to reduce the 
amount asserted by one party in determining a 
reasonable fee. . . . In Alexander v. Brown, 646 
P.2d 692 (Utah 1982), this Court affirmed a trial 
court's award of attorneys fees where the trial 
court chose the middle ground between two estimates 
of what were reasonable fees. Id. at 695. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 989. 
First General, in appealing the award of attorneys' fees, 
recognizes that any determination of what constitutes a reasonable 
attorneys' fees is generally within the trial court's discretion. 
First General also acknowledges that this discretion involves an 
evaluation of the evidence presented (First General Services 
Appellant's Brief ("First General's Brief") pp. 22-23). First 
General fails to recognize, however, that the trial court, in a 
mechanic's lien foreclosure action, is not required to affirm a 
jury award of attorneys' fees. This obtains because the 
foreclosure of a mechanic's lien is an equitable action in which 
the jury's award is only advisory and it is within the trial 
court's prerogative "to determine disputed questions of fact in 
equity matters." Frehner v. Morton, 18 Utah 2d 422, 424 P.2d 446, 
448 (Utah 1967). 
First General advances a number of reasons why the jury award 
of $52,522.53 should be reinstated. First, First General asserts 
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that the only explanation offered by the court for its reduction of 
the fee award was that it could not allow a fee award of $52,000 on 
a claim of only $10,000 (R. 5162; see First General's Brief p. 27). 
According to First General, this basis is not adequate to support 
the court's reduction of the jury award. There is no prohibition, 
however, against a trial court's considering the amount of the fee 
requested, in light of the amount in dispute, as a major 
consideration in its evaluation of the reasonableness of a fee 
award request. In fact, under the Utah Code of Professional 
Responsibility, DR 2-106 (now, Rule 1.5, Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct), this comparison may be the key factor in a court's 
determination that a fee request should be reduced where the fee is 
"clearly excessive." First General is also incorrect in its 
assertion. The court obviously took other factors into account. 
For example, it heard and was able to evaluate the trial testimony 
of First General's counsel regarding attorneys' fees; it also had 
the affidavit of counsel which enumerated the number of attorney 
and paralegal hours worked. The court was clearly disturbed by the 
sheer number of hours put into the case, stating, "I don't know 
what took place in his [Bostwick's] office. I'm certainly not here 
to criticize you, Mr. Bostwick, except to say that I—it was just 
inconceivable to this court of how, on a $10,000 claim, you can get 
$75,000 into it. It's just not there" (R. 5159). The court later 
noted, "[w]hy can't we get some reasonableness in these attorneys' 
fees? They're just not reasonable" (R.5163). In reducing the fee 
award, the trial court undoubtedly relied heavily on the fact that 
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such a procedurally simple action as a foreclosure involving some 
$10,000 could not reasonably result in fees of $52,000 through the 
second day of trial, with another $19,000 to $20,000 incurred for 
the remainder of trial. 
First General also argues that the trial court erred because 
it failed to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law 
in support of its decision to reduce the jury award of attorneys' 
fees from $52,522.53 to $10,658.47. First General relies upon 
Matter of Estate of Quinn, 830 P.2d 282 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) and 
Acton v. Delerian, 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987) for the proposition 
that failure to make findings of fact is always clear error. This 
reliance is misplaced.1 In State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 787-788 
n. 6 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that "Acton/s 
precise wording of the standard [regarding findings of fact], . . . 
is not entirely accurate." The Ramirez court made clear that 
failure to make findings does not automatically constitute 
reversible error. Depending upon the circumstances of the case, 
such a failure may be harmless. Id. at 788 n. 6. Thus, "even 
without requisite findings, [a] trial court will be upheld if there 
is competent evidence to support [its] ruling . . . " Id. , citing, 
Moiave Uranium Co. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. . 22 Utah 2d 239, 244 n. 7, 
451 P.2d 587, 591 n. 7 (1969). Thus, the Utah Supreme Court will 
1
 First General also cites Graco Fishing and Rental Tools v. 
Ironwood Exploration, Inc.. 766 P.2d 1075, 1099 (Utah 1988) for 
this same proposition. Graco, however, was remanded because Graco 
"did not differentiate between fees incurred in prosecuting the 
cause of action on which Graco was successful and those claims on 
which it was not," and not because the court failed to make 
specific findings of fact. Id. at 1079-1080. 
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uphold the trial court "even if it failed to make findings on the 
record whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the court 
actually made such findings." Ramirez, 817 P. 2d at 788 n. 6. 
Here, the trial court implicitly made the requisite findings. 
First General also contends that under Utah law, this Court is 
allegedly reluctant to disturb a jury's fee award, citing Wright v. 
Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The 
Wright decision, however, does not inform us whether the jury 
awarded the precise amount sought by the prevailing party. Thus, 
the trial courts award, as the opposing party claimed, may not in 
fact have been rationally based. Moreover, the Wright decision 
does not state whether the contract language permitted an award of 
all fees to the prevailing party, including those incurred in 
prosecuting as well as defending an action. Consequently, Wright 
is not persuasive on the issue of reduction of a jury award by the 
trial court. 
Finally, First General asserts that this case is factually 
similar to Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), 
where, according to First General, the amount of attorneys' fees 
sought by the prevailing party was large in relationship to the 
amount of its principal claim but small when compared to amounts 
sought by the opposing party in its counterclaims. Dixie State 
Bank is distinguishable in several ways from the instant case. 
First, contrary to First General's contention, the amount owed the 
plaintiff bank (somewhere between $5,000 and $6,000) was more than 
the amount of the attorneys' fees claimed of $4,747.50. This is in 
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marked contrast to First General's principal claim of approximately 
$10,000 and its request for an award of some $72,000 in fees and 
costs. Second, the trial court in Dixie State Bank specifically 
found that the amount of attorneys' fees claimed ($4,747.50) was 
"reasonable in all regard." Id. at 988. The trial court in this 
case, on the other hand, found First General's claim for attorneys' 
fees to be entirely unreasonable (Perkins's Facts 5 13-14). Thus, 
the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Dixie State Bank—that once the 
trial court determines that a fee request is reasonable, "it is a 
mistake of law to award less than that amount"—has no application 
in the case now before this Court. Id. at 991. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Requiring 
First General to Pay Attorneys' Fees Incurred by Frampton 
in Foreclosing Its Mechanic's Lien Against Perkins. 
As First General correctly notes, Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-17 
and 38-1-18 govern the award of attorneys' fees in mechanic's lien 
foreclosure actions. However, First General fails to note that 
these statutes give the trial court the power to establish a 
reasonable attorneys' fees and to apportion fees awarded to a 
subcontractor between the owner and contractor. Section 38-1-17 
states in pertinent part: 
Costs—Apportionment—Costs and Attorney's Fees to 
Subcontractor. As between the owner and contractor 
the court shall apportion the costs according to 
the right of the case. . . . 
Section 38-1-18 states in pertinent part: 
Attorney's Fees. In any action to enforce any lien 
under this chapter the successful party shall be 
entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee, to 
be fixed by the court, . . . 
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Where a contractor breaches its contract with a subcontractor 
by failing to pay the subcontractor and the subcontractor is forced 
to bring an action, the trial court may properly award fees and 
costs incurred by the subcontractor against the general contractor. 
Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In Hoth, the 
uncontroverted evidence showed that the general contractor had not 
paid the subcontractor for the balance of its contract. The trial 
court found that the owners were liable to pay the subcontractor 
the remaining balance on the original contract plus reasonable 
attorneys' fees. The court then ordered the general contractor to 
indemnify the owner for both the amounts due under the contract and 
the subcontractor's attorneys' fees. This Court upheld the trial 
court's holding that the property owners were entitled to 
indemnification for attorneys' fees incurred by the subcontractor 
based on the fact that the subcontractor would not have had to 
bring the action except for the general contractor's breach of its 
agreement with the subcontractor. 
Similarly, in the case now before this Court, Frampton had an 
agreement with the general contractor, First General, for 
installation of a swamp cooler in Perkins's home. First General, 
in breach of its contract with Frampton, failed to pay all monies 
due Frampton. Under the rule set forth in Hoth. the trial court 
properly exercised its discretion by holding that First General 
must indemnify Perkins for fees and costs awarded to Frampton. 




Based on the foregoing argument, this Court should hold that 
the evidentiary errors on the part of the trial court, taken singly 
or together, so prejudiced the jury that it was unable to render a 
decision free from impermissible motives. Furthermore, this Court 
should hold that First General, because it did not meet its burden 
of apportioning costs and fees, is not entitled to any award of 
fees and costs. 
DATED this 13th day of September, 1995. 
SUITTER AXLAND & HANSON 
Jesse C. Trentadue, Esq. 7} 
Claudia F. Berry, Esq. 
Attorneys for Zandra Perkins 
Appellee/Cross Appellant/Defendant 
and Third Party Plaintiff 
CFB40.8 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of 
Brief of Appellee/Cross Appellant/Defendant and Third Party 
Plaintiff Zandra Perkins to be hand delivered on the 13th day of 
September, 1995, to: 
Henry E. Heath, Esq. 
STRONG & HANNI 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Darrel J. Bostwick, Esq. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
254 West 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and mailed, postage prepaid thereon, to: 
David K. Smith, Esq. 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 600 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
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ZANDRA PERKINS, an individual, 
;i Defendant, 




h BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
\\ COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
I Third-Party Defendant, 
lj Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Zandra Perkins moves the 
h Court for an Order in Limine excluding any evidence, testimony, 
' i 







PERKINST MOTION IN LIMINE 
TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF 
PRIOR CRIMINAL CONVICTION 
Civil No. C9006000 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
(i) Ms. Perkins' 1987 conviction for reckless burning or any of ; 
the facts which led to that conviction; (ii) Ms. Perkins1 1991 J 
i 
conviction for shoplifting or any of the facts which led to that j 
i 
conviction; or (iii) allegations that the fire which damaged Ms. | 




This Motion is based upon the following grounds: j 
1. Ms. Perkins' 1987 conviction for reckless burning has 
been expunged and is therefore fundamentally inadmissible under 
Utah R. Evid. 609; 
2. Ms. Perkins1 1991 conviction for shoplifting is does 
not bear on her credibility and is therefore fundamentally 
inadmissible under Utah R. Evid. 609; and 
3. Ms Perkins was in Tempe, Arizona at the time of the 
fire on May 19, 1990 and any suggestion that the fire was 
intentionally started would be highly prejudicial and grounds for 
mistrial. 
These grounds are more fully set forth in Ms. Perkins1 
accompanying Memorandum in Support. 
DATED this // —'day of January, 1993. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
ROBERT S CAM^BELL^^TR. J^7j 
'JON C."MARTINSON 
Attorneys for Zandra Perkins 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by 
the law firm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, One Utah Center, 
Thirteenth Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, and that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing PERKINS1 MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF PRIOR 
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS was hand-delivered to the following this 
j'Tr^ day of January, 1993. 
Henry E. Heath, Esq. 
H. Burt Ringwood, Esq. 
Strong & Hanni 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Darrel J. Bostwick, Esq. 
Walstad & Babcock 
254 West 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
David K. Smith, Esq. 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 600 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557) 
JON C. MARTINSON (5509) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215 
Telephone: 801-537-5555 
Attorneys for Zandra Perkins 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




ZANDRA PERKINS, an individual, 
Defendant. 
ZANDRA PERKINS, an individual, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant, 
PERKINST MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RE: BEAR RIVER'S 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
ON THE ISSUE OF CAUSATION 
Civil No. C900906000 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Zandra Perkins ("Perkins") 
respectfully moves the Court for an Order striking Bear River 
0l0i3 
Mutual Insurance Company's ("Bear River") Second Affirmative 
Defense. The grounds for this Motion are as follows: 
I. In its Answer to Perkins' Third-Party Complaint, Bear 
River alleged as its Second Affirmative Defense, that the 
fire in question was intentionally caused. 
A. However, the fire's origin would limit Bear 
River's liability to Perkins only if Perkins herself or 
her agent intentionally set the fire. 
1. Perkins has testified in deposition and by 
sworn affidavit that she was not involved in any way in 
the causation of the fire. 
2. No charges were ever filed against Perkins in 
connection with the fire; in fact the case was never 
even screened before a prosecutor. 
3. The only scrap of data which Bear River has 
has been able to assemble is the unfounded opinion and 
conjecture of the arson investigator who investigated 
the fire. 
a. This "evidence" consists of the 
investigator's opinion that it is unusual for one 
person to have been involved in three fires in a 




4. Bear River's contention does not rise above 
the level of rank speculation and irresponsible opinion 
and therefore cannot form the basis of Bear River's 
Second Affirmative Defense. 
B. Bear River's Second Affirmative Defense must 
therefore be stricken. 
These grounds are more fully set forth in the accompanying 
Memorandum in support. 
DATED this / (^ day of March, 1993. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
JOrrC. MARTINSON 
rtorneys for Zandra Perkins 
C J 0 4 5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by 
the law firm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, One Utah Center, 
Thirteenth Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, and that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing PERKINS1 MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: BEAR 
RIVER'S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE ON THE ISSUE OF CAUSATION was hand-
delivered to the following this day of March, 1993. 
Henry E. Heath, Esq. U'-,J 
H. Burt Ringwood, Esq. 
Strong & Hanni 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Darrel J. Bostwick, Esq. ~J~l 
Walstad & Babcock 
254 West 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
served upon: 
David K. Smith, Esq.—^^ ^ 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 600 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
by mailing a true and correct copy thereof by first-class mail, 
postage prepaid, on the ((fy day of March, 1993. 
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Perkins9 Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict 

ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557) 
JON C. MARTINSON (5509) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215 
Telephone: 801-537-5555 
Attorneys for Zandra Perkins 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




ZANDRA PERKINS, an individual, 
Defendant. 
ZANDRA PERKINS, an individual, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant, 
PERKINST MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL 
Civil No. C900906000 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 50(b) and 59, 
Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Zandra Perkins ("Perkins") by 
and through her counsel of record, Robert S. Campbell, Jr. and 
01613 
Jon C. Martinson, of Campbell Maack & Sessions, respectfully 
moves the Court for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in 
the alternative, for a new trial. This Motion is based on the 
following grounds: 
1. The Court erred in allowing evidence of the previous 
fire occurring in Perkins' Hillsden home to be introduced. This 
evidence was irrelevant and highly inflammatory, and its effect 
was to unfairly and fatally prejudice the minds of the jurors 
against Perkins, her testimony, her witnesses and her claims. 
2. Reasonable minds could not differ as to the fact that 
First General materially breached its contract with Perkins and 
as a matter of law this breach excused any further performance or 
subsequent breach by Perkins. 
3. There is insufficient evidence as a matter of law as to 
the reasonableness of First General's attorney's fees, and First 
General adduced no evidence whereby the Court can apportion 
attorney's fees between First General's prosecution of its claims 
and its defense against Perkins' counterclaims. 
2 
C16H 
These grounds are more fully set forth in the accompanying 
Memorandum in Support, filed herewith. 
DATED this [(g^t day of July, 1993. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
i 
JOBERT ST. OKMPBELL, JR. 
!ON\C. MARTINSON 
Attorneys for Zandra Perkins 
C1615 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by 
the law firm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, One Utah Center, 
Thirteenth Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, and that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR IN 
THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL was hand-delivered to the 
following this day of July, 1993. 
Henry E. Heath, Esq. 
H. Burt Ringwood, Esq. 
Strong & Hanni 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Darrel J. Bostwick, Esq. 
Walstad & Babcock 
254 West 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and served upon: 
David K. Smith, Esq. 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 600 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
by mailing a true and correct copy thereof by first-class mail, 
postage prepaid, on the /(£rv day o f July, 1993. 
f;lG*6 
Order on Perkins' Motion for 
JNOV/New Trial 

ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557) 
JON C. MARTINSON (5509) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
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Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Defendant Zandra Perkins 
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ZANDRA PERKINS, an 
individual, 
Defendant. 




BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Third-party defendant. 
KENT L. FRAMPTON, dba KENT L. 




ZANDRA L. PERKINS, TRUSTEE OF 
THE ZANDRA L. PERKINS 
FAMILY TRUST, and FIRST 
GENERAL SERVICES, 
ORDER ON PERKINS' 
MOTION FOR JNOV/NEW TRIAL 
AND OTHER POST-TRIAL MOTIONS 
Civil No. 900906000 




The motion of Perkins for a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict and alternatively a new trial having come on for hearing 
before the Court, the HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON, District Judge 
presiding, on Thursday, August 5, 1993, the defendant and third-
party plaintiff Perkins appearing through her counsel Robert S. 
Campbell, Jr. of Campbell Maack & Sessions, the plaintiff and 
counter-defendant, First General Services, appearing through its 
counsel Darrel J. Bostwick, the third-party defendant, Bear River 
Mutual Insurance Company, appearing through its counsel, Henry E. 
Heath, and the plaintiff Kent L. Frampton, dba Kent L. Frampton 
Heating and Air Conditioning, appearing through its counsel, David 
K. Smith, 
and the Court having considered the Perkins motions, as 
well as the motion of First General Services to supplement its 
attorney's fee award, the motion of Bear River Mutual Insurance 
Company for judgment and costs pursuant to Rule 54(d), and the 
motion of Frampton to supplement attorney's fees and costs, and 
the matters having been fully briefed and the Court having 
considered the same, 
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court being fully advised in all and 
singular the law and facts in the premises and for good cause 
appearing, 
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that: 
1. Perkins1 motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict and alternatively, for new trial, be and the same is 
hereby denied as against Bear River; 
2. Perkins1 motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict and alternatively, for new trial, be and the same is 
2 01775 
hereby denied as against First General Services, except as to the 
jury verdict for attorney's fees under the jury verdict and as to 
that, the Court orders as follows: 
A. That Perkins' motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict against First General be and the same 
is hereby granted for attorney's fees under the 
jury verdict except for the sum of $10,658.47; 
B. That First General's motion to amend the judgment 
to supplement for attorney's fees be and the same 
is denied in all respects; 
3. That Frampton's motion to amend the judgment to 
supplement for attorney's fees and costs be and the same is hereby 
denied in all respects; 
4. That as part of the entry of final judgment upon 
the trial of the case, First General Services be and the same is 
hereby ordered to pay in full the judgment previously entered in 
favor of Frampton and against Perkins in the sum and amount of 
$426.21 for work performed on Perkins' home and for the sum of 
$4,582.00 for attorney's fees under the earlier judgment of 
Frampton; 
5. That as to Bear River Mutual's motion for entry of 
judgment and costs, the Court has concluded that both Perkins and 
Bear River were prevailing parties on various aspects of their 
claims and accordingly, an apportionment of costs and expenses 
should be awarded to each. Counsel for the parties are ordered to 
work out an equitable apportionment of costs and expenses and to 
submit that to the Court for determination, either upon 
stipulation or by motion, as necessary; 
3 C177G 
6. That the final judgment as to all claims and issues 
in this case be and the same is hereby amended to reflect the 
terms of this Order. , 
DATED this Q day of August, 1993. 
BY ORDER OF THE COURT: 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
/ Third District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
. CAMSBELU^jy. CS \ ROBERT S
Attorneys for Zandra Perkins 
DARREL J. BOSTWICK 
JEFFERY R. PRICE 
Attorneys for First General 
STRONG & HANNI 
HENRY E. HTATH' 
H. BURT RTNGWOOD 
Attorneys for Bear River 
DAVID K. SMITH 
Attorney for Frampton 
4 01777 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed 
by the lawfirm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, One Utah Center, 
Thirteenth Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, and 
that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, true and correct copies of proposed Order on 
Perkins1 Motion for JNOV/New Trial and Other Post-Trial Motions 
were served upon: 
Henry E. Heath, Esq, 
STRONG & HANNI 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
David K. Smith, Esq. 
6925 Union Park Center #600 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Darrel J. Bostwick, Esq. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
254 West 400 South #200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
by hand delivery, on 10th day of August, 1993, thereafter upon 
consultation and review between all counsel, the form of the order 
was agreed to by all parties except First General Services. 
Accordingly, Rule 4-504 is satisfied and copies of the attached 
final draft of the order are being served upon the foregoing 
C1778 
counsel this 2nd day of September, 1993, with a request that the 
Court sign the same forthwith. 
DATED this 2nd day of September, 1993. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
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Notice of Appeal 
JESSE C. TRENTADUE Esq. (#4961)DI 
CLAUDIA F. BERRY, Esq. (#5037) 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
Attorneys for Defendant Zandra L. Perkins 
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ZANDRA PERKINS, an individual, 
Defendant. 
ZANDRA PERKINS, an individual, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
KENT L. FRAMPTON, dba KENT L. 




NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 900906000 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
Consolidated 
C1809 
ZANDRA L. PERKINS, TRUSTEE OF 
THE ZANDRA L. PERKINS FAMILY 
TRUST, and FIRST GENERAL 
SERVICES, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that defendant and third-party 
plaintiff Zandra Perkins, individually and as Trustee of the Zandra 
L. Perkins Family Trust ("Perkins"), by and through her counsel of 
record, Jesse C. Trentadue, Esq. and Claudia F. Berry, Esq., appeals 
to the Utah Supreme Court from the following: 
1. The trial court's Order granting Kent L. Frampton's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, dated March 22, 1993, and from the 
trial court's Order entered June 4, 1993 awarding attorneys' fees 
and costs to Kent L. Frampton which Order also held that Frampton 
has a valid mechanics lien against Perkins; 
2. Those portions of Perkins's Motion for Summary 
Judgment Re: Bear River's Affirmative Defense on the Issue of 
Causation which were denied in a hearing before the trial court on 
March 26, 1993; 
3. The Judgment entered July 6, 1993, which was based 
upon the Special Verdict of the jury and which dismissed Perkins's 
claims against Bear River Mutual Insurance Company ("Bear River") 
- 2 -
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(1) for breach of express or implied covenants or obligations under 
the insurance contract with Perkins; (2) for bad faith breach of 
express or implied covenants or obligations under the terms of the 
insurance contract with Perkins; (3) for express and implied 
indemnification against Bear River; and (4) which affirmed the award 
of the Special Verdict of $5,100 to Perkins, with interest. 
4. Those portions of the trial court's Judgment entered 
July 6, 1993 which (1) awarded First General Services $10,658.47 
against Zandra L. Perkins for breach of contract, together with 
interest; (2) awarded First General Services the sum of $52,522.53 
against Zandra L. Perkins for attorneys' fees and costs, together 
with interest; (3) upheld the Special Verdict of the jury finding 
that First General Services's Mechanic Lien is foreclosed and shall 
remain in full force and effect throughout all post-trial 
proceedings; and (4) dismissed with prejudice the four counterclaims 
of Perkins against plaintiff First General Services. 
5. The trial court's Order on Perkins's Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict/New Trial and other post-trial 
motions, entered September 3, 1993, which (1) denied Perkins's 
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and, Alternatively, 
for New Trial, against Bear River; (2) denied Perkins's Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and, Alternatively, for New 
- 3 -
Trial against First General Services, including the full award of 
attorneys' fees; and (3) ordered apportionment of costs and 
expenses. 
DATED this 18th day of October, 1993. 
SUITTER AXLAND & HANSON 
rfesse C. Trentadue, Esq. 
Claudia F. Berry, Esq. 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Notice of Appeal to be mailed, postage prepaid 
thereon, this 18th day of October to the following: 
Henry E. Heath, Esq. 
STRONG & HANNI 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David K. Smith, Esq. 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 600 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Darrel J. Bostwick, Esq. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
254 West 400 South, Suite 200 
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^£I ,J iereby give accessand authorization to FIRST GENERAL SERVICES, CORP., for the purpose of making, 
I '-necessary repairs to the above address as a result of —"-^-FIRE " -— r - - ^Z Lir 
I *\And I, hereby authorize my insuror to include the name FIRST GENERAL SERVICES on any check or draft 
issued in honor of said insurance claim. 
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will be paid to First General Services beginning at the work, 
> ~4>. Work/On job will stop 
in the event the deductible amount is not remitted to First General Services. , 
. . V,I hereby agree that if it is necessary for First General Services to pursue legal action to collect the above amounts, 
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Trial Transcripts 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




ZANDRA PERKINS, AN 
INDIVIDUAL, 
DEFENDANT. 





BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, A UTAH CORPORATION 
THIRD-PARTY 
DEFENDANT. 
REPORTER'S PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT 
OF TRIAL PROCEEDINGS: OPENING 
STATEMENTS OF MESSRS. HEATH 
AND CAMPBELL 
BUTTERFIELD LUMBER. INC., 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS . 
E. EUGENE PETERSON, FIRST 
GENERAL SERVICES, ZANDRA L. 
PERKINS AND JOHN DOES I-XX, 
DEFENDANTS. 
CASE NO. C900906000 
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
(CONSOLIDATED) 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 2 3 1993 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By 
Deputy Ctork 
0 2 8 0 0 
KENT L. FRAMPTON DBA KENT 




ZANDRA L. PERKINS, TRUSTEE 
OF THE ZANDRA L. PERKINS 
FAMILY TRUST, AND FIRST 
GENERAL SERVICES, 
DEFENDANTS. 
BE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE 19TH DAY OF APRIL. 
1993. THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CONTINUED IN TRIAL IN COURTROOM 
NO. 502 OF THE COURTS BUILDING, METROPOLITAN HALL OF JUSTICE, 240 
EAST 400 SOUTH, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH BEFORE THE HONORABLE HOMER 
F. WILKINSON, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE STATE 
OF UTAH. 
APPEARANCES 
MESSRS. PARREL J. BOSTWICK, ATTORNEY-AT-LAW, AND 
JIFrLin R. PRICE, ATTORNEY-AT-LAW, WALSTAD & BABCOCK, 254 WEST 
'400 SOUTH, SUITE 200, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 TELEPHONE 
531-7000 APPEARING ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF FIRST GENERAL SERVICES. 
MFSSRS. ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, ATTORNEY-AT-LAW AND 
JON C. MARTINSON, ATTORNEY-AT-LAW, CAMPBELL, MAAK AND SESSIONS, 
ONE UTAH CENTER, THIRTEENTH FLOOR, 201 SOUTH MAIN STREET, SALT 
LAkT CITY, UTAH 84111-2215 TELEPHONE 537-5555 APPEARING ON BEHALF 
OF DEFENDANT AND THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF PERKINS. 
02B01 
MESSRS. HENRY E. HEATH, ATTORNEY-AT-LAh, AND H. 
BURT RINGV/OOD, ATTORNEY-AT-LAK , STRONG & HANNI, SIXTH FLOOR 
BOSTON BUILDING, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 TELEPHONE 532-7080 
APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT BEAR RIVER MUTUAL. 
DAVID K. SMITH, ATTORNEY-AT-LAW. 6925 UNION PARK 
CENTER, SUITE 600, MIDVALE, UTAH 84047 TELEPHONE 566-3373 
APPEARING ON BEHALF OF KENT L. FRAMPTON HEATING AND AIR 
CONDITIONING. 
I N D E X 
OPENING STATEMENT BY MR. CAMPBELL PAGE 4 
OPENING STATEMENT BY MR. HEATH PAGE 21 
02802 
1 THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED IN THE 
2 PRESENCE AND HEARING OF THE JUR^:) 
3 THE COURT: THE RECORD MAY SHOW THAT ALL 
4 MEMBERS OF THE JURY ARE PRESENT. YOU MAY PROCEED WHEN YOU'RE 
5 READY, COUNSEL. 
6 OPENING: HEATH 
7 MR. HEATH: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. MAY IT 
8 PLEASE THE COURT, COUNSEL, IT'S NOW MY OPPORTUNITY, AS 
9 MR. CAMPBELL AND MR. BOSTW1CK HAVE INDICATED, TO MAKE AN 
10 OPENING STATEMENT. LET ME SAY PRELIMINARILY, SO THAT YOU 
11 UNDERSTAND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AN OPENING STATEMENT AS IT 
12 RELATES TO AX ENTIRE TRIAL. 
13 MR. CAMPBELL INDICATED TO YOU THAT AN OPENING 
14 STATEMENT IS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR ATTORNEYS TO INTRODUCE WHAT 
15 THEY BELIEYF THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW. A CAUTIONARY STATEMENT 
10 THAT I WOULD MAKE TO YOU IS THAT I EXPECT TO BE BOUND BY WHAT 
17 Y\\I LMDENCE S H J W S . THAT'S THE TESTIMONY YOU HEAR FROM THE 
18 WITNESS AND, THE EXHIBITS, THE EVIDENCE THAT COMES IN FROM THE 
19 SI AND; NOT FROM THL MOUTHS OF ATTORNEYS. 
20 ATTORNEYS HAVE A VERY IMPORTANT FUNCTION, AND 
21 THAT'S TO GET THI EVIDLNCL 10 YOU, BUI UNLESS WE CHARACTERIZE 
22 THE EVIDENCE, SUMMARIZE II, EXPRESS IT PROPERLY, THEN YOU HAVE 
23 EG COML INTO PLA^ AS \0\ 'Ri JUDGES AND AS YOU HAVE YOUR 
24 FUNCTION AS JUDGES OF THE EVIDENCE AND TO MAKE A 
25 DETERMINATION: WhLRL IS Tilt TRUTH? 
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1 THIS IS A CREDIBILITY CASE; PLAIN AND SIMPLE, 
2 THIS IS A CREDIBILITY CASE. IT RESULTS FROM A FIRE THAT WAS 
3 INDICATED OCCURRED AT THE PERKINS HOME IN MAY OF 1990. 
4 THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW THAT MS. PERKINS AND HER 
5 SISTER, MARSHA, HAVE CONTINUALLY, DURING THE COURSE OF THE 
6 ATTEMPT ON THE PART OF BEAR RIVER TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE, TO 
7 BUILD A CLAIM TO THE POINT WHERE THEY CAN CLAIM THAT ALL OF 
8 THE LIMITS UNDER THE POLICY ARE DUE AND OWING THEM. 
9 MR. CAMPBELL: THAT'S ARGUMENT, THAT'S NOT 
10 EVIDENCE. THAT IS NOT FACTUAL EVIDENCE, AND I WOULD OBJECT TO 
11 THAT. 
12 MR. HEATH: YOUR HONOR, THEY'RE CLAIMING THAT 
13 THEY'RE ENTITLED TO THE POLICY LIMITS ON EVERY ASPECT OF THE 
14 DWELLING, AND ON THE CONTENTS AND ON ADDITIONAL LIVING 
15 EXPENSES. 
16 THE COURT: YOU MAY PROCEED, COUNSEL; STAY TO 
17 OPENING STATEMENT. 
18 MR. HEATH: I WAS RESPONDING TO MR. CAMPBELL'S 
19 OPENING STATEMENT, IF I MAY. 
20 MR. CAMPBELL: WE DIDN'T TALK ABOUT POLICY 
21 LIMITS, IF THE COURT PLEASE, AND THAT IS NOT TESTIMONY IN THIS 
22 CASE. 
23 MR. HEATH: WELL--. 
24 MR. CAMPBELL: THERE WILL NOT BE TESTIMONY IN 
25 THE CASE. 
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1 MR. HEATH: I'M GLAD TO HEAR THAT CONFESSION. 
2 AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE CLAIMS THAT HAVE BEEN PRESENTED WILL 
3 SHOW THAT THEY ARE ASKING FOR ITEMS THAT WERE NOT DESTROYED IN 
4 THE FIRE. THEY'RE ASKING FOR ITEMS THAT WERE CLEANED AFTER 
5 THE FIRE, WERE RETURNED, AND ARE STILL IN THE HOME, WERE NOT 
6 DAMAGED IN THE FIRE, WERE NOT DESTROYED. 
7 THEY RECEIVED SMOKE DAMAGE, THEY WERE CLEANED, 
8 AND WERE RETURNED TO THEM. 
9 THEY'RE ASKING FOR IMPROVEMENTS TO THE HOME 
0 THAT WERE NOT COVERED BY THE POLICY, IMPROVEMENTS IN THE HOME 
1 THAT WILL ILLUSTRATE, AS YOU LOOK AT IT, THAT AS A MATTER OF 
2 FACT THEY'RE NOT ITEMS THAT WERE EVEN DAMAGED IN THE FIRE. 
3 LET ME GIVE YOU AN EXAMPLE OF THAT, AND I'LL 
4 TALK MORE ABOUT IT. AND WHEN I SAY THIS, ZANDRA PERKINS 
5 UNDERSTANDS THAT SHE'S NOT ENTITLED TO IT. SHE SAID THIS IN 
G HER DEPOSITION, BUT IT APPEARS IN HER CLAIM, AND AS LATE AS 
7 WITHIN THE LAST TWO WEEKS WE RECEIVED THE FINAL DOCUMENTATION 
8 OP THE CLAIM, AND IT STILL APPEARS IN THE CLAIM, AND THAT'S 
9 FOR ALL OF THE CONCRETE WORK, REPLACE THE DRIVEWAY, REPLACE 
0 THE PATIO, THAT WERE NOT DAMAGED IN THE FIRE. 
1 THEY WERE DAMAGED PRIOR TO THE FIRE, AND IN 
2 VERY POOR CONDITION AS A MATTER OF FACT, AND THERE WILL BE 
3 EVIDENCE CONCERNING THAT. 
4 THEY'RE ASKING FOR PAYMENTS WHICH BEAR RIVER 
5 BELIEVES ARE CLEARLY FRAUDULENT. BEAR RIVER HAS A DUTY TO 
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1 PRESENT THAT EVIDENCE TO YOU, AND YOU WILL BE THE JUDGES OF 
2 THE FACTS AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE ENTITLED TO THE AMOUNT 
3 THEY ARE ASKING FOR. 
4 MR. CAMPBELL HAS DESCRIBED THE FIRE AS 
5 INVOLVING LARGE SECTIONS OF THE HOME, THAT THERE WAS SMOKE 
6 THROUGH A LARGE PART OF THE HOME. MR. CAMPBELL SHOWED YOU 
7 WHAT THE HOME LOOKED LIKE BEFORE AND AFTER THE FIRE. 
8 THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW THAT IT HAD A CARPORT, 
9 AND IN FACT THAT'S WHERE THE FIRE WAS, IN THE CARPORT. THE 
10 FIRE CAME UP AND DAMAGED THE ROOF, AND THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW 
1 THAT THIS ROOF HAD BEEN PUT ON SOMETIME BEFORE THE FIRE OVER A 
2 FLAT ROOF THAT WENT ON THE HOME AS WAS ORIGINALLY BUILT. 
13 THIS PORTION OF THE HOME HAD A GABLED ROOF, 
4 THIS PORTION WAS FLAT, AND THEY CAME IN AT SOME POINT IN TIME 
15 AND PUT A GABLED ROOF OVER THIS PORTION OF THE HOME, TOO, AND 
16 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THAT IS THAT THE FIRE CAME UP INTO THIS 
7 ROOF AND THE TRIOR ROOF WHICH WAS LEFT THERE ACTED SOMEWHAT AS 
8 A PROTECTION MORE THAN JUST AN-ATTIC WOULD HAVE BEEN 
9 PROTECTION. 
0 SO THE FIRE REALLY DID NOT PENETRATE 
1 SIGNIFICANTLY DOWN INTO THE HOME. NOW SMOKE GOT DOWN INTO THE 
2 HOME; YOU'LL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEE PHOTOGRAPHS. THIS IS 
3 THE DOOR COMING OFF OF THE CARPORT INTO THE KITCHEN. 
4 THERE'S THE ONLY PLACE THAT THERE WAS 
5 SIGNIFICANCE FIRE PENETRATION INTO THE HOME. THE ONLY PLACE. 
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i NOW SMOKE GOT AROUND IN THE HOME, AND THERE WILL BE DISCUSSION 
2 AS TO THE EXTENT OF SMOKE IN THE HOME. 
3 BUT THAT'S THE ONLY PLACE THE FIRE ACTUALLY 
4 PENETRATED INTO THE HOME OF ANY SIGNIFICANCE. 
5 NOW THERE'S--I DON'T WANT TO MISLEAD YOU, 
6 BECAUSE THERE WAS AN AREA IN THE UPPER BATHROOM BEHIND THE 
7 MEDICINE CABINET THAT WOULD BE ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE HOME 
8 WHERE THIS WALL WAS EXPOSED TO THE FIRE THAT APPARENTLY THE 
9 FIRE CAME DOWN INSIDE, AND THERE WILL BE TESTIMONY THAT THE 
10 INSIDE WALL, THERE WAS FIRE, AND THERE WILL BE PICTURES OF 
11 THAT. THERE WAS NO REAL MASSIVE TOTAL DESTRUCTION OF THE HOME 
12 AS DESCRIBED. 
13 WHILE I'M ON THAT, LET ME SHOW YOU PHOTOGRAPHS. 
14 THIS IS A PHOTOGRAPH OF THE KITCHEN AREA, RIGHT NEXT TO WHERE 
15 THE FIRE WAS BEFORE THE HOUSE WAS REPAIRED, RIGHT AFTER THE 
lb FIRE. THIS PHOTOGRAPH WAS TAKEN IN THE KITCHEN AREA. THIS 
17 PHOTOGRAPH SHOWS WHAT THE HOUSE LOOKS LIKE NOW. 
18 NOTICE THE DRAPERIES. NOTICE ALSO THE DRAPERY 
19 THAT WAS IN THE HOUSE BEFORE IN THAT AREA. YOU DO SEE 
20 EVIDENCE, AND THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW, AND IN THIS PHOTOGRAPH 
21 THERE IS SOME SOOT AND SMOKE THAT HAS SETTLED AND CONDENSATION 
22 FROM SMOKE THAT'S SETTLED ON THE TABLE IN THAT AREA OF THE 
23 KITCHEN. 
2; THIS IS A PHOTOGRAPH IN THE AREA OF THE LIVING 
25 ROOM. IT WILL SHOW YOU THE DRAPES, THE AREA OF THE LIVING 
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1 ROOM. THERE WAS DAMAGE IN THE LIVING ROOM AREA INTO THE ATTIC 
2 AREA OVER THE LIVING ROOM AND DID GET ULTIMATELY THROUGH THAT 
3 AREA. THERE'S A ROOF UNDERNEATH, AND THERE WAS SOME WATER 
4 DAMAGE THAT SOAKED THE DRAPES THAT HAD TO BE REPLACED AND THE 
5 CARPETS IN THAT AREA THAT HAD TO BE REPLACED ALSO. 
6 THIS IS A PHOTOGRAPH DOWN INSIDE THE MIDDLE 
7 LEVEL OF THE HOUSE. THERE WERE ACTUALLY FOUR LEVELS IN THE 
8 HOUSE, AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE TRIAL, I THINK YOU'LL SEE 
9 A DIAGRAM OF THE VARIOUS LEVELS OF THE HOME. 
10 THIS SHOWS THE MIDDLE ROOM. THIS IS THE AREA 
11 OF THE SMOKE DAMAGE, WHAT IT LOOKED LIKE WITH THE FURNITURE 
12 RIGHT AFTER THE FIRE. THIS IS HOW IT LOOKS NOW. 
13 THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW THAT MANY OF THESE ITEMS 
14 IN THIS AREA COULD BE AND WERE CLEANED, AND WE WILL BRING IN 
15 THE PERSON WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR CLEANING THAT, AND HE'LL 
16 TESTIFY CONCERNING HIS ABILITY TO CLEAN MANY OF THESE ITEMS. 
17 THIS IS ANOTHER AREA, LOOKING AT THAT, AND I 
18 WOULD CALL YOUR ATTENTION HERE-TO LOOK AT THE AREA AS IT 
19 RELATES TO THE UPPER PICTURE, BEING RIGHT AFTER THE FIRE. THE 
20 LOWER PICTURE IS AS IT LOOKS NOW. 
21 NOTICE THE DIFFERENCE IN THE DRAPERIES. THE 
22 UPPER PICTURE, BEFORE THE TIRE, THE PICTURE, THIS COVERS THE 
23 SAME WINDOW DRAPERIES. 
24 SO YOU SEE THERE ARE ISSUES FOR YOU TO 
25 CONSIDER, ISSUES OF FACT, AND WE WOULD ASK YOU TO LISTEN, VERY 
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CAREFULLY TO ALL OF THE TESTIMONY, DECIDE WHERE THE TRUTH 
LIES, BECAUSE THAT'S YOUR FUNCTION AS JURORS. 
WHO IS ZANDRA PERKINS? SHE'S AN EDUCATED 
WOMAN, SHE HAS ACTUALLY THREE COLLEGE DEGREES, INCLUDING A 
JURIS DOCTORATE DEGREE IN LAW. 
SHE GOT THAT DEGREE DURING PART OF THE TIME 
THIS FIRE WAS—WHILE THE HOME WAS BEING RE-BUILT AFTER THE 
FIRE, AND AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THAT, SHE WAS NOT HERE AND 
AVAILABLE. 
IN HER DEPOSITION, AND I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES ARE—AND BY THE WAY, YOU'RE GOING TO HEAR THE 
TERM "DEPOSITION" THROUGH THE COURSE OT THE TRIAL FROM TIME TO 
TIME. A DEPOSITION IS A SWORN EXAMINATION OF A WITNESS OR 
PARTY TO THE CASE. IT'S TAKEN IN AN ATTORNEY'S OF}ICE WITH A 
COURT REPORTER. THEY'RE UNDER OATH. 
AND THERE'S AN OPPORTUNITY, AS PART OF OUR 
PREPARATION FOR TRIAL AND INVESTIGATION OF THE CASE, TO TAKE A 
DEPOSITION OF ANYONE WHO MAY HAVE INFORMATION PERTAINING TO 
IT, INCLUDING ZANDRA PERKINS, AND MANY OTHERS WHO WERE 
DEPOSED. 
THAT'S Win WE CAN STAND UP HERE WITH SOME 
vGNFlDENCE AND TELL \01 WHAT THE EVIDENCE IS GOING TO SHOW. 
;:\NDRA PERKINS HAS INDICATED AT THE TIME OF THE DEPOSITION 
THAT SHE HAD NO SIGNIFICANT GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT, HAD BEEN A 




1 SHE DID WORK SELLING LIVING SCRIPTURES IN 
2 CALIFORNIA AND IN ARIZONA IN '89 AND '90, AND SHE WAS IN 
3 ARIZONA SELLING LIVING SCRIPTURES AT THE TIME OF THIS FIRE. 
4 SO THIS IS ONE PICTURE, ONE SNIPPET OF 
5 INFORMATION CONCERNING ZANDRA PERKINS. 
6 THERE'S ALSO ANOTHER ZANDRA PERKINS WHO ALSO 
7 ADMITTED IN HER DEPOSITION THAT SHE SET A HOME ON FIRE ON 
8 HILLSDEN DRIVE, A HOME SHE OWNED AT THE TIME, IN 1987, AND 
9 THAT SHE HAD A FIRE THAT SHE WAS NOT INVOLVED IN IN MARCH OF 
10 '90 IN THE SAME AREA. ACTUALLY IT WAS A SHED OFF THE SIDE OF 
11 THIS CARPORT. 
12 I DON'T WANT YOU TO MISCONSTRUE WHAT I HAVE 
13 JUST TOLD YOU. IT IS NOT BEAR RIVER'S POSITION, NEVER HAS 
14 BEEN ITS POSITION, THAT THEY HAD EVIDENCE THAT ZANDRA PERKINS 
15 SET THIS FIRE INVOLVING THIS CASE. THE EVIDENCE IS SHE WAS IN 
16 ARIZONA AT THE TIME. 
17 BUT THE SIGNIFICANCE IS THAT THAT INFORMATION 
18 CAME NOT ONLY TO THE FIRE INVESTIGATORS BUT TO BEAR RIVER, AND 
19 THEY SET THAT INFORMATION ASIDE AND HANDLED THIS CLAIM AS THEY 
20 WOULD ANY OTHER CLAIM. 
21 THEY ATTEMPTED TO ADJUST THIS CLAIM IN A 
22 REASONABLE AND FAIR MANNER, AS QUICKLY AS THEY COULD. 
23 THERE IS AN ALLEGATION THAT BEAR RIVER SOMEHOW 
24 HAS FAILED TO LIVE UP TO ITS RESPONSIBILITY. THAT'S ONE OF 
25 THE ISSUES THAT YOU'LL HAVE TO DECIDE. AND WE SUBMIT THAT 
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THEIR WILLINGNESS TO SET ASIDE THAT INFORMATION CONCERNING THE 
1987 FIRE, AND TO SETTLE THIS CASE, TO PAY A SIGNIFICANT 
AMOUNT OF MONEY WHICH THEY HAVE PAID, IS EVIDENCE NOT ONLY OF 
THERE NOT BEING ANY BAD FAITH BUT THAT THEY WERE IN GOOD FAITH 
IN THIS CASE, AND THAT THIS CASE COULD HAVE BEEN, AND WOULD 
HAVE BEEN SETTLED EARLY ON BUT FOR THE PROBLEMS THAT BEAR 
RIVER ENCOUNTERED ALONG THE WAY AS ZANDRA PERKINS HERSELF AND 
THROUGH HER SISTER, WHO HAD HER POWER OF ATTORNEY, CONTINUED 
TO ASK FOR THINGS TO WHICH THEY WERE NOT ENTITLED. 
THE FIRST THING THAT WE SHOULD DO I THINK AT 
THIS POINT IS TO ANALYZE JUST WHAT IS THE ROLE OF AN INSURANCE 
COMPANY AND AN INSURED WHEN YOU HAVE A LOSS OF THIS TYPE. 
THIS IS KNOWN AS THE DECLARATION PAGE, WHICH IS 
ATTACHED TO THE FRONT OF EVERY INSURANCE POLICY, AND IT SETS 
FORTH THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY THAT ARE PROVIDED IN THE POLICY 
FOR A DWELLING OF $85,000. THAT'S THE HOME, THE STRUCTURE, 
THE LANDSCAPING AROUND IT, WHAT IT WOULD COST TO PUT THE HOME 
BACK IN PLACE. 
NOW IF YOU FIND OUT THAT IT TAKES MORE THAN 
THAT, THAT'S THE LIMIT OF THE LIABILITY. SO THE EVIDENCE 
WOULD BE THAT, WITH THE HELP OF THE AGENT, YOU TRY TO 
DETERMINE WHAT IT WOULD COST TO REPLACE THE DWELLING. IF IT 
WAS TOTALLY DAMAGED, TOTALLY DESTROYED THAT IS; NOT IF YOU HAD 
A FIRE SUCH AS THE ONE DESCRIBED HERE. 
AND THE FIRE MARSHALL WILL TESTIFY THAT THIS 
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1 WAS NOT A MAJOR FIRE. 
2 SECONDLY, UNSCHEDULED PERSONAL PROPERTY, AND 
3 AS IT WAS BLOWN UP, I'M NOT SURE — I BELIEVE THAT'S $59,500 WAS 
4 THE LIMIT OF LIABILITY INSURANCE, THAT THAT'S THE PROPERTY AND 
5 EFFECTS IN THE HOUSE. THAT'S ONE OF THE MAJOR AREAS OF MAJOR 
6 CONCERN, AND WE'LL TALK MORE ABOUT THAT. 
7 ANOTHER AREA, ADDITIONAL LIVING EXPENSES. 
8 THOSE ARE EXPENSES THAT WERE MADE NECESSARY BY VIRTUE OF YOUR 
9 BEING PUT OUT OF YOUR HOME DURING THIS TIME WHEN YOU HOUSE IS 
10 BEING REPAIRED. 
11 THERE ARE SEVERAL CONDITIONS THAT APPLY. SOME 
12 OF THESE WERE CLEARLY ADHERED TO: GAVE PROMPT NOTICE. 
13 BUT THIS PROVISION IS PARTICULARLY AN ISSUE IN 
14 THIS CASE, AND THAT IS TO PREPARE AN INVENTORY OF DAMAGED 
15 PERSONAL PROPERTY SHOWING QUANTITY, DESCRIPTION, ACTUAL CASH 
16 VALUE AND AMOUNT OF LOSS, ATTACH ALL BILLS, RECEIPTS AND 
17 RELATED DOCUMENTS THAT JUSTIFY THE FIGURES IN THE INVENTORY. 
18 NOW THAT'S KIND-OF A DIFFICULT ONE, AND THIS IS 
19 WHERE INSURANCE COMPANIES GET IN AND DO TRY TO HELP THEIR 
20 INSUREDS WHEN YOU HAVE A FIRE. YOU SHOULD PREPARE A LIST OF 
21 THINGS THAT YOU CLAIM WERE DAMAGED IN THE FIRE, AND THEN A 
22 DETERMINATION HAS TO BE MADE, "CAN THEY BE REPAIRED, CAN THEY 
23 BE CLEANED, DO WE NEED TO REPLACE THEM, IF SO WHAT IS THE 
24 VALUE FOR DOING ANY OF THOSE THINGS?" 
25 NOW IF YOU DON'T HAVE THE BILLS, RECEIPTS AND 
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1 RELATED DOCUMENTS, THEN YOU GO TO THE NEXT LEVEL OF PROOF, AND 
2 THAT IS TO DETERMINE KHAT PROPERTY OF LIKE KIND AND QUALITY--
3 AND THAT'S A TERM OF ART YOU WILL HEAR THROUGHOUT THIS--
4 PROPERTY OF SAME VINTAGE, PROPERTY OF SAME KIND. 
5 FOR EXAMPLE, IF YOU HAVE A VOLKSWAGEN THAT'S IN 
6 THE CARPORT AT THE TIME, HYPOTHETICALLY SPEAKING--THAT'S NOT 
7 THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE--AND THAT IS DAMAGED, YOU CAN'T 
8 REPLACE IT WITH A CADILLAC. YOU HAVE TO REPLACE IT WITH A 
9 VOLKSWAGEN OF LIKE KIND AND QUALITY. WE'LL TALK MORE ABOUT 
0 IT, BECAUSE SHE HAD A SPECIAL PROVISION IN THE POLICY WHICH 
1 WE'LL TALK ABOUT LATER, BUT THIS IS WHERE THE ADJUSTER AND THE 
2 INSURED SIT DOWN AND WORK TOGETHER. 
3 AND MR. DIO WILL TESTIFY THAT THE FIRST TIME HE 
4 MET ZANDRA PERKINS, HE EXPLAINED THESE THINGS TO HER. 
5 SHE ADMITTED IN HER DEPOSITION THAT SHE HAD 
G READ THE POLICY, AND CERTAINLY HAVING A LAW DEGREE SHE COULD 
7 UNDERSTAND, AND THAT'S NOT REALLY TOO DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND 
8 WHAT THAT MEANS. YOU PREPARE AN INVENTORY, THEN YOU 
9 SUBSTANTIATE WHAT YOU'RE CLAIMING IN SOME WAY THAT'S 
0 AGREEABLE. 
i IT OFTEN INVOLVES A MATTER OF NEGOTIATION 
2 BETWEEN THE INSURANCE AGENT OR ADJUSTER, AS THE CASE MAY BE, 
3 AND THE INSURED TO DETERMINE WHAT THE VALUES TRULY ARE, 




1 IF A PERSON, FOR EXAMPLE, CLAIMS SOMETHING THAT 
2 DOESN'T EXIST, THEN FOR EXAMPLE I HAVE SOMETHING DESTROYED IN 
3 A FIRE THAT DOESN'T EXIST, THEN THE INSURANCE COMPANY HAS TO 
4 LOOK AT THAT CAREFULLY AND CONSIDER THAT. 
5 THEN WE GET INTO AN AREA OF FRAUD, AND WE 
6 MAINTAIN IN THIS AREA THAT IN FACT SOME OF THAT HAPPENED IN 
7 THIS CASE, THAT AS WE STARTED LOOKING THROUGH THESE 600 SOME-
8 ODD ITEMS, THERE WERE THINGS IN THERE THAT WERE NOT DAMAGED OR 
9 WERE NOT IN THE HOME OR, AS A MATTER OF FACT, SHE SUBMITTED 
10 DIFFERENT INVENTORIES AND THEY WERE INCONSISTENT WITH ONE 
11 ANOTHER. AND WE BELIEVED THAT THAT DEMONSTRATED ACTUAL FRAUD 
12 ON HER PART AND AN ATTEMPT TO DEFRAUD THE INSURANCE COMPANY. 
13 ANOTHER THING IS TO SEND TO US WITHIN 60 DAYS 
14 AFTER OUR REQUEST A SIGNED, SWORN PROOF OF LOSS, ET CETERA. 
15 NOW THAT'S SOMETHING THAT THE INSURANCE COMPANY EXPECTS. THAT 
16 IS THAT IF YOU HAVE A LOSS, PARTICULARLY IF YOU'RE CLAIMING A 
1-7 LARGL LOSS LIKE THIS, THAT YOU ACTUALLY SIGN A FORM UNDER OATH 
18 SAYING, "I AFFIRM THAT THIS IS-THE LOSS I EXPERIENCED," AND 
19 THEN YOU IDENTIFY WITH THAT LOSS THE ITEMS YOU'RE CLAIMING. 
20 IN THIS CASE SHE SIGNED TWO, PERHAPS THREE 
21 PROOFS OF LOSS, BUT THEY WERE SIGNED IN BLANK. THEY DIDN'T 
22 REALLY RELATE TO HER CLAIM DIRECTLY. 
23 AS A MATTER OF FACT, ONE OF THEM, BEAR RIVER 
24 REQUIRED—SHE DEMANDED AN ADVANCE BETORE SHE DOCUMENTED HER 
25 CLAIM, AND BEAR RIVER WAS WILLING TO DO THAT IN GOOD FAITH AS 
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AN EFFORT TO MOVE THIS CASE ALONG. 
SO THOSE ARE SOME OF THE REQUIREMENTS THAT THE 
POLICY MAKES UPON AN INSURED. I WON'T TAKE TOO MUCH LONGER ON 
THIS, BUT YOU'LL SEE THIS. 
ANOTHER PROVISION OF THE POLICY REQUIRES OR 
EXPLAINS HOW YOU ADJUST A LOSS, HOW YOU SETTLE IT. WE WILL 
PAY, ADJUST ALL LOSSES, UNLESS THERE'S SOME OTHER PERSON NAMED 
IN THE POLICY, THE LOSS WILL BE PAYABLE 60 DAYS AFTER WE 
RECEIVE YOUR PROOF OF LOSS. 
THAT HAS TO BE, OBVIOUSLY, A CORRECT PROOF OF 
LOSS; WE DON'T PAY YOU IF YOU SEND A PIECE OF PAPER IN AND 
IT'S UNSIGNED, AND IT HAS TO BE DOCUMENTED. 
AND THEN AFTER WE REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH YOU. 
OBMOUSLY, WE I;ON'T PAY IF WE DON'T HAVE AN AGREEMENT. THAT 
DOESN'T MEAN WL CAN ARE ITRARILY--AND BEAR RIVER DOES NOT DO 
THAI, AND IT DOFSN'T MAKF ANY ECONOMIC SENSE FOR THEM TO BE 
ARBITRARY, BECAUSE WHEN WE GET INTO LITIGATION LIKE THIS IT 
LNDS UP A LOT MORE EXPENSIVE THAN OTHERWISE. 
YOU'LL FIND, AND THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW, WE 
BELIEVE, THAT BEAR RIVER HAS BENT OVER BACKWARDS, ACTUALLY 
VMD MUCH MORE THAN THEY HAVE PROVEN THE CLAIM WAS WORTH. 
SO THOSE ARE SOME MORE PR„\ISIONS. Till S IS A 
IRO\i:iON THAT \<L WOULD LIKE YOU TO PA\ SPECIAL ATTENTION TO. 
IT IS THE POLICE PROVISION THAT WE DO NOT PROVIDE COVERAGE, 
OBVIOUSLY, FOR INSLKLD WHO HAS INTENTIONALLY CONCEALED OR 
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1 MISREPRESENTED ANY MATERIAL FACT OR CIRCUMSTANCE. 
2 WE CLAIM THAT THERE IS EVIDENCE OF INTENTIONAL 
3 CONCEALMENT, INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION. 
4 NOW IN EVERY CASE YOU MAY HAVE A MISTAKE, AND 
5 THERE, TO THE EXTENT THAT SHE IS ABLE TO SATISFY US THAT SOME 
6 OF THESE ERRORS WERE MISTAKES, THEN THIS WOULD NOT APPLY. 
7 BUT IN ORDER FOR YOU TO FIND UNDER THIS SECTION 
8 THAT THERE IS NO COVERAGE, YOU HAVE TO BE VERY SUBSTANTIALLY 
9 SATISFIED AND CONVINCED THAT SHE KNEW THAT SHE WAS DOING 
10 SOMETHING THAT WAS FRAUDULENT, AND THE COURT WILL INSTRUCT YOU 
11 AS TO WHAT OUR BURDEN OF PROOF IS AND JUST WHAT WE HAVE TO DO 
12 TO CONVINCE YOU OF THAT FACT. 
13 THIS SECTION HAS TO DO WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF 
14 THE INSURED TO LIVE UP TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE POLICY. YOU 
15 KNOW, MANY PEOPLE THINK THAT AN INSURANCE POLICY IS GUARANTEE, 
16 THAT THEY WILL PAY ANYTHING THAT PEOPLE ASK FOR. SOMETIMES 
1-7 OBVIOUSLY--. 
18 MR. CAMPBELL: THIS IS NOT OPENING STATEMENT, 
19 AS TO WHAT THE EVIDENCE IS GOING TO BE. IT IS ARGUMENT, AND I 
20 HAVE TO OBJECT. 
21 MR. HEATH: YOUR OBJECTION IS WELL-TAKEN. BUT 
22 THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW THAT SHE HAD NOT LIVED UP TO THE POLICY 
23 PROVISIONS OF BEAR RIVER'S POLICY THAT SHE HAD IN MANY 
24 PARTICULARS, AND WE'LL POINT THOSE OUT. 
25 FINALLY, AND THIS IS GOING TO BE A MAJOR 
41 
02840 
1 CONTENTION IN THIS CASE, ZANDRA PERKINS HAD PAID AN EXTRA 
2 PREMIUM SO THAT SHE WAS NOT ONLY ENTITLED TO THE DEPRECIATED 
3 CASH VALUE OF ANY PROPERTY THAT WAS DAMAGED, BUT SHE WAS 
4 ENTITLED TO HAVE THAT PROPERTY ACTUALLY REPLACED. 
5 SO IF FOR EXAMPLE SHE HAD A CARPORT THAT NEEDED 
6 TO BE REPLACED, THE INSURANCE COMPANY WOULD NOT DEPRECIATE 
7 THAT DOWN, THEY WOULD PAY THE ACTUAL EXPENSE THAT WOULD GO 
8 INTO REPLACING THAT CARPORT; NOT WHAT IT WOULD HAVE COST TO 
9 BUILD THE CARPORT THAT WAS 20 YEARS OLD. 
0 IT WOULD PROVIDE FOR A NEW CARPORT. THE SAME 
1 WAY WITH ITEMS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY INSIDE THE HOUSE. 
2 THEY WOULD PAY FOR ITEMS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
2 INSIDE THE HOUSE IF TIILY'RE DESTROYED, IF THEY CAN'T BE 
A REPAIRED. THEY WOULD PAY THE REPLACEMENT COST. 
3 BUT THERE IS A REQUIREMENT IN THAT, AND THAT IS 
<o THAT THE INSURED ACTUALLY REPLACE THEM. IF THE INSURED 
7 CHOOSES TO KELP THE PROPERTY, AS IN THIS CASE, MUCH OF THE 
8 MATERIAL WAS CLEANED AND KEPT, THEN IN ORDER FOR THEM TO 
? QUALIFY TO GET WHAT WE CALL REPLACEMENT COST, THEY HAVE TO 
C ACTUALLY REPLACE IT. NOW THEY REPLACE IT AND FIX THE HOME, 
1 BU'I MANY ITEMS HAVE NOT BEEN REPLACED, AND THEY HAVE TO SHOW 
2 PROOT OF REPLACEMENT. AND THIS IS WHERE AN INSURED IS PUT ON 
3 NOTICE THAT WHEN YOU UL\ SOMETHING TO REPLACE, FOR EXAMPLE A 
-+ DAMAGED TABLE, YOU BRING US THE RECEIPT THAT SHOWS THAT YOU 
1IA\E BOUGHT IT, THAT DESCRIBES WHAT KIND OF TABLE IT IS, THAT 
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IT IS ESSENTIALLY A TABLE OF LIKE KIND AND QUALITY--YOU CAN'T 
REPLACE A THIN TABLE WITH A MAHOGANY TABLE OR WHATEVER—AND WE 
WILL PAY THE ACTUAL REPLACEMENT COST. BUT YOU HAVE TO RLTLACL 
IT FIRST. 
IF YOU CHOOSE NOT TO DO THAT, THEN \OU ONL\ GET 
ACTUAL CASH VALUE. 
AND THE ACTUAL CASH VALUE IS DETERMINED BY 
CONSIDERING THE CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY AT THE TIME, AND 
DETERMINING WHAT THE DEPRECIATED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY WAS AT 
THE TIME. 
THERE WILL BE TESTIMONY THAT MR. DIO ATTEMPTED 
TO SETTLE THIS CASE AND MADE AN OFFER AT ONE TIME TO SETTLE AT 
LEAST THE PORTION RELATING TO THE CONTENTS BY SUGGESTING A 
IORMLLA THAT ALLOWED THE PAYMENT OF ONLY 50 PERCENT OF THE 
REPLACEMENT COST OT THOSE ITEMS. 
THERE WILL BE TESTIMONY THAT DEPRECIATION UNDER 
IHO.sr CIRCUMSTANCES IS PROBABLY TOO HIGH, BUT MR. DIO WILL 
L'M'LAIN TO \Ol WHAT HE WAS THINKING ABOUT WHEN HE ALLOCATED 
I HAT 50 PLRCLNT. 
THERE WAS A LUMP-SUM TYPE THING; THEY SAID, 
"YOl HA\E COO ITEMS HERE, RATHER THAN GOING THROUGH AND 
REQUIRING YOU '10 DOCUMENT L\ERY SPLCIFIC ITEM, RATHER THAN GO 
THROUGH AND IR\ TO DETERMINE ACTUAL REPLACEMENT COST OF EVERY 
ITEM, RATHER THAN MAKING YOU REPLACE EVERY ITEM, WE WILL OFFER 
YOL 50 PERCENT." 
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1 THIS IS THE BEGINNING POINT OF THE NEGOTIATION. 
2 WELL, THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPI THAT, AND 
3 NEGOTIATIONS BROKE DOWN, AND AS A RESULT OF THAT, BEAR RIVER 
4 BROUGHT IN AN INDEPENDENT ADJUSTER SAYING, "LOOK, IF YOU 
5 CAN'T--IF MR. DIO'S NOT BEING RESPONSIVE TO YOUR REQUESTS, 
6 WE'LL HAVE AN INDEPENDENT ADJUSTER," AND HE BENT OVER 
7 BACKWARDS AS BEAR RIVER TRIED TO SETTLE IT ON THE BASIS OF 30 
8 AND EVEN 25 PERCENT I BELIEVE. DON'T HOLD ME TO THAT FIGURE, 
9 BECAUSE MR. BRAD BLOOM, WHO WILL TESTIFY, THAT HE HAD 
0 INSTRUCTIONS FROM BEAR RIVER TO DO WHAT HE COULD TO SETTLE THE 
1 CASE WITHIN REASON. 
2 AND HE WENT TO THE POINT OF--ON THIS, OT TRYING 
3 To SETTLE THIS PART OF IT. 
'4 AND NOW AS WE GET INVOLVED IN THE EMDENCE, AND 
5 WE GET PREPARING FOR TRIAL, WE FIND OUT THAT MANY OF THESE 
o ITEMS THAI SHE WAS CLAIMING SHE PAID FOR WERE ACTUALLY CLEANED 
7 AND RETURNTD AND ARE STILL IN THE HOME. 
8 LET ML MENTION TO YOU, IF I MAY, AN AREA WHERE 
9 VE BELIEVE THE REAL FRAUD EXISTS IN THIS CASE, NOT THAT IT 
0 DOESN'T IN OTHERS. ONE OF THE COVERAGES UNDER THE POLICY I 
i MENTIONED TO VOL ALREADY, AND MR. CAMPBELL REFERRED TO IT, IS 
2 ADDITIONAL L1WNG EXPENSES MADL NECESSARY BY VIRTUE OF THE 
3 TIRE. 
4 WELL, ZANDRA PERKINS, AT THE TIME, WAS NOT 
5 LIVINo IN THIS HOME. THAT'S SIGNIFICANT, BECAUSE THAT CUT 
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DOWN TREMENDOUSLY ON HER ACTUAL LIVING EXPENSES AS A RESULT OF 
THE FIRE. 
SHE HAD A LOT OF THINGS THERE, BUT SHL WAS 
LIVING IN ARIZONA AT THIS POINT. SO HER ADDITIONAL LIVING 
EXPENSES WERE NOT THE SAME AS IF SHE HAD BEEN LIVING THERE. 
SHE DIDN'T HAVE TO GO OUT AND FIND ANOTHER HOME TO LIVE IN, 
DIDN'T HAVE TO GO OUT AND FIND A HOTEL TO STAY IN. IN FACT 
SHE CAME BACK FROM ARIZONA TO SEE WHAT THE FIRE WAS, TO SEE 
WHAT THE DAMAGE WAS. 
NEVERTHELESS, DURING THE COURSE OF TRYING TO 
RESOLVE THIS CASE, BEAR RIVER CONTINUALLY WAS BOMBARDED WITH 
DEMANDS THAT THEY DETERMINE ARE TOTALLY UNREASONABLE. 
HERE'S AN EXAMPLE OF ONE SUCH DEMAND. THIS IS 
--I1 DOESN'T SHOW LT HERE VERY WELL, BUT THIS IS SIGNED BY 
CLEA PERKINS HERE. SHE — BY THE WAY, WE SUBPOENAED HER, AND 
: lu LYIDLXJL WILL BE THAT SHE'S NOT PHYSICALLY ABLE TO COME 
AND TES1 I¥\ . 
MR. CAMPBELL: THAT'S NOT EVIDENCE, IF THE 
COLRi PLEASE. THAT'S JUST SIMPLY IMPROPER ARGUMENT. 
MR. 11LATII: WELL, WILL SHE BE HERE? 
MK. CAMPBELL: I'M NOT GOING TO GET UP AND 
RESPOND TO THIS IN 1HL MIDDLE OF OPENING STATEMENTS. 
THE COURT: DON'T START ASKING QUESTIONS. MOVE 
0\LR IT. 
MR. HI A HI: OKAY. IN ANY EVENT, THEY SUBMIT A 
4 5 
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1 BILL, THEY SUBMIT A BILL TO BEAR RIVER, ASKING HER TO PAY HER 
2 MOTHER $50 PER DAY FOR ROOM AND $20 PER DAY FOR BOARD DURING 
3 THIS PERIOD OF TIME, MOST OF WHICH SHE WAS NOT EVEN LIVING IN 
4 SALT LAKE, NOT EVEN AT HER MOTHER'S HOME. 
5 AT HER DEPOSITION, MS. PERKINS EXPLAINED THAT 
6 BY SAYING, "WELL, MY MOTHER KEPT A ROOM AVAILABLE FOR ME AT 
7 HOME, THEREFORE I BELIEVE $50 A DAY IS REASONABLE." 
8 AND THEN WE SEE THAT THAT COMES TO A TOTAL OF 
9 $10,000. SHE'S INCLUDING $20 A DAY FOR BOARD, FOR FOOD, THAT 
0 SHE WOULD HAVE TO BUY HER FOOD WHETHER SHE HAD FIRE OR NOT. 
1 AND SHE WAS BUYING HER FOOD DOWN IN ARIZONA. 
2 AND THE ONLY TIME DURING THAT WHOLE PERIOD SHE 
3 WAS LIVING AT HOME WAS DURING THE MONTH OF AUGUST. SO FOR 
4 ABOUT 30 DAYS, SHE WAS LIVING WITH HER MOTHER, BUT SHE'S 
CLAIMING THAT ROOM AND BOARD DURING THIS WHOLE PERIOD OF TIME 
b IN THE AMOUNT OF $7,900 FOR ROOM; THAT'S 158 DAYS BETWEEN THE 
7 PERIOD OF THE FIRE IN MAY AND INTO OCTOBER. 
C NOW THE ONLY TIME SHE ACTUALLY WAS WITH HER 
9 MOTHER DURING THAT PERIOD OF TIME WAS 30 DAYS AT THE MOST. SHE 
0 MAY HAVE COME BACK A FEW TIMES, AND SO IF SHE CAME BACK A FEW 
1 TIMES, MAYBE YOU COULD ADD A LITTLE BIT. BUT SHE SAID IN HER 
2 DEPOSITION, SHE WAS ONLY THERE ONLY IN AUGUST. IN SEPTEMBER 
3 SHE RETURNED TO PORTLAND WHERE SHE WAS IN LAW SCHOOL, AND YET 
4 THIS IS WHAT THEY'RE CLAIMING. THAT'S WHY BEAR RIVER HASN'T 
5 PAID HER FOR ADDITIONAL LIVING EXPENSES. 
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IN ADDITION TO THAT, HER MOTHER CLAIMS THAT — AS 
SHE PREPARED THIS, A CHARGE FOR THE USE OF HER LAUNDRY 
FACILITIES IN HER HOME DURING THAT SAME PERIOD OF TIME, 13 6 
DAYS . 
AND APPARENTLY THAT'S EVERY DAY OF THE KEEK, 
BECAUSE SHE SAYS, "WE DON'T DO LAUNDRY ON SUNDAY." 
AND YET BEAR RIVER'S BEEN BILLED FOR THE 
CLEANING OF THESE CONTENTS BY PROFESSIONAL LAUNDERERS, AT 
LEAST TWO AND MAYBE THREE FOR CLEANING VARIOUS THINGS. 
SHE'S CLAIMING A TOTAL OF $1,346.40, CLAIMING 
THAT THIS LAUNDRY FACILITY WAS USED A TOTAL OF 136 DAYS DURING 
THAT TIME PERIOD. ZANDRA WASN'T EVEN LIVING THERE. 
NOW WITH REGARD TO THE DWELLING, WE BELIEVE 
THERE IS SIGNIFICANT FRAUDULENT CLAIMS WITH REGARD TO THE 
DWELLING. MS. PERKINS SAID, AND COUNSEL HAS SAID HERE IN 
OPENING STATEMENT, THAT THEY HAVE MADE NO CLAIM FOR THE 
BUILDING Or Till, GARAGE. WELL, OBVIOUSLY THE GARAGE IS AN 
IMPROVEMENT, A BETTERMENT. BUT IF YOU LISTEN CLOSELY TO THE 
EVIDENCE OF MR. RASMUSSEN, YOU LOOK AT ART NOBLE, THE 
TESTIMONY FROM THEM, BEAR RIVER HAS BEEN BILLED FOR THE TOTAL 
AMOUNT, NOT JUST DAMAGES TO THE CARPORT, REPLACEMENT, BUT FOR 
THE WALL THAT WENT ALONG SIDE THE CARPORT IN ORDER TO MAKE 
THIS INTO A GARAGE. 
YOU'LL HEAR TESTIMONY OF CPH THAT DID THE 
CONCRETE WORK, YOU'LL SEE PICTURES OF THE CONCRETE WORK, BUT 
4 7 
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1 MARSHA SMITH, MS. PERKINS' SISTER, ASKED THEM IF THEY WERE 
2 GOING TO REPLACE THE CONCRETE IN THE PATIO. 
3 THEY SAID, "NO." SHE SAID, "IT'S STAINED BY 
4 THE FIRE." SHE SAID THAT IT NEEDED TO BE ACID-WASHED AND 
5 CLEANED. DIDN'T WANT TO PUT CONCRETE IN THE CARPORT, BAD 
6 CONCRETE IN THE MAIN, SO THAT SHE SAID, "WHILE YOU'RE DOING 
7 THAT, DO THE WHOLE THING." 
8 IT WAS EXPLAINED BY CPH THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE 
9 COVERED UNDER THE INSURANCE POLICY, AND ZANDRA IN HER 
0 DEPOSITION SAID IT WAS NOT SUBMITTED TO THE INSURANCE COMPANY. 
1 WE SEE THE BILL, AS WE SEE THE ACCOUNTING 
2 REPORT, THAT IN I ACT IT WAS, AND AS RECENTLY AS WITHIN THE 
3 LAST TWO WEEKS WHEN WE FINALLY GET THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF THEIR 
JLAIM FROM MR. RASMUSSEN, \/L SEE THAT IT'S NOW INCLUDED. 
THAT'S WHY THIS CASE HASN'T SETTLED, BECAUSE WE 
(> CAN NEVER GET--. 
•7 MR. CAMPBELL: IF THE COURT PLEASE, THAT IS NOT 
8 OPENING STATEMENT AS TO WHAT--. 
{) THE COURT: I WOULD SUSTAIN, COUNSEL. 
0 MR. CAMPBELL: THAT'S TOTALLY IMPROPER, AND THE 
i JIRi OUGHT TO BE SO ADVISED. 
2 MK. HEATH: THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW--. 
3 THE COURT: COUNSEL, DON'T DWELL ON THE 
A SETTLEMENT SITUATION. 
5 MR. HEATH: I APOLOGIZE FOR THAT, YOUR* HONOR , 
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1 AND COUNSEL. BUT THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW THAT BEAR RIVER HAS 
2 NOT RECEIVED, IN ANY FORM OF DOCUMENTATION, EVEN FROM 
3 MR. RASMUSSEN WHO'S GOING TO COME IN HERE AND TESTIFY WHAT HE 
4 BELIEVES THE VALUE OF THE CLAIM IS, A CLAIM WHICH IS FREE OF 
5 FRAUD, A CLAIM WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE EVIDENCE, AND A 
6 CLAIM WHICH INCLUDES THE ITEMS THAT WERE ACTUALLY DAMAGED. 
7 LET ME TALK TO YOU A LITTLE BIT ABOUT BEAR 
8 RIVER WITH REGARD TO FIRST GENERAL SERVICE. BEAR RIVER DOES 
9 NOT HAVE ANY SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH FIRST GENERAL SERVICE. 
0 MR. DIO WILL SHOW YOU THAT HE CARRIES AROUND, IN HIS 
i EXPERIENCE, PEOPLE WHO HAVE SUFFERED A FIRE, THEIR HOME, THFY 
'1 DO WANT RECOMMENDATIONS, AND HE HAS CARDS OF SEVERAL 
CONTRACTORS, AND OTHER CONTRACTORS IN FACT WILL COME IN HERE 
AND TESTIFY CONCERNING THE BID WHICH WAS SUBMITTED ON BEHALF 
OF IIRoT GENERAL SERVICE, 
t. AND AS A MATTER OF FACT, WHEN MR. DIO ARRIVED 
7 \\ 1HL PROPERTY, THERE WAS A PERSON ALREADY THERE, BLAINE 
o JCT^ER, WHO WAS THERE INSPECTING THE DAMAGES FOR THE PURPOSE 
* o:--HL*LL BT CALLED TO TESTIFY, AND HE WAS THERE INSPECTING IT 
0 FOR THE PURPOSE OF TRYING TO SUBMIT A BID, AND WAS PREPARED TO 
i DO 50. 
1 MR. DIO CALLED HIM AND ASKED HIM IF HE WAS 
3 GOING TO SUBMIT A BID, AND HE SAID, "NO, I WENT OLT AND 
-4 PERKINS HAD ALREADY HIRED I1RSI GENERAL SERVICE." 
: IH\T DIVISION, THAT'S WHERE THE TWO BIDS COME 
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1 IN; THERE ACTUALLY WERE NOT TWO. TWO PEOPLE LOOKED AT THE 
2 PROPERTY FOR THE PURPOSE OF BIDDING. 
3 AND BEAR RIVER'S POSITION IS THAT THEY WILL ?A\ 
4 ANYONE WHO SUBMITS A REASONABLE BID. THEY RESERVE THE RIGHT 
5 TO REVIEW THE BID, AND ALSO THAT'S REFERRED TO AS A SCOPE 
6 SHEET, TO SEE WHETHER OR NOT THE ITEMS THAT THEY'RE ACTUALLY 
7 ASKING FOR ARE ACTUALLY INCLUDED IN THE POLICY. 
8 IF THEY ARE REPLACING THEM WITH MATERIALS IN 
9 LIKE KIND AND QUALITY AND ET CETERA, ET CETERA. 
10 BEAR RIVER'S BEEN PUT BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD 
11 PLACE BECAUSE AS MR. DIO TRIED TO RESOLVE THIS, ZANDRA PERKINS 
12 TERMINATED FIRST GENERAL SERVICE. THEY HAVE THEIR DISPUTE 
13 ONGOING. IN FACT THAT'S HOW THIS LITIGATION GOT STARTED. 
1M TIRST GENERAL SERVICE SUBMITTED A BILL, A SCOPE 
ii SHEET, A BID, EARLY ON I OR A SUM WHICH BEAR RIVER AGREED TO. 
i(> AND ULTIMATELY BEAR RIVER HAS PAID MORE THAN 
j-7 THAI. WHAT HAPPENED IS MS. PERKINS FIRED FIRST GENERAL 
J8 SERVICE. IT RESULTED IN A LOT OF DUPLICATION. WE MENTIONED 
19 LEO THORPE hHO CAME IN AND COMPLETED THE HOME. THE EVIDENCE 
20 WILL SHOW THAI THERE WERE MANY CONTRACTORS WHO CAME IN. LEO 
21 THORPE SAYS HE HAD A GENERAL CONTRACTORS LICENSE, BUT AS A 
22 MATTER OF FACT HIS DID—HIS BILLS WERE ACTUALLY TYPED BY 
23 ZANDRA PERKINS. THEY HAD A CLOSE ASSOCIATION. 
24 HE, ON A PRIOR OCCASION, TESTIFIED TO THAT, AND 
25 THE^ WERE ACQUAINTED WITH ONE ANOTHER, AND AS A MATTER OF FACT 
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THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW THAT THORPE HIMSELF DID VERY, VERY 
LITTLE IF ANYTHING ON THE JOB. 
CONTRACTORS CAME ON, SOME OF THEM HAD 
SUBCONTRACTORS, OTHERS WERE SUBCONTRACTORS THAT HAD NOTHING TO 
DO WITH LEO THORPE, BUT ALL OF THIS ADDED TO THE COST OF 
COMPLETING THE DWELLING. 
THEN WHEN YOU TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE 
IMPROVEMENTS AND THE BETTERMENTS, THEN THEIR CLAIM COMES UP 
HIGHER THAN WHAT BEAR RIVER IS OBLIGATED TO PAY. 
BEAR RIVER IS OBLIGATED TO PAY THE REASONABLE 
REPAIR OF THE DWELLING TO ITS LIKE KIND AND QUALITY. THEY 
RECEIVED A VALID BID, A SCOPE SHEET, FROM FIRST GENERAL 
SEPMCL. THEY STOOD READY TO PAY IT, ULTIMATELY THEY PAID 
FIRST GENERAL SERVICE $20,000. 
LET ME SAY THAT THEY DID THAT IN AN EFFORT TO 
GLT THE PROJECT GOING. ZANDRA PERKINS WAS IN PHOENIX AT THE 
TIML, A CALL CAME TO THEM INDICATING THAT SHE HAD AUTHORIZED 
GENL PETERSON 10 ACCEPT THOSE MONIES, AND HE WILL SO TESTIFY 
HZ HAD APPROVAL FROM HER, AND AS A RESULT OF THAT, BEAR RIVER 
SAID, "WELL, H)L NEED TO GET GOING," AND SOME OF THAT MONEY 
WENT TO PAY LABRET ' S INTERIORS WHO FURNISHED CARPET AND 
DRAPES, AND $18,000 OF JT WENT TO HIS SUBS FOR THE WORK HE HAD 
DONE. THE BID WAS MUCH HIGHER THAN THAT, IN THE AREA UPWARDS 
ul $40,000 TO REPAIR THE DWELLING, AND BEAR RIVER FELT THAT 
THOSE TWO PAYMENTS OF $20,000, $10,000 ONE TIME AND $10,000 
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ANOTHER TIME, WOULD HELP MOVE THE PROJECT ALONG, EVEN THOUGH 
THERE HADN'T BEEN ADEQUATE DOCUMENTATION CONCERNING OTHER 
PARTS OF THE CLAIM. 
INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, IN THE MIDDLE OF JUL\ OF 
1990, ZANDRA PERKINS CAME BACK TO UTAH, HAD A CONVERSATION 
WITH MR. PETERSON ABOUT THE PROJECT, WHAT WAS HAPPENING. 
MR. PETERSON'S TESTIMONY WILL BE THAT UP TO 
THAT TIME HE HAD HAD VERY LITTLE OR ANY COMPLAINTS ABOUT HIS 
WORK, bUT THEN HE STARTED TALKING ABOUT WHAT HE WAS GOING TO 
DO TO COMPLETE THE PROJECT, AND THEN THERE WAS A CONVERSATION 
--AND I CAN'T QUOTE IT VERBATIN--BUT MR. PETERSON WILL COME 
CLOSE TO THAT, AT LEAST IN SUBSTANCE, AND THAT IS THAT SHE 
ASKED HIM, "IS THERE ANY WAY TO FINISH THE GARAGE AND HAVE IT 
INCLUDED IN THE INSURANCE CLAIM0" HE SAID, "ABSOLUTELY NOT," 
hE WOULDN'T DO THAT. 
HE SAID ATIER THAT TIME THE RELATIONSHIP WEN1 
DOWNHILL, AND THE^ STARTED FINDING ALL SORTS OF THINGS TO FIND 
WRONG WITH HIS WORK. 
THEN ON JUL'i THE 30TH , BEAR RIVER ISSUED A 
SECOND PAYMENT, PERKINS AT THAT POINT IN TIME BECAME CONCERNED 
AND ASkLb BtAR RIVER TO STOP PAYMENT ON IT, AND THEY SAID THEY 
WOILD NOT STOP PAYMENT ON IT BASED ON THE FACT THAT THE^--
THEIR REVIEW uF THE WORK, HE HAD DONE IT, AND IT WAS WORTH AT 
LEAST THAT MUCH IF NOT MORE. 
INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, THERE WAS A CLAIM IN 
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THERE--I WON'T GO INTO THEIR CLAIMS: YOU'LL HEAR ENOUGH ABOUT 
THAT--THAT IN FACT THEIR ACCOUNTANT HAS CONTRIBUTED $30,000. 
MR. CAMPBELL: THAT'S PURE ARGUMENT. IF WE 
WERE IN CLOSING ARGUMENT, YOU WOULDN'T HEAR ANY MORE THAN WHAT 
COUNSEL IS NOW DOING. WE'RE ON THE BORDER OF A MI SI RIAL, AND 
I WANT TO MAKE A MOTION AFTER COUNSEL IS THROUGH, BUT THIS IS 
TOTALLY IMPROPER ARGUMENT, NOT WHAT THE EVIDENCE IS GOING TO 
SHOW. 
MR. HEATH: WELL, I GUESS MR. RASMUS SEN CAN 
RESPOND TO THAT. YOU CAN HEAR HIS TESTIMONY. 
MR. CAMPBELL: YOUR HONOR, I'VE MADE AN 
OBJECTION. 
THE COURT: AND I WILL ALLOW HIM TO CONTINUE. 
MOVE OFF FROM IT AND CONTINUE, COUNSEL. 
MR. HEATH: THE RESULT OF THAT IS THAT THE 
CONTRACT WITH FIRST GENERAL WAS TERMINATED. BEAR RIVER THEN 
HAD TO DEAI WITH A LOT OF OTHER CONTRACTORS. 
THEY MADE PAYMENTS DIRECTLY TO ZANDRA PERKINS, 
ViDL PAYMENTS TO OTHER CONTRACTORS, AND HERF'S THE TOTAL 
\MOUNT OF PAYMENTS THAT BEAR RIVER HAD MADE. 
BEAR RIVER HAS PAID THESI AMOUNTS DIRECTLY TO 
ZANDRA PERKINS, $44,000; THESE ARE AMOUNTS THEY PAID TOWARDS 
THE DWELLLNG, $54,609. THAT'S WHAT THEY ALLOCATED TOWARDS THE 
DWELLING WHICH WAS MORE THAN THL ORIGINAL SCOPE SHEET 
SUBMITTED ?>\ FIRS I wENERAL SERVICE. 
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ON THE CONTENTS, THEY HAVE PAID — THIS IS FOR 
PROPERTY IN THE HOKE, $35,953. THEY PAID FOR SOME ITEMS IN 
THAT THAT IN FACT WERE NOT REPLACED, WERE CLEANED AND RETURNED 
TO THE HOME. 
MR. CAMPBELL: THAT'S REPETITIVE, YOUR HONOR, 
AND ALSO ARGUMENTATIVE. I DON'T THINK COUNSEL KNOWS HOW TO 
MAKE AN OPENING STATEMENT. 
MR. HEATH: AND I OBJECT TO THE CONTINUAL 
INTERRUPTIONS. 
THE COURT: NO, NO, YOU ARE REPEATING, COUNSEL. 
PLEASE MOVE ON. 
MR. HEATH: THIS IS THE FIRST TIME I'VE 
REFERRED TO THAT FIGURE, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: MAYBE THE FIGURE BUT THL CONTENTS. 
MR. HEATh: THE ADDITIONAL LIVING EXPENSES, THE 
ILLL AMOUNT BEAR RIVLK HAS PAID, $91,062 IS THIS FIRE WHICH WE 
HAVE DEMONSTRATED FOR YOU. 
THERE WILL BE ISSUES ABOUT DELAY, ABOUT WHY 
THIS HAS DRAGGED ON, WH\ WE'RE HERE IN COURT. IT'S BEAR 
Rl\PR'S POSITION THAT THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW CLEARLY THAT THEY 
TRIED, IN THE FACE OF ALL THE EVIDENCE THE^ COULD, IN THE FACE 
of ALL THE OPPOSITION THLY HAD, TO TRY TO RESOLVE THIS CASE. 
1 IiZ \ HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO BECAUSE 01 THE NATURE OF THE 
INFORMATION, LACK 01 DOCUMENTATION, AND CLAIMS THAT HA\F BEEN 
LROLGIIT TO LIGHT IN THIS INVESTIGATION; THAT IN TACT THE 
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AMOUNT BEAR RIVER HAS PAID IS MORE THAN THE VALUE OF THE 
CLAIM. THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: MR. SMITH? 
MR. CAMPBELL: YOUR HONOR, EXCUSE ME, I HAVE 
TWO MOTIONS I WANT TO MAKE ON COUNSEL'S STATEMENT. 
THE COURT: YOU MAY RESERVE THEM, COUNSEL. 
MR. CAMPBELL: AND--. 
THE COURT: YOU MAY RESERVE THEM, COUNSEL. 
MR. CAMPBELL: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR, THAT'S 
ALL I WANTED TO SAY FOR THE RECORD. 
(WHEREUPON, FURTHER PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, BEING 
REPORTED BUT NOT HEREIN TRANSCRIBED PURSUANT TO 
REQUESTED TRANSCRIPT CONTENT.) 
('TRANSCRIBED BY NANC\ BURR) 
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WOULD HAND THEM TG THE COURT., IF I MAY* 
MR. BOSTWICK: AND WILL COUNSEL PROVIDE COPIES 
OF THOSE? 
MR. CAMPBELLS I WILL, YES. 
(WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED 
IN THE PRESENCE AND HEARING OF THE JURY:) 
THE COURTs THE RECORD MAY SHOW THAT ALL 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY ARE PRESENT. IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH 
COUNSEL, AND OUR ARGUMENTS,- WE HAVE RESOLVED ONE MATTER WHICH 
WE WCUL.D LIKE TO CALL TO YOUR ATTENTION. I AM GOING TO READ A 
STATEMENT TO YOU AND ASK YOU TO LISTEN CLOSELY TO IT, AND 
YOU'LL THEN BE CONSIDERING THIS STATEMENT WITH ALL OF THE 
OTHER THINGS WHICH YOU CONSIDER AS FAR AS THE CASE IS 
CONCERNED. 
IN THE OPENING STATEMENT OF COUNSEL OF BEAR 
RIVER, ON MONDAY AFTERNOON, REFERENCE WAS MADE TO THE 
POTENTIAL OF SHOWING INSURANCE FRAUD ON THE PART OF THIRD-
PARTY PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT PERKINS. 
I INSTRUCT YOU THAT THE COURT HAS DETERMINED AS 
A MATTER OF LAW THAT INSURANCE FRAUD IS NOT AN ISSUE IN THIS 
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MAY N C T ATTEMPT TO SHOW, UNDER THE EVIDENCE. , THAT INCORRECT, 
INACCURATE OR FALSE STATEMENTS WERE MADE B v MS. P E R K I N S I N 
S U B M I T T I N G C L A I M S TO BEAR R I V E R INSURANCE COMPANY. 
THAT I S AN I S S U E WHICH YOU MAY CONSIDER I N 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE I N S T R U C T I O N S OF LAW G I V E N TO YOU AFTER A L L 
OF THE EV IDENCE HAS BEEN PRESENTED. THANK YOU. I S THE 
WITNESS HERE? 
MR. BOSTWICK: HE I S . 
THE COURTs MR. F U L L M E R , ASK THE WITNESS TO 
COME I N . 
MR. CAMPBELL : YOUR HONOR, AS I UNDERSTAND THE 
STATE OF THE RECORD NOW, THERE HAS BEEN A MOTION TO S T R I K E 
T H I S W I T N E S S - T E S T I M O N Y , THE E X H I B I T S , AND THE COURT I S T A K I N G 
I T UNDER ADVISEMENT SUBJECT TO FURTHER E X A M I N A T I O N . 
THE COURT: I T MAY SHOW AS I I N D I C A T E D , 
COUNSEL. 
S I R , YOU WERE PREVIOUSLY SWORN AND I WOULD 
ADMONISH YOU THAT Y O U ' R E S T I L L UNDER OATH. 
(WHEREUPON, J E F F _ L E A V i J T , HAV ING P R E V I O U S L Y 
BEEN DULY SWORN TO THE T R U T H , RESUMED THE 
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WHAT I'M SAYING IS I'M DENYING YOUR MOTION AND 
UPHOLDING WHAT MR. CAMPBELL IS SAYING AS FAR AS I THINK THAT'S 
THE RIGHT THING. IT'S A CONTRACTUAL RIGHT, AND I WOULD RULE 
THAT WAY. NOW ANY OTHER MOTIONS?_ I HAVE A COUPLE OF MATTERS 
MYSELF. 
MR. BOSTWICK: I DON'T HAVE A MOTION, BUT I 
NOTICED IN REVIEW OF THE EXHIBITS WE FAILED TO OFFER EXHIBIT 
NO. 18—. 
MR. CAMPBELL: THE COURT IS ASKING ABOUT 
MOTIONS HERE. 
MR. SMITH: THERE'S ONE HOUSEKEEPING MATTER. I 
ACTUALLY—MR. HEATH BROUGHT THIS UP, I WAS LOOKING THROUGH MY 
FILE TO SEE IF OUR PLEADINGS ARE THERE, AND FOR SOME REASON I 
DON'T SEE THE PLEADINGS THERE, YOUR HONOR. THEY SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN BROUGHT UP FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT, AND MAYBE I'M MISSING 
IT, BUT I'VE LOOKED THROUGH THOSE VOLUMES AND—. 
THE COURT: I SAW THE PLEADINGS OF THAT FILE 
MANY MONTHS AGO FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT IN YOUR CASE. 
MR. SMITH: DID YOU? I LOOKED THROUGH AND I 
DIDN'T SEE THEM. I WANTED TO MAKE SURE THEY WERE IN THERE. 
THE COURT: THE DOCUMENTS—I HAVE TWO ISSUES. 
ONE IS THAT I HAVE A MATTER UNDER ADVISEMENT, AND THE COURT, 
AFTER I LEFT THE BENCH LAST NIGHT, I WAS SOMEWHAT CONCERNED AS 
I HAD RULED CONCERNING THE FRAUD CLAIM, AND SO I HAD THE 
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REPORTER READ TO ME FROM THE TRANSCRIPT AS FAR AS THE 
TESTIMONY THAT HAD BEEN GIVEN, AND IT'S BEEN TWO WEEI-S AGO AND 
MANY THINGS HAVE TAP EN PLACE. I HOPE THE JURY REMEMBERS IT, 
THE TESTIMONY. 
BUT ANYWAY, WHAT I'M SAYING IS THIS: I 
REVIEWED THE TESTIMONY OF MR. PETERSON, WHAT HE SAID 
CONCERNING THIS MATTER, AND THE TESTIMONY OF—WHO WAS THE 
OTHER ONE"-1 WELL, ANYWAY, I LOCKED AT THE TESTIMONY, AND I'M 
OF THE OPINION THAT THERE IS A JURY QUESTION AS FAR AS FRAUD 
IS CONCERNED, THAT I THINI- THAT I COULD BE IN ERROR AS FAR AS 
MOT SUBMITTING THAT TO THE JURY. 
SO I M REVERSING MYSELF AND ALLOWING THE FRAUD 
CLAIM, WHICH WOULD ALSO REINSTATE THE CI_MIM FOR PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES, TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
MR. B05TWIH : PUNITIVE DAMAGE ON THE 
NEGLIGENCE—. 
THE COURT: YES, NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION. 
NOW MR. SMITH HAS MADE A MOTION, AND MR. SMITH, I DON T I-MOW 
IT YOU RE RENEWING IT--. 
MR. SMITH: I AM, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT; DO YOU WANT TO ARGUE ANYTHING 
FURTHER BEFORE ME OR ARE YOU SUBMITTING IT'"1 
MR. SMITH: YOUR HONOR, I THINI- I'LL SUBMIT IT. 
I'VE PRESENTED A MEMORANDUM HERE, AND I THINI I VE PRETTY WELL 
STATED WHAT I WANTED TO STATE. 
2<?0 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




ZANDRA PERKINS, an Individual, 
Defendant. 
ZANDRA PERKINS, an Individual, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF 
PERKINS7 JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT; OBJECTION TO 
FORM OF JUDGMENT RE: 
COSTS TO BE APPORTIONED 
BETWEEN BEAR RIVER AND 
PERKINS; PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT 
REGARDING ATTORNEYS FEES; 
DEFENDANT FRAMPTON'S 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES 
Civil No. C900906000 
(Hon. Homer F. Wilkinson) 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the 5th day of 
August, 1993, commencing at the hour of 8:00 a.m., the 
above-entitled matter came on for hearing in Courtroom No. 
502 of the Courts Building, Metropolitan Hall of Justice, 
24 0 East 4 00 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, before the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge in the Third Judicial 
District, State of Utah. 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
MESSRS. PARREL J. BOSTWICK. Attornev-at-Law: 
and JEFFERY R. PRICE. Attorney-at-Lav. Walstad & Babcock, 
1 Temple View Centre, 57 West South Temple, Eighth Floor, 
2 Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, telephone 531-7000, appearing on 
3 behalf of Plaintiff First General Services. 
4 MESSRS. ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR., Attornev-at-
5 Law; and JON C. MARTINSON, Attornev-at-Law, Campbell, Maack & 
6 Sessions, One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor, 201 South Main 
7 Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215, telephone 537-5555, 
8 appearing on behalf of Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff 
9 Perkins. 
10 MESSRS. HENRY E. HEATH. Attornev-at-Law: and 
11 H. BURT RINGWOOD, Attorney-at-Law, Strong & Hanni, Sixth 
12 Floor, Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, telephone 
13 532-7080, appearing on behalf of Third-Party Defendant Bear 
14 River Mutual. 
15 DAVID K. SMITH. Attornev-at-Law. 6925 Union 
16 Park Center, Suite 600, Midvale, Utah 84047, telephone 
17 566-3373, appearing on behalf of Kent L. Frampton Heating & 
18 Air Conditioning. 
19 (Whereupon, the following proceedings were had 
20 in open court:) 
21 THE COURT: The matter before the Court is the case 
22 of First General Services v. Perkins and, of course, their 
23 action against Bear River Mutual. Counsel, I have four 
24 motions before the Court today, it looks like; one by each 
25 party. How do you want to proceed? 
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1 MR. CAMPBELL: I would suggest, Your Honor, that we 
2 proceed with Perkins7 judgment NOV, Rule 59 motion for new 
3 trial. If those are granted, others will become moot. 
4 THE COURT: You may proceed first on your motion. 
5 MR. CAMPBELL: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, 
6 may it please the Court, the issues that are before the Court 
7 this morning are grave and most substantive. While this case 
8 was tried just about three months ago, the result which the 
9 jury brought back into this courtroom ought to still be 
10 ringing in the ears of everybody who attended this trial, and 
11 the conscience of this Court. 
12 I think the Court instructed the jury, and as the 
13 jury retired, based upon the evidence of two weeks, it was 
14 two weeks, and we ran very long days. The Court worked hard 
15 and the parties and counsel hard to get the case to the jury 
16 on Thursday of the second week. 
17 But, Your Honor, the evidence in this case was 
18 simply overwhelming with regard to the breach of contract of 
19 First General and the breach of contract of Bear River. The 
20 evidence — I'm not going to argue this morning, take the 
21 Court's time to review specifically what that evidence is in 
22 great detail. The Court knows it. We've laid it out in some 
2 3 respects in our brief. 
24 But it is important. I'm not here, as I say, to 
25 give a further closing argument; that's not the function 
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1 under Rule 50(b) and 59(a) of a motion for judgment 
2 notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for new trial. 
3 But rather it is, Judge, to give some balance and 
4 weight and integrity to the evidence which Your Honor heard 
5 as well as everybody else in this courtroom, and there were 
6 perceptions that the evidence far weighed in favor of 
7 Ms. Perkins at the close of that testimony. 
8 Now, I submit to the Court that the evidence of 
9 breach, First General's breach of contract, was so manifest 
10 that for the jury to come back in this courtroom and find a 
11 breach on the part of my client, and award this man $10,000 
12 and $52,000 in attorneys fees is the best exemplar of passion 
13 and prejudice and bias on the part of the panel. 
14 There is no other way you can explain that. There 
15 is no expert testimony underlying their claim for attorneys 
16 fees; none at all. Certainly, Mr. Bostwick can't classify, 
17 can't qualify as that, and there is no apportionment; and 
18 I'll get to that in a minute. 
19 As to the questions as to Bear River, the evidence 
20 was very clear about a breach of contract. The real question 
21 was, in that case, was there a bad faith breach? But as to a 
22 breach of contract, the evidence was stacked up in this 
2 3 courtroom, Your Honor, about the fact that Bear River didn't 
24 properly adjust this claim; 120 to 150 days out there, and 
25 there had only been a matter of $20,000 paid. And that was 
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1 to their pal First General who they had recommended to be 
2 placed on as the contractor to repair the fire in the first 
3 J place. 
4 But we found examples, Your Honor, of not only 
5 paying $20,000 without the consent of Perkins to First 
6 General, Bear River's contractor, they disputed virtually 
7 every item of property. When they did get the personal 
8 property settled, they used that then as a wedge to force a 
9 settlement on the dwelling. 
10 On top of that, they failed to adjust the property 
11 timely, and we had, as the Court knows, by December, six 
12 months afterwards, there had only been paid a fraction of 
13 what this woman admittedly suffered by way of contents and by 
14 way of dwelling. 
15 Dio, as the Court will recall, the adjuster for 
16 Bear River, discounted everything that had — that this woman 
17 submitted to him 50 percent. He didn't have any formula, he 
18 just did it. He just chopped it off. 
19 And the breach of contract, Judge, for failure to 
2 0 adjust the fire — because there's one thing, and I'm about 
211 to get to that, that underlies all of the evidence, as to 
22 Bear River's breach of contract, Judge, as well as the 
2 3 evidence of First General, they piggybacked this whole issue. 
24 These two have been together, and they will be this 
25 morning; they have been together throughout the two weeks of 
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this trial. It was very clear. 
First General played off the same evidence that 
Bear River did, and that was that this woman tended to 
develop habits of burning down houses. 
And this other home, the evidence was some of the 
most prejudicial evidence that could possibly have come in. 
And what was astonishing, not only to Perkins but to me, and 
also perhaps to the Court, was that after we had argued the 
motion in limine prior to the time — of course the time of 
trial, at the pre-trial stage, I understood Bear River to 
claim that this evidence was very relevant to their position. 
It turns out, Judge, as the Court — as Mr. Heath 
addressed the Court, and as he made statements ultimately in 
connection with the Hillsden fire, it didn't have anything to 
do with Bear River's adjustment of this case. It was totally 
irrelevant to their position. 
So how could it possibly, then, have come before 
this Court as admissible evidence, particularly under 
Rule 402 and Rule 403, which gives this Court not discretion 
but encourages the Court to reject questionable evidence, 
particularly if it has — if it's going to be inflammatory. 
And the second area or issue that was going to 
cause bias or prejudice on other substantive and totally 
unrelated issues — and that's what happened — is that this 
woman, this case was not so much about what Bear River did to 
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1 adjust this case but what this woman did in burning down 
2 another house• 
3 And once that evidence came in, even though 
4 Mr. Heath, in good faith — and I don't charge improper 
5 conduct on the part of Henry in this matter; and the Court 
6 knows it — but once that evidence came in, Judge, it was 
7 impossible to erase it from the minds of the jury. 
8 And if they saw this woman as a potential 
9 arsonist — and you have the Fire Chief of Murray sitting in 
10 here, and they wanted him to just start salivating a little 
11 over himself attempting to say that the fire at the subject 
12 property was also arson-caused, and that came before the 
13 jury. 
14 And in light of that testimony, it was very clear 
15 that this jury, and by reason or by virtue of it, returned 
16 the judgment based upon the evidence that was stacked up 
17 against it, and they really quit preponderating evidence, and 
18 in First General's case the overwhelming evidence of a 
19 breach; nevertheless, they came back and found against Zandra 
20 Perkins on virtually every issue except for one. 
21 And $5,100 was the recovery against Bear River for 
22 what admittedly was the fair rental value of the house during 
23 the time that the property was vacant. 
24 Now, the difficulty, Judge, that that evidence, the 
25 prejudiciality of that evidence, and frankly I fault counsel, 
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1 I fault the parties in this case, for having led the Court to 
2 believe that this evidence on the prior fire was going to be 
3 relevant. But it wasn't. And nobody used it. 
4 1 And it sat there. I couldn't mention it, for 
5 obvious reasons, but it sat there before this jury; and when 
6 this woman took the witness stand and questions were asked 
7 her about what she testified in her deposition about having 
8 set the fire at Hillsden, the damage had all been done. 
9 And the difficulty with it was that First General 
10 got the benefit of that prejudice and bias and played off of 
11 it and encouraged it as well. 
12 And as the Court has seen, there has not been, 
13 there has not been an issue in this case in which First 
14 General has not fully concurred with Bear River and Bear 
15 River has reciprocated fully with regard to First General, in 
16 the face of what are clear breaches of contract by First 
17 General. 
18 And we have laid them out. I don't want to go into 
19 them in any depth. But the Court recalls what it was. They 
2 0 didn't install the air conditioner in the right place, they 
21 were told where it was before the fire, they said, "No, it 
22 wasn't there, it was in the attic of the garage." 
23 They refused to put in the chimney. Now, Judge, if 
24 that isn't a breach of contract, I don't know what is. I 
25 mean, a chimney is something that generally is fairly 
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1 indispensable to the operation of a fireplace in a home. 
2 They said it wasn't there. They had to be shown a 
3 photograph, not by my client, but by a neighbor, before they 
4 would believe my client. 
5 Their contract wasn't with my client, as it was 
6 supposed to be, it was with Dio and Bear River, and the 
7 evidence was clear as to that. 
8 The ridge vents, they had by July 31st not even 
9 done any cleaning of the lower portions of the house. And 
10 what was left was charred wiring. 
11 What was left was water-soaked sheetrock. What was 
12 left was a living room ceiling that was sacked, and those 
13 were material breaches of contract. 
14 And once these breaches took place, Your Honor, my 
15 client had no obligation to perform. 
16 And now, the case law in this jurisdiction is clear 
17 on that. But the problem, Judge, that drives this whole case 
18 is the fact that Mr. Bostwick is down here asking for $51,000 
19 in attorneys fees to prosecute a $10,000 claim. And he wants 
20 an additional $20,000 to $25,000 again this morning by way of 
21 this motion. 
22 And I submit to the Court that the law will not 
23 allow this travesty to take place. It is very clear that you 
24 have to have opinion evidence on areas in which it is not 
25 within the lay knowledge of the ordinary juror. 
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1 And legal fees are not, and Mr. Bostwick is not an 
2 expert witness. He couldn't qualify as an expert witness. 
3 He didn't testify as an expert witness. He testified just as 
4 another lawyer did in a case that went to the Supreme Court, 
5 and we've cited that in our brief to Your Honor, the Kerr 
6 case and the Cox case, Kerr particularly where the Supreme 
7 Court said that you have got to lay out by qualified, 
8 competent testify the attorneys fees that are due and owing. 
9 If you don't do that, you can't have it. We know, 
10 Judge, that a property owner cannot, in this state, testify 
11 as to the fair market value of his property. He used to be 
12 able to do that, but the law clearly now is you can't do 
13 that; whether it's an eminent domain matter or a house in 
14 which a fire has occurred, you have to have competent, 
15 qualified evidence. And First General didn't have that. 
16 And then they top that, Your Honor, by clearly 
17 showing that most of the time they spent in this case was in 
18 defending the counterclaims of my client, counterclaims for 
19 fraud, for breach of contract, for slander of title, for 
20 negligent misrepresentation as well. 
21 And there was no apportionment between those 
22 attorneys fees as to which they claim that they're due for 
23 the performance of the contract. The $10,000 — . 
24 THE COURT: Why do you say that they don't come 



























MR. CAMPBELL: I'm sorry? Why — . 
THE COURT: Why do you say the defense of the 
counterclaim doesn't come under the provisions of the 
attorneys fees entered into under the contract with First 
General? 
MR. CAMPBELL: Because, if the Court please, that 
contract was quite specific, that even if you assume that 
contract was what's being enforced — and that is that the 
attorneys fees that are to be allowed are in connection with 
the work to be performed — but it's not in connection with 
the defense of the counterclaim. My client didn't agree that 
if they were to proceed by way of a counterclaim for fraud, 
which is a completely separate and independent cause of 
action from breach of contract claim of First General, that 
they were going to pay their attorneys fees, that they were 
First General's attorneys fees for that. 
Judge, there has not been — if there's any 
question about this, there hasn't been a case cited to the 
Court on that issue, as far as I can know, that would allow 
them to do that. 
The case law is fundamentally against them, and 
that is that counterclaims are not a basis upon which 
attorneys fees can be awarded, and you don't apportion — you 
can't recover anything. 
THE COURT: You're saying that if I have a contract 
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1 which awards attorneys fees, and I sue you, and you 
2 counterclaim against me under the same contract, that that 
3 provision doesn't apply to the attorneys fee provision? 
4 MR. CAMPBELL: That is exactly what I'm saying, 
5 Your Honor. And indeed in addition to that, I'm saying that 
6 if the cause of action that we're talking about is a breach 
7 of contract, and for fraud, there is no allegation of fraud 
8 on the part of First General with regard to my client that 
9 would allow attorneys fees on that issue. If you — if the 
10 Court allows these attorneys fees, you're allowing, apart 
11 from the question, "Are they reasonable?," the Court would be 
12 allowing attorneys fees for recovery of a defense against 
13 fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and slander of title. 
14 And those are certainly not covered by any sort of 
15 an alleged contract in which they say that First General is 
16 entitled to attorneys fees if an action is needed to be 
17 brought in connection with the enforcement of the contract. 
18 I submit to the Court that there is no basis for 
19 that. But there is no basis for any attorneys fees on the 
20 part of First General, because there isn't any qualified, 
21 competent evidence on that, and the jury simply took whatever 
22 it was — I mean, there was no showing that you had to spend 
23 $51,000 and now $72,000 to defend the judgment in a $10,000 
24 claim. 
2 5 Now, that's reprehensible. That is what brings 
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1 courts and lawyers in disrepute in the eyes of the public. 
2 It's offensive even to think about that sort of claim. 
3 And I submit to the Court that there isn't any 
4 evidence that will stand review on appeal, if this Court were 
5 to allow Mr. Bostwick to walk out of there with $75,000 in 
6 his pocket in connection with prosecuting a claim for 
7 $10,000. 
8 And clearly, it's got to proceed by statute or 
9 contract. 
10 Let me turn to Bear River. I think Bear River's 
11 problem, the problem with Bear River is a more difficult one 
12 than it is with First General. Bear River, the breach of 
13 contract with Bear River, it was very clear, I think the 
14 Court was concerned about the bad faith breach. It certainly 
15 was concerned about the breach of contract on the part of 
16 First General. 
17 The Court inquired of counsel while the jury was 
18 out just before they returned right in the courtroom, "What 
19 would we do on punitive damages, that phase of the hearing? 
20 Would we start it tomorrow, the following day, or on 
21 Saturday, or when would it be?" 
22 But the Court was genuinely concerned about what I 
23 think the Court perceived the weight of the evidence was. 
24 And I don't ask this Court to substitute its judgment where 
25 there is questionable evidence, but I submit to the Court 
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1 that the weight of the evidence in this case was overwhelming 
2 by the end of the case, and there was a collapse of Bear 
3 River's case with one of their experts who got on the stand, 
4 and then he left, and Bear River decided not to call him. 
5 The other witness had great difficulty. He was a 
6 person that didn't know anything, except adjusting fires for 
7 insurance companies, had never done one. 
8 He was from Phoenix and is now retired, or Sun 
9 City; the Court will recall that line of examination. 
10 And Bear River's case stood in shambles at the 
11 close of the evidence. I think the Court had a sense of 
12 that. This Court cannot simply look in the jury box and say, 
13 "This is what the jury found, I have to be bound by that." 
14 This Court has an obligation under the law to 
15 review, to see what a jury did, and if the Court finds it 
16 fundamentally is against the weight of the evidence, the 
17 Court can't let that judgment stand. 
18 Otherwise, there would be a travesty, Judge, in 
19 this courtroom of untold proportions. This woman, who has a 
20 fire in her house, and who everybody in the courtroom agrees 
21 did not have anything to do with setting that fire, is now 
22 faced, Judge, with recovering a $5,100 judgment against Bear 
23 River for rental. 
24 But apart from that, if the judgment stands, and 
25 the Court doesn't award a judgment NOV or a new trial, 
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1 against First General, they're going to wind up with a 
2 $75,000, $85,000, $90,000 judgment against this woman. 
3 Her home will be forced to be sold to pay that, 
4 Frampton is in here asking for some money. You're going to 
5 hear about that in a few minutes. 
6 And that is equally offensive, because Frampton's 
7 position was in here to defend a claim, he wants $9,400 for 
8 defending a claim by way of attorneys fees. It's one of the 
9 most despicable claims I've run across in seeing what has 
10 happened to this woman, in attempting to request only one 
11 thing: fair adjustment of a fire, and a dispute between a 
12 contractor over $10,000. 
13 She's going to lose her home. She will have to 
14 clearly sell it. She has no other proceeds. She's going to 
15 wind up in bankruptcy over a fire of which she has no 
16 position or control or responsibility for. 
17 Now, those are the problems that weigh upon the 
18 conscience and position of this Court. It is a Court of 
19 equity, it is a Court of law, but it is also a Court that 
20 heard the evidence. 
21 And I submit to Your Honor that a judgment NOV is 
22 most proper in connection with First General and also with 
23 Bear River, particularly as to the breach of contract. 
24 The bad faith problem, I think that's a problem on 
2 5 judgment NOV. I think it is not with regard to the motion 
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1 for new trial, in light of what Bear River did when they had 
2 the contents settled and resolved and use that as a hammer, 
3 as a sledge hammer against my client to force a settlement of 
4 the household — or, of the dwelling itself. 
5 That is an act of bad faith. But I think I can't 
6 argue that as a matter of judgment NOV, but I certainly can 
7 as a matter of breach of contract. 
8 And I submit to the Court that we've either got to 
9 go back and re-try this case before a jury that was fair and 
10 was impartial and didn't hear this inflammatory evidence with 
11 regard to this woman having set a fire on a previous home and 
12 her expertise in therefore trying to gerrymander a fire 
13 settlement; if that evidence hadn't been before this Court, 
14 we couldn't be here arguing this motion this morning. 
15 But I think the problem, Judge, as far as the 
16 practical aspects of this case, the problem that drives this 
17 whole problem, is Mr. Bostwick's claim for $75,000 in 
18 attorneys fees for prosecuting a $10,000 claim. 
19 And I don't know of any evidence that allows this 
2 0 man to recover for the defense of a fraud case and slander of 
21 title and negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract. 
22 The contract itself doesn't say that, and this Court knows 
23 that the Supreme Court has been very clear about this 
24 question: You don't recover attorney's fees unless they're 
25 precisely set out. 
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1 And they are not, and Mr. Bostwick hasn't cited a 
2 case to the Court that would even come close to allowing 
3 that. 
4 So we submit as to the motion for judgment 
5 notwithstanding the verdict, Your Honor, Rule 50(b), it is 
6 well-taken and should be granted; or, in the alternative, if 
7 the Court feels it can't enter judgment in our favor for the 
8 amount that we had requested, that the Court has an 
9 obligation to, I submit, enter judgment of an order setting 
10 this case back for a new trial. 
11 THE COURT: Counsel, I have a trial starting at 
12 9:00. It's 8:30 now. I'm going to have to ask you to be as 
13 concise as possible. Mr. Campbell took about 25 minutes. 
14 You have about 12 minutes. 
15 MR. BOSTWICK: We'll be much shorter, Your Honor. 
16 With regard, Your Honor, to the issues on the Hillsden fire, 
17 we heard those again and again, and I'm not going to 
18 reiterate the arguments. 
19 We just believe that the Court's prior ruling was 
2 0 sound. At this stage in the litigation, it would be unjust, 
21 unfair to go back and change that after a two-week trial 
2 2 where there was much disputed evidence and ample evidence to 
23 support a verdict, even if that evidence turns out to be 
24 somewhat prejudicial. 
25 With regard to the motion for judgment 
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1 notwithstanding the verdict, the standard is clear: If 
2 there's any substantial evidence in the record which supports 
3 the verdict, the Court must uphold the verdict. The Court 
4 must ignore all the evidence that tends to go against the 
5 verdict. 
6 In this case, every issue that Mr. Campbell has 
7 addressed was disputed. It was disputed vigorously, and the 
8 issues came down to one of credibility. 
9 And Ms. Perkins' witnesses didn't support the day. 
10 The jury did not believe Ms. Perkins' version, her story, for 
11 the reasons that her credibility was questioned and shown to 
12 be lacking. 
13 The jury did not believe Ms. Smith for the same 
14 reasons. The jury did not believe the neighbor because on 
15 cross-examination, the neighbor recanted his testimony and 
16 indicated he had not been told what he had previously 
17 testified he was told, and on and on and on. 
18 This was simply a case of credibility. 
19 Ms. Perkins' witnesses simply did not hold the day. 
20 With regard to attorneys fees, perhaps that is what 
21 is driving this case, Your Honor. In fact, I'm certain of 
22 it. The attorneys fee issue is driving this case because it 
23 is a significant financial obligation imposed upon 
24 Ms. Perkins by the jury, and rightfully so. 
2 5 Mr. Campbell indicated he believes that there are 
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1 no cases that support our position. The very cases they cite 
2 support our position. The Stubbs case, there were two bases 
3 for the court not awarding attorneys fees. One was that the 
4 plaintiff wasn't successful in a defense of the counterclaim. 
5 And, No. 2, their counterclaims did not relate to the 
6 principal cause of action. 
7 The case I have cited, the language — and Your 
8 Honor has read it — the attorneys fee issue, with regard to 
9 the contract, the contract is clear in its language: "I 
10 agree that if it's necessary for First General Services to 
11 pursue legal action to collect these amounts, I assume 
12 liability for any and all attorneys fees and court costs." 
13 It's very simple, very straightforward, and broad 
14 enough to cover attorneys fees requested here. 
15 Granted, if Your Honor — if Ms. Perkins had agreed 
16 to submit the issue of attorneys fees to Your Honor after 
17 trial, Your Honor may have come down with a different result 
18 than the jury did. 
19 1 Your Honor may have awarded a smaller amount of 
2 0 attorneys fees. But the bottom line is that the jury was 
21 presented evidence, and ample, competent evidence of 
22 attorneys fees and the reasonableness thereof. 
23 The jury deliberated. That was one of the issues 
24 that they considered, and they came back with an award. And 
25 this Court should not disturb that award. 
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1 Mr. Campbell has indicated through his brief and 
2 through his oral argument that it's his opinion that expert 
3 testimony on attorneys fees is required in every case. That 
4 simply is not the case. Rule 4-505 allows affidavits of 
5 attorneys fees. The cases that Ms. Perkins cited in the 
6 memorandum allow attorneys fees. 
7 In the cases that are cited therein, an affidavit 
8 of attorneys fees of the kind that were submitted at trial, 
9 Exhibit No. 35, as well as the testimony of myself, and 
10 vigorous cross-examination of Mr. Campbell, of myself, on the 
11 issue of reasonableness, as well as Mr. Campbell's testimony 
12 on Ms. Perkins7 fees and cross-examination therein, and the 
13 stipulation of counsel, Bear River, and Ms. Perkins all 
14 support and provided adequate and ample foundation and all 
15 the evidence for an award of attorneys fees by the jury. 
16 And we believe that Your Honor should uphold that, 
17 because there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. 
18 The fact Ms. Perkins wishes it otherwise is not relevant. 
19 The fact Ms. Perkins stands to bear a large financial burden 
20 is not relevant. 
21 My client has borne a large financial burden and 
22 will do so if he fails to recover as the jury has clearly 
23 awarded him. 
24 With regard to apportionment, one last item, in the 
25 Dixie State Bank case, the court did award attorneys fees for 
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1 successful defense of a counterclaim, a tort counterclaim, 
2 because it related to the principal cause of action. 
3 Every one of Ms. Perkins7 counterclaims was 
4 integrally involved in and related directly to the 
5 counterclaim, slander of title, related to the foreclosure 
6 action. 
7 The fraud claim and other claims went directly to 
8 the heart of making an enforceable contract. If First 
9 General failed to prevail on those, they simply would not be 
10 able to prevail or be awarded attorneys fees under the 
11 provisions, but they were 100 percent successful on the 
12 defense of their counterclaim. 
13 So we believe the law and the facts support an 
14 award of attorneys fees that were awarded by the jury, and we 
15 request that the Court deny the motion for judgment 
16 notwithstanding the verdict as well as the motion for new 
17 trial. Neither one are well-taken, and we ask the Court to 
18 affirm the order as indicated by the jury. 
19 MR. HEATH: Henry Heath on behalf of Bear River, 
2 0 Your Honor. Responding, first of all, to Mr. Campbell and 
21 Perkins' argument that the fire history prejudiced the jury 
22 in this case, let me address that issue first, Your Honor. 
2 3 The Plaintiff Perkins takes a position — and as I 
24 refer to "the plaintiff" I'm referring to the plaintiff as 
25 regarding Bear River; she is actually a defendant and 
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1 third-party plaintiff — but Perkins takes the position that 
2 when Bear River states that the fire history did not affect 
3 the manner in which it handled her claim, that that is the 
4 same as Bear River saying it was irrelevant to them. 
5 And that's not the case. It was not irrelevant to 
6 Bear River nor to the issues of this case. 
7 The material fact at issue, as the Court properly 
8 perceived in the argument and consideration and deliberation 
9 on the motion in limine, and again when it came up during the 
10 course of the trial on evidentiary rules, the Court properly 
11 perceived that as long as the issue of bad faith is before 
12 this jury, Bear River has an opportunity to present evidence 
13 of its good faith. 
14 Now, the evidence of what good faith is, and the 
15 materiality of it, is not only what was done by Bear River, 
16 but what it didn't do. And that's where Mr. Campbell has 
17 failed to perceive, all the way through this, in every 
18 argument, on every level, that what Bear River didn't do in 
19 this case was important, because of the knowledge it had of 
20 the prior fire. 
21 That was significant to show that they approached 
22 this claim with good faith. Let me point out the good things 
23 they could have done but did not do because of the fire. 
24 First of all, they didn't claim that she caused the 
25 fire. They never went to her and said, "You caused the fire 
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1 in issue here, and therefore we're denying the claim." 
2 They didn't delay payment while they conducted an 
3 exhaustive investigation to see if she had caused the fire, 
4 neither did they delay payment while Murray City conducted 
5 its investigation. 
6 But perhaps most significantly, they never once, 
7 they never once held the fact of the Hillsden fire over her 
8 head in saying, "You know, you may be an arsonist, you're a 
9 suspect, therefore we're not going to pay your claim." 
10 Those are things that they didn't do which is 
11 evidence, and material evidence, of their handling of this 
12 claim in good faith. 
13 And that's why the evidence on the issue of bad 
14 faith of the Hillsden fire, as limited as it was by the 
15 Court, and limited by the evidence, and limited by our 
16 handling of it, and by our comment on it — and we were very 
17 careful, Your Honor, not to suggest to the jury that she 
18 caused or had the fire set as a result of any conduct of her 
19 own or her family. 
2 0 We pointed that out in our closing argument 
21 carefully, and throughout the case. And for them to say that 
22 therefore it's not relevant and doesn't qualify under 
23 Rule 402 as admissible evidence is absolutely wrong. 
24 And the Court has properly perceived that twice. 
25 We've heard that argument over and over again, and 
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1 Mr. Campbell just absolutely refuses to understand it. 
2 I think he understands it, but it's the only thing 
3 he has to talk about; and therefore, he continues to bring it 
4 to the attention of the Court as a desperate attempt to get 
5 this Court to agree with him one last time in support of his 
6 motion for a new trial or for judgment NOV. 
7 In order for that to be significant to the jury's 
8 consideration, Your Honor, and by virtue of their own 
9 statements in their memoranda in support of these motions, 
10 the jury would have to have concluded that in fact she did 
11 have something to do with causing her home to burn. 
12 In order for that evidence to be prejudicial to 
13 Ms. Perkins, they would have had to have made that 
14 conclusion, that she was an arsonist, or she had part in a 
15 conspiracy to have her home set afire, and they suggested 
16 that that's why we introduced this evidence and that it was 
17 lying around there and in the jury's mind, that that must 
18 have been what they concluded; otherwise, they couldn't have 
19 come to this result. 
20 Well, the evidence and the result of the verdict 
21 just don't support that. The jury did not believe that she 
22 was an arsonist. Had that been the case, they would not have 
2 3 awarded her anything. They would have not have given her 
24 $5,100 for the fair rental value of her home while it was 
25 being under repair. 
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1 So the jury did not think that Ms. Perkins was an 
2 arsonist or that she caused the fire or that the Hillsden 
3 1 property evidence suggested that. 
4 Rather the jury believed that Bear River, 
5 notwithstanding that evidence, believed Ms. Perkins on the 
6 issue of that, that she didn't have anything to do with the 
7 fire, and attempted to adjust this claim. 
8 Now, obviously the Court is bound to consider the 
9 evidence at this point in the light most favorable to 
10 upholding the jury verdict. 
11 The jury didn't need to rely upon the fire history, 
12 the prior fire history of Ms. Perkins, in order to reach its 
13 verdict and to attack the credibility of Ms. Perkins. 
14 I'm somewhat amused by Mr. Campbell's 
15 characterization of Bear River's position at the close of the 
16 evidence, that their case was in shambles. That's a 
17 characterization that is absolutely myopic. He refuses to 
18 evaluate this evidence the way the jury did. 
19 He made the same statement to the jury, statements 
2 0 that were rejected by the jury and should be rejected by this 
21 Court. 
22 The reason Ms. Perkins' case did not succeed is 
23 because of her own credibility problems, and that has nothing 
24 to do with the Hillsden fire. It rather has to do with the 
25 whole phony claim that she filed for the additional living 
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1 expenses, which even Mr. Campbell recognized was phony and 
2 withdrew it, to his credit, prior to going to trial, 
3 Nevertheless, that was before the jury, that the 
4 reason Bear River hadn't successfully adjusted this claim is 
5 because the claim had never been properly presented to it; 
6 that even though the claim had never been properly presented 
7 to Bear River, they nevertheless bent over backwards and paid 
8 over $91,000 to her on portions of the claim that were not 
9 properly documented. 
10 Mr. Campbell makes the statement that Bear River 
11 was in bad faith because Bear River would not — or, held 
12 this, breached the agreement on the contents claim, and held 
13 that over her head in settling the dwelling claim. 
14 It was just the reverse, quite frankly: The 
15 dwelling claim, Bear River attempted to settle it, and they 
16 advanced money on it. They advanced money to contractors as 
17 bills came in. 
18 You heard the testimony of Leo Thorup that there 
19 were double payments, there were overcharges, there were 
2 0 kickbacks coming to Ms. Perkins that were improper, there 
21 were claims by Ms. Perkins that clearly were beyond the scope 
22 of the damages. 
23 And most telling was perhaps — if you want to look 
24 at one part of the trial and attack her credibility, it is 
25 the testimony of Mr. Peterson that, in fact, Ms. Perkins 
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1 approached him prior to her terminating him and asked him to 
2 include things that were improper. 
3 And when he advised her that he would not do so, 
4 then two weeks later he was terminated. That's the reason 
5 the jury believes, in my opinion, that she breached her 
6 contract with First General, that she could not control 
7 Mr. Peterson and First General Services to cause them to make 
8 claims against the insurance policy that were not justified: 
9 the concrete claims, the garage, and other things that the 
10 Court heard. 
11 Well, I'm not going to comment on all the evidence, 
12 but I think the Court remembers the whole replacement cost 
13 issue. 
14 Mr. Campbell's argued strenuously to the Court in 
15 support of the jury instructions, and he argued strenuously 
16 to the jury that she was entitled to replacement cost. 
17 Bear River stood on the policy. The jury heard the 
18 evidence and held that Bear River was not in breach of the 
19 contract on any particular aspect of the contract. 
2 0 The only reason that Ms. Perkins recovered anything 
21 is because Bear River acknowledged, in fairness — and this 
22 shows again their good faith — that had she made a claim at 
2 3 the appropriate time for fair rental value, rather than this 
24 phony claim for additional living expenses, renting her 
25 mother's house, renting rooms there, et cetera, et cetera, 
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1 Bear River acknowledged that had she made, in the proper 
2 course, a claim for fair rental value, they would have paid 
3 her, and the jury said, "Yeah, okay, now she's making that 
4 claim, therefore she's entitled to $5,100." 
5 That, to my way of thinking, is the most credible 
6 evidence, the most credible evidence of the jury's 
7 conscientious approach in this case. They were not 
8 prejudiced. They listened to the evidence. They accepted 
9 Bear River's position, because that was the overwhelming 
10 weight of the evidence. 
11 There was no delay on the part of Bear River, but 
12 the delay was occasioned by Ms. Perkins and her agents. 
13 In fact, Your Honor, the best evidence of that is 
14 Derk Rasmussen, the economist, who came in here, and 
15 Mr. Rasmussen had been purposefully hired to sort out the 
16 value of her claim. 
17 He gave a deposition within two weeks of trial in 
18 which he prepared an exhibit saying, "This is what her claim 
19 is worth." 
2 0 And when we get to trial, it was changed again. We 
21 didn't know, even at the time of trial — in fact, even today 
22 we don't know what that documented evidence is for the full 
23 value of her claim. 
24 So Bear River made the best judgment that it could. 
25 They paid her $91,000 on a home that she had up for sale for 
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1 $78,500. 
2 They paid her the contents, in some cases they paid 
3 her the replacement of the contents when the contents were 
4 cleaned and still for the repair for the contents, the actual 
5 cash value of the contents when those contents are still in 
6 her home, and she is still using them. 
7 The Court heard all of that. Quite frankly, we're 
8 to the point now where much more could be said, but it would 
9 be a clear abuse of discretion of this Court, and with all 
10 due respect, I have great confidence in this Court that this 
11 Court cannot ignore the overwhelming weight of the evidence 
12 and either grant an NOV or to order a new trial on any of the 
13 issues of the case as they relate to Bear River. 
14 It's true that the consequences of the outcome of 
15 this lawsuit will have serious results to Ms. Perkins, but 
16 she's got to pay the price for her own greed. She was the 
17 one who was claiming things she wasn't entitled to. She was 
18 the one that was wrongfully terminating her contract, and as 
19 a result Bear River got thrown into the middle of a situation 
20 where they didn't know which contractor to pay. 
21 She was the one that brought this on herself. She 
22 was the one that incurred her attorneys fees, attorneys fees 
23 that we can't recover. 
24 And Bear River's in a situation where it had to 
25 spend not only $91,000 to adjust this claim, but considerable 
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1 attorneys fees to defend it against actions which I think, 
2 Your Honor, boarder on abuse of this court system. 
3 I don't think the Court can countenance this kind 
4 of conduct. I don't know what her problems are, but she's 
5 brought them on herself, Your Honor, and I submit the verdict 
6 is supported by the overwhelming evidence and must stand. 
7 MR. CAMPBELL: Your Honor, I'll be brief in my 
8 response, because what you've heard from both counsel, now 
9 for First General and for Bear River, is — and I'm not going 
10 to engage in ad hominem ad nocumentum as to what I have done 
11 personally. That isn't what is before this Court. 
12 It's a great deal more than that that is before the 
13 Court. It isn't me personally or what I have done that 
14 counts in the Court's equation of justice at all. 
15 But what they both recognized is the fact that this 
16 Hillsden fire was inflammatory, it was sensational, and it 
17 was prejudicial. 
18 And as both counsel have said, this was a trial of 
19 credibility. That's why that issue, Your Honor, was so 
2 0 important, and it lays out there, and I can't touch it, 
21 because it's so sensitive. And they let it be used, and it's 
22 what they have said is that this is irrelevant testimony, 
23 that it didn't have anything to do with their adjusting of 
24 this claim, so let it sit there. 
25 And they want to let the jury use it in whatever 
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way they want. And the Court clearly advised the jury that 
ty L in take into consideration all the admissible evidence, 
give whatever weight they think is appropriate to it. I 
d be 
improper :„ *>*. *; attach - \*~ /erdict ^ :• t r 
tu wiidi x.m -r<:- i^red. 
But we ki low that, we've talked to them, and 1 
submit to the court that their service — . 
MR. HEATH: Your Honor, 1 object to that on the 
record, when he says he's talked to the jury. That is 
inappropriate, and it's clearly inappropriate argument. 
MR. CAMPBELL: My credibility has been attacked by 
1:1 :ii s mai :i just now, and it has been suggested to me —• . 
THE COURT: Don't get into anything else, unless 
MR. CAMPBELL: And that's right. And I understand. 
- J * ni t a I k i i iq «'i I 'i u I „ p J i.i i n , c o m m o n , 
ordinary sense. Mr. Heath has attacked my good faith as a 
know 
why :.-- thought - . * * . - < «% \^c' offends the system 
as well, and that's the same soi t n| it dsnll( lour Honui , mat 
the Hillsden fire is involved with, because it has nothing to 
do with any of the issues. 
But i t taints the case, and it makes i t turn upon 
personalities, and that is a real problem, Your Honor, that 
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1 Bear River cannot overcome, and neither can First General. 
2 And Mr. Bostwick just argued to the Court, even if 
3 this evidence were prejudicial, even if it were erroneous, 
4 the Court shouldn't overturn the judgment. That was his 
5 opening statement to the Court. 
6 With regard to what Mr. Bostwick has to say, Judge, 
7 the cases he cited didn't — I want the Court to look at 
8 that, if there's any question about it, the issue of 
9 apportionment, because the Supreme Court never touched in 
10 either Dixie State or in the other case that was cited, they 
11 did not even discuss the question of apportionment. 
12 There is no case on apportionment, Your Honor, 
13 before the Court. Judge, just two years ago there was a huge 
14 case tried by Judge Hanson just across the hall, and Judge 
15 Hanson — it was a case against Sydney Horman, which 
16 Mr. Misuraca tried for Kimball, and it went to the Supreme 
17 Court. It was for 13 weeks, tried up in the Summit Court, a 
18 case which the Court knows of. It was well-known. It was a 
19 rather notorious case. 
2 0 And Mr. Misuraca did not apportion his attorneys 
21 fees, and Judge Hanson wouldn't allow any and granted a 
22 judgment against Kimball for not apportioning the attorneys 
2 3 fees between those that related to the causes of action as to 
24 which the contract provided and the counterclaim that was 
25 being defended and other issues as to which attorneys fees 
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were not involved. 
THE COURT: T'm going to make an apportionment 
judgment as far as attorneys fees, what are you saying I 
MR. CAMPBELL: There isn't any competent evidence 
before the C"*c Jirt all L. 
THE COURT: If I don't see fit to eliminate them 
a] ] . 
MR. CAMPBELI 1 th i nk the Court should eliminate 
them all. 
THE COURT: Tf T don't see fit to, what should I 
do? 
MR. CAMPBELL: Well, because I don't believe there 
is competent evidence before the Court, the Court would 
either have to — you cannot enter judgment. You can't enter 
judgment against First General for attorneys fees, and if the 
Cour t tl i i i iks i t wants to hear a new trial, to be limited to 
the question of attorneys fees, the Court may be able to do 
that b]r bi fur cat i nqi «t puj I ion ol it 
THE COURT: If I arbitrarily, as a court of equity, 
adjust ti, ."< - es, am "I within my realm arid ntiwe l 
MR. CAMPBELL: I most respectfully suggest it is 
not — I think it is not within the viurt's »'.«aJm, IMI* 
attorneys fees — the $75,000 is the difficulty that brings 
this case to the point where n is. An*l wt- .iibmit |-11 the 
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1 Court that with regard to the evidence that Bear River — and 
2 I'm not going to personalize it by talking about Mr. Heath — 
3 Bear River submitted to this Court with regard to that 
4 Hillsden fire, that over shadows everything else that took 
5 place in this courtroom. I couldn't do anything about it 
6 regardless of whether the advocacy was vigorous or not. It 
7 was something that couldn't be touched because of the very, 
8 very sensitive — the more you talk about it, the more 
9 difficult it becomes as far as lay people were concerned, lay 
10 jurors, to explain why it has anything to do with the case. 
11 We submit that the judgment NOV should be granted, 
12 Your Honor, both as to — or, a new trial, both as to First 
13 General and Bear River. We'd be happy to answer any other 
14 questions, Your Honor. I think the balance of the issues can 
15 be taken quickly. With respect to the entry of judgment — . 
16 THE COURT: Let's let these parties address their 
17 own. Mr. Heath, yours first, you have an objection to the 
18 form of the judgment as far as the costs? 
19 MR. HEATH: Yes, Your Honor. I think I can get to 
20 that quickly. The question is Rule 55(d) allows costs to the 
21 prevailing party. As between Bear River and Perkins, Bear 
22 River clearly prevailed on all of the issues. Perkins 
23 prevailed on one issue. She got $5,100 as a mere reflection, 
24 and as we indicated before, that when the testimony finally 
25 got to trial, Bear River acknowledged that $5,100 would have 
0 5 1 4 5
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1 been the fair rental value had It been claimed properly, and 
2 pi*esen11-.11 J 11 11 pi o p e i c 1 a i \\\. 
3 It was not properly presented. Bear River has not 
I t a k Q11 t; 11«• j p os J t u111, V11 JI I• 11 on'•M • <' • " •"'" •1 -*1^";- " 1 r"r)u]'"" l" * v i „ 
5 have argued that, "Well, we're going + c deny chat claim 
6 b e c a u s e 11 wa i»n * t I: i m e I y ma • ) 
7 finding of breach of contract because Bear River didn't pay 
8 a n y t h i n g o n t h e a d d i t i o n a l I I s, i nq e x p e n s e s I'hf i\mi1 hat. 
9 instructed the jury and the jury properly found that Bear 
10 River did not breach its contract, so it prevailed on every 
11 point in defending the third-party complaint of Ms, Perkins. 
12 Now, they're going to argue that under some cases, 
13 and they have cited authorities of the Highland case, 
14 Highland v. Stevenson, and Brown v. Richards, that there the 
15 attorneys tees can be awarded to a party whn nrevai Is 
16 partially, but they don't have to prevail on every point. 
17 I Hot 11 t h o s e c a s e s , the y i, n v o I y <"ed c 1 a imi d 
18 counterclaims where attorneys fees were awarded h 
19 pa rt. i &i\ u i n!i, t 1 he i oi it. i a c \ , ai iti 111 it f, h i1 I > w I 111 pI. ev a .i i <• -d <i ^
 (-i 
2 0 contractor by virtue of prevailing on its el aim and 
21 counterclaim, where the countorc 1 a imanl- pt*pva i 1 pel nn 11 « 
22 claim. 
23 They were both awarded attorneys fees. 
24 no way analogous to the case we have here. In fac~ }erkins 
25 the fact that Perkins got any money at all cannot be 
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 ^ 
1 suggested to the Court that she prevailed. Rule 54(d) allows 
2 the Court discretion on this matter, Your Honor. 
3 I think we're not asking for a lot; we're asking 
4 for approximately — I think whatever the cost bill states on 
5 that — $4,000 or approximately $4,000 to $5,000, Your Honor. 
6 It appears to me clear that in court Bear River 
7 prevailed on every issue, every claim that Perkins made 
8 against it on bad faith, and costs were incurred in defending 
9 the bad faith and the breach of contract. 
10 There were no costs incurred on the fair rental 
11 value. It wasn't even raised until at the time of trial. 
12 Therefore, Your Honor, the Court should exercise 
13 its discretion and grant Bear River its motion for costs, and 
14 that's the only objection we have to the form of the judgment 
15 that Perkins — in her form of the judgment, she said that 
16 neither party would recover costs. 
17 MR. CAMPBELL: Your Honor, quickly. Perkins did 
18 prevail and is the prevailing party in the case. The law in 
19 this case, for this issue, is not in doubt. It is in the 
2 0 Highland Construction Company case, and we stand on it. And 
21 Mr. Heath has not distinguished that for the Court, and that 
22 is that the fact that a party doesn't prevail on all counts, 
23 and doesn't prevail on the amount they ask for, but had 
24 prevailed on an amount less than that, does not mean they're 






















And the jury found — if what Mr. Heath for Bear 
River now :>d"s is c o n eel, why cii i ci that even an to the jury? 
That is to say, "Did Perkins sustain ~:v2 damage? 
Whdt cite the ddiiiages sustained 1 i OIIII I he Hay l^th house fire 
for which Perkins — tor which Bear River is obligated to 
reimburse 1Jei k ins?" "MI'.WPT • $,:n
 ( I « n i , lf 
Now, if Bear River was willina :.,. stipulate to 
- .; ry, - y 
found in Perkins' favor on that issue and is the prevailing 
party, and therefore Bear Ri ver if:; vie I entitled t 
on any aspect of the case, even-though they prevailed on 
other issues. 
There is a valid claim for $5,100, and they don't 
object to that being a judgment. What they want is a 
judgment entered against them for $5,100, then $4,500 for 
costs in connection with the defense of the case. 
That simply is inconsistent with Rule 54(d), and 
also with the Highland Construction case, and the precedent 
for thii s Coi lr t 
MR. HEATH _>u : i submit it .- Honor. The 
Court hp" ' ^ ^ 'ret - ins 
incurred costs .<•<** AI--^CI ot * ne cas* hat that 
was really materi 
costs accordingly, anc <. : : hearing -
costs are that are appropriate. • . I g 
05148 3-
1 party, the case law, I'll submit the cases to the Court, and 
2 I think the Court can see that the memorandum law is very 
3 clear under the circumstances that Bear River was the 
4 prevailing party. We wouldn't be here with motions for new 
5 trial and judgment NOV and all of the arguments we've heard 
6 today if, in fact, they didn't think Bear River was the 
7 prevailing party. 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Bostwick, you have a motion to 
9 amend the j udgment. 
10 MR. BOSTWICK: Very briefly, Your Honor; most of 
11 the issues have already been covered. 
12 With regard to the supplemental attorneys fees, 
13 Your Honor, unlike the $52,000 and the jury verdict, the 
14 supplemental fees that we have submitted to the Court are 
15 essentially wide open for the Court's determination of 
16 reasonableness. 
17 However, Your Honor sat here through the last seven 
18 days of trial. You saw active participation in the case that 
19 we had in the trial. We made efforts to not have Mr. Price 
20 here during the times he wasn't needed. We made efforts to 
21 minimize those things. 
22 If Your Honor feels a need to reduce those 
23 supplemental fees on the basis of reasonableness, I don't 
24 think it needs to be on an arbitrary basis; there are 
25 guidelines and cases that allow the Court to do so based upon 
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1 what would normally be charged for that service. 
2 If the Court has an opinion that the last seven 
3 days of trial and post-trial efforts in dealing with 
4 objections to the judgment, post-trial motions and et cetera, 
5 are unreasonable, then it's within the Court's prerogative to 
6 reduce those. 
7 We do not believe that it is unreasonable. The 
8 efforts were required. There is no time during the trial 
9 that we would have slipped out and not been present; 
10 virtually every witness attacked the credibility or facts 
11 that dealt with First General, and simply there was no way we 
12 could have avoided incurring those fees. 
13 In addition, there was no instruction to the jury, 
14 and it was only raised after the trial with regard to this 
15 apportionment. If it was an issue of Ms. Perkins, it should 
16 have been addressed with the jury at that time. 
17 THE COURT: Mr. Bostwick, you took the stand, you 
18 testified, you were examined on the witness stand on these 
19 fees. Why didn't you bring up the total amount of your fees, 
20 projecting what your fees were going to be, as far as the 
21 conclusion of the case was concerned? 
22 MR. BOSTWICK: We could have done that. We chose 
23 to — . 
24 THE COURT: You say you could have done it. You 
25 could have done it. 
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1 MR. BOSTWICK: Mr. Campbell refused to allow it to 
2 be submitted to — . 
3 THE COURT: By any affidavit. Why didn't you get 
4 that evidence into the jury? 
5 MR. BOSTWICK: It was an unknown. We simply did 
6 not know. We made it as clear as possible to the jury that 
7 $52,000 we were claiming was through the second day of trial. 
8 There was no objection by Perkins or any other party to the 
9 submission by supplemental affidavit of the remaining fees 
10 during trial and subsequent thereto, and on that basis we 
11 felt we were entitled to that. If the Court feels that a 
12 detailed apportionment is necessary, affidavits are clearly 
13 detailed enough to do so. The cases hold that that's 
14 appropriate if the Court feels it's necessary. Thank you. 
15 MR. CAMPBELL: Your Honor, there wasn't any 
16 statement or question asked or request made with respect to 
17 supplemental attorneys fees during the course of the trial. 
18 It didn't even come up. And we objected to attorneys fees, 
19 that admission of attorneys fees, and what I thought was 
2 0 going to happen was that after the — after First General put 
21 on its testimony for attorneys fees, they were going to call 
22 a witness, an expert, a lawyer, to come in and say, "These 
23 fees are reasonable." 
24 But that never happened, and with regard to the 
25 supplemental attorneys fees of $19,708, that comes too late 
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1 in the day in any event, because the matter has already been 
2 submitted to the trier of fact, and there was no indication 
3 that — I mean, not even any estimate. 
4 But the problem, Judge, with this position is the 
5 same problem, the same flaw, that underlies the entire 
6 problem with Mr. Bostwick: He hasn't apportioned anything of 
7 this $19,708. That makes a total, then, of $72,000, a little 
8 over $72,000, in a claim for attorneys fees in connection 
9 with prosecuting a $10,000 claim. 
10 I don't know of any cases, Judge, that ever stood 
11 with scrutiny of a trial judge or Supreme Court of Utah under 
12 similar circumstances where there has been that sort of 
13 attorneys fees awarded where there has been no apportionment 
14 in connection with a major, serious problem of fraud, 
15 negligent misrepresentation, slander of title, and breach of 
16 contract in which they were defending — they were in defense 
17 in a good portion of this case, and they can't recover, 
18 either under the lien statute or under the contract. 
19 The Court allowed them recovery of attorneys fees 
20 in connection with the prosecution of their contract claim 
21 against Perkins, so we submit that the $19,708 is improper 
22 for both reasons: There is no competent evidence, and 
23 secondly, Counsel didn't apportion it. The Court has no idea 
24 as to what the allocation there would be between the 
25 counterclaim and the defending on the fraud issues, and those 
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1 issues that relate to the prosecution of the contract claims 
2 against Perkins. 
3 MR. BOSTWICK: We'll submit it, Your Honor. 
4 Mr. Campbell refuses to remember several times that we did 
5 reserve our right, and he doesn't remember that at this time. 
6 MR. CAMPBELL: I didn't — . 
7 MR. BOSTWICK: And now is an inappropriate time to 
8 say anything, Mr. Campbell. I believe it's my opportunity. 
9 We did reserve those rights. There were no objections, and 
10 supplemental fees are appropriate, and again were required. 
11 They're reasonable under both the Mechanic's Lien Foreclosure 
12 Statute, as well as other provisions. 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Smith? 
14 MR. SMITH: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, I 
15 believe my motion is moot in light of the Court's execution 
16 of the supplemental judgment after my filing a motion, 
17 together with a memorandum. 
18 THE COURT: Let me indicate on that that, yes, that 
19 was signed, but I noted — and I don't want to pass any 
20 fault, but it seems like it's the fault of the system here. 
21 Papers come up to me, and as soon as a judgment is filed, 
22 they come up to me, and I hold it for eight days, and many 
23 times papers come in downstairs and they do not get it up to 
24 me. And you may have noted that the judgment was signed on 




2 MR. SMITH: I'm happy to address that. 
3 THE COURT: I would set the judgment aside and hear 
4 that matter. 
5 MR. SMITH: And I'm happy to address the issue, 
6 Your Honor. I'd like to point out to the Court that 
7 originally — and this is not new in court — but originally 
8 we filed this claim separate from any and all other claims 
9 before the Court here in the Circuit Court. Ours was to 
10 foreclose on the mechanic's lien for the amount that was due. 
11 That case was subsequently — . 
12 THE COURT: That case was filed against — . 
13 MR. SMITH: It was filed both against Perkins and 
14 against First General Services in the Circuit Court. We're 
15 an involuntary participant in this particular action. We 
16 never wanted to be particularly active in this particular 
17 action because it involved so much more than simply our 
18 claim. 
19 But nevertheless, we were brought in; and the 
2 0 Court, as it awarded judgment, summary judgment — . 
21 THE COURT: Who was that judgment against? 
22 MR. SMITH: It was against Zandra Perkins on our 
23 mechanic's lien. Now at that point, we would have been happy 
24 to have been put out of the case, except that there was a 
25 claim for setoff by Zandra Perkins which, several times, the 
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1 Court asked counsel whether or not they were still going to 
2 pursue that, and they were very certain that that 
3 counterclaim should be pursued. They felt that they had a 
4 good-faith counterclaim for offset. So we had no choice. We 
5 were drawn into the — . 
6I THE COURT: Under what provision are you asking for 
7 attorneys fees being brought into it? 
8 MR. SMITH: Under the Mechanic's Lien Statute. We 
9 think that under that statute, we're entitled, where they're 
10 claiming an offset against the mechanic's lien, to attorney's 
11 fees for having to defend on the claim for offset. 
12 And I believe our claim is well-taken. We had to 
13 respond, had to spend the better part of two weeks here in 
14 defending, and you'll recall the Court found, even after the 
15 testimony was in, that there simply wasn't enough testimony 
16 to even take it to the jury. 
17 So we were here reluctantly and had no choice but 
18 to defend. They were claiming over $13,000 in offsets, and 
19 my client is charged for the time spent in defending that. 
2 0 I think our claim for offset is — they're entitled 
21 to their attorneys fees in defending against that, and we 
22 should be granted it. 
2 3 I'll submit it based upon the Mechanic's Lien 
24 Statute. I think we're entitled to attorneys fees for 
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That was reserved, Your Honor. 1 
That's what I was thinking. 1 
That was reserved against First 
those issues are outstanding but — . 
All the attorneys fees were J 
Against Zandra Perkins. 
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How much? I 
The total judgment was about $4,500. 1 
Your principal was around $400, wasn't 
CAMPBELL: $426.26. 
COURT: And the attorneys fees were $4,000? 1 
CAMPBELL: Around $4,000. 
COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
CAMPBELL: Your Honor, this claim is really the 
on what is ; a very black hour in this court. If this 
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1 Court were to award another $9,4 64 for attorneys fees for 
2 this — for Frampton to come in by way of defense, this was a 
3 separate cause of action. Somehow, as the Court knows, this 
4 case started out in Murray City Court. It was transferred 
5 here to this Court without this Court's consent. 
6 Mr. Smith acknowledged that the case probably 
7 shouldn't be here and wasn't quite sure why it was. Perhaps 
8 it was because he had a claim also against First General. 
9 But it's very clear that the Mechanic's Lien 
10 Statute, its position on that is for prosecuting a claim of 
11 $426. And for him to claim $9,464 atop of what the Court has 
12 already awarded by way of attorneys fees is not only an abuse 
13 of process, but it is something the Court can't do. I mean, 
14 this was for defense, for defense of a separate cause of 
15 action upon the part of my client. 
16 You call it a setoff, but it was a counterclaim, 
17 raised properly initially in Murray City Court. It was 
18 raised here in counterclaim. Mr. Smith said, "I'm not going 
19 to sit through all of the trial involving Bear River, and 
20 I'll come in when it involves my client." 
21 But it was a defense. If it wasn't in connection 
22 with foreclosure of the mechanic's lien, that's the only 
23 basis for attorneys fees, and that $9,464, Your Honor, cannot 
24 stand as a matter of law. We submit it. 
25 MR. SMITH: Can I respond to that? I think if the 
46 
1 Court will review the pleadings, the pleadings filed 
2 originally in this case raised the issue of the water damage 
3 as a defense, as an affirmative defense. It is not 
4 specifically set out as a counterclaim. So these issues, the 
5 water damage, was part of a defense against a mechanic's 
6 lien. 
7 By way of an offset — and I think under the 
8 Mechanic's Lien Statute, the cases under that, they say that 
9 attorneys fees are properly awardable where you have to 
10 defend an offset on a claim for foreclosure of a mechanic's 
11 lien. I think that's properly what the law is in this case. 
12 MR. CAMPBELL: And there's not been a case cited, 
13 Your Honor, to support that. We submit it. 
14 THE COURT: Counsel, I sit here today and have 
15 heard arguments on this case, and I sat through two weeks of 
16 trial and heard arguments, and I shook my head every night as 
17 I left the bench of what a mess this is and where it was 
18 going, why it wasn't disposed of. 
19 When I see a situation going down where the parties 
20 simply — and I'm not going to try to recall or restate all 
21 the evidence — but First General coming before this Court on 
22 a $10,000 claim and asking for $75,000 in attorneys fees, 
23 it's just, as Mr. Campbell stated, the bar or the Court 
24 cannot tolerate things of that sort. 
25 Where I read the affidavits of Mr. Bostwick as far 
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1 as the number of attorneys and legal paralegals that have 
2 worked on the case, I don't know what took place in his 
3 office. I'm certainly not here to criticize you, 
4 Mr. Bostwick, except to say that I — it was just 
5 inconceivable to this Court of how, on a $10,000 claim, you 
6 can get $75,000 into it. It's just not there. 
7 I see First General suing on this matter, and none 
8 of the parties come before this Court with clean hands, where 
9 they've made mistakes as far as the restoring of the 
10 property. 
11 I'm not going to recall them all, but they made all 
12 kinds of mistakes that were testified to, of where Zandra 
13 Perkins comes in and claims that she made were absurd as far 
14 as the insurance company, and her attempts to get the 
15 contractor to do things that were improper. 
16 The way she handled the entering into the contract 
17 and the attempt to set the contract aside, it was just so 
18 bad. 
19 And Bear River, here they pay $91,000, on which it 
20 appears to be about a $40,000 to $60,000 fire, yet their 
21 adjustor in this Court's opinion just goofed in many areas as 
22 far as the way he handled the claim, and in trying to use the 
23 settling of one part of it to force the other. 
24 Well, the jury brought back a verdict, a verdict 
25 which this Court would not — if I had been giving the 
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1 verdict, and in hearing the evidence I heard, it would not 
2 have been the verdict. I would not have given the verdict 
3 which First General prayed for. 
4 I would not have given the verdict that Zandra 
5 Perkins prayed for. I would not have given the verdict Bear 
6 River prayed for. 
7 So — and of course, you'll never know what my 
8 verdict would have been. But I'm saying that we have here a 
9 homeowner who is — has her home burn down, or burned, and 
10 she attempts to get that fixed; walked out of Court with a 
11 $65,000 judgment against her, and she was not all clean. She 
12 was not all good. 
13 Of course, Mr. Campbell makes a great deal as far 
14 as the Court's ruling, allowing into evidence on the first 
15 fire. I don't know what impact that had on the jury. I do 
16 know that, as it came in, the impact it had on the Court was 
17 a lot less than this Court anticipated it would be, the way 
18 Mr. Heath went at it and passed over it; that it almost, to 
19 this Court — this Court did not have — it did not have any 
20 impact at all. 
21 And certainly, it was not the impact, in this 
22 Court's opinion, that Mr. Campbell argues that it had. 
23 I would probably state that I'm still of the 
24 opinion that under the claims brought, it was admissible; but 
25 I probably also would state that under the small area that it 
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1 was brought in on, if I had known that that's all they were 
2 going to use it for, I probably wouldn't have allowed it, 
3 because to me it was just not significant. 
4 I have other reasons as well, and some of which 
5 have been stated here, as to what happened in this trial. I 
6 don't know that I — but I have reasons, but they're not 
7 material. 
8 Now, the questions at hand and some of these are 
9 awfully tough. Of course, Mr. Campbell asks the Court the 
10 major thing, which is his motion for judgment NOV and a new 
11 trial. He argues that the Court has broad discretion. 
12 I will agree with him that the Court has 
13 discretion, but I guess I agree — and maybe not disagree; 
14 disagreeing isn't quite it as far as what he says before this 
15 Court. 
16 But in this Court's opinion, and before I can 
17 overturn a jury of a verdict, I have to find good grounds to 
18 do it, so there's no basis for the jury to find the verdict 
19 which they did; or, of course, if there was significant error 
20 that was prejudicial. 
21 I do not find that error — I'm not saying that it 
22 was reversible error, allowing in the testimony of the 
23 Hillsden fire, that that was significant prejudice enough to 
24 overturn the jury's verdict. 
25 I'm also of the opinion that there was sufficient 
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1 evidence for reasonable minds to differ, and the jury defined 
2 the verdict which they did. 
3] However, except as to the area of attorneys fees: 
4 I asked Mr. Campbell the question, "If I arbitrarily set the 
5 attorneys fees, whether it would stand, would I have the 
6 authority?" He says, "No." 
7 I certainly question it. But I don't know how else 
8 to approach the situation. 
9 Mr. Campbell argues that there should be an 
10 apportionment, and his argument may be good. I'm not 
11 persuaded by it. If it were just the — there were two areas 
12 of attorneys fees, the mechanic's lien, if it were just for 
13 that area, for the foreclosure of the mechanic's lien, I 
14 would say, yes. 
15 But with the provision of the contract for 
16 attorneys fees, and by statute that becomes reciprocal, then 
17 I think the issues is raised relating very directly to that 
18 contract. 
19 And I may be wrong, and I may find out, and I 
20 certainly will be the first to acknowledge if I have made a 
21I mistake. 
22 But I'm not persuaded. But yet I'm looking for a 
23 way to adjust the attorneys fees. 
24 I just cannot allow attorneys fees of $52,000 to be 
25 awarded on a $10,000 claim. I cannot. And I will address 
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1 that right now, to Mr. Smith, 
2 I tried my best, my best to get Mr. Smith out of 
3 this case. I looked at it and I didn't find it in pretrial 
4 and before that they had — that anybody had any cause of 
5 action against Mr. Smith. Fine, if they did, but they left 
6 him in. 
7 And of course, the expenses ran up on it. And I'm 
8 still of the opinion that he had no business being in it. 
9 You know that, because I sustained his motion for a directed 
10 verdict as soon as it was made. 
11 But yet, I'm also of the opinion that the 
12 Mechanic's Lien Statute on the attorneys fees is not broad 
13 enough to cover the alleged water damage that was caused by 
14 your client as far as the property was concerned. 
15 And even if the statute is that broad, I cannot 
16 award attorneys fees of $13,000, in the neighborhood of 
17 $13,000, on a $426 claim. That's what I'm saying: I shook 
18 my head and asked, "Where's this case going? What are they 
19 doing? Why can't we get some reasonableness in these 
2 0 attorneys fees? They're just not reasonable." 
21 I don't know. I'm still thinking, and I guess I'm 
22 going to do something that I think is subject to being 
2 3 overruled. But I guess this case is going up. I wish I 
24 could do something to end it, make everybody happy, but I 
25 don't have those magic powers. 
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1 I am going to — I don't think — and the only 
2 basis I'm doing this on is that I don't think the attorneys 
3 fees which were testified to, or which were awarded by the 
4 jury, were reasonable attorneys fees. 
5 But the trouble is: I don't have a real basis, 
6 through evidence or otherwise, to base a measure of 
7 reasonableness on the attorneys fees. 
8 Therefore, I'm going to award attorneys fees in the 
9 amount — the same amount as the judgment which the jury 
10 awarded to First General against Zandra Perkins, which is 
11 $10,658. 
12 MR. BOSTWICK: Plus interest? 
13 THE COURT: I'm not allowing any interest on the 
14 principal judgment. 
15 Now, I'm also of the opinion that First General had 
16 the obligation of paying their subcontractors. They paid, 
17 the testimony was, all subcontractors but one. Why they saw 
18 fit not to pay this subcontractor, I don't know. At this 
19 time that's why I asked Mr. Smith this morning to refresh my 
2 0 memory, because that's the way I remembered it. 
21 I'm of the opinion that First General Services 
22 isn't responsible for the judgment taken by Frampton. I 
23 would deny, of course, additional attorneys fees, and I am 
24 also of the opinion — and this is what I remember at the 
25 time, when I signed that judgment, "Why isn't somebody 
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1 objecting to the amount of attorneys fees when they were 
2 being awarded to Mr. Smith for $4,000 on a $426 judgment?" 
3 Nobody objected. I signed the judgment. I don't 
4 even know now that I could set that aside. I don't think I 
5 can. I don't think it's reasonable. I'm not saying you 
6 didn't put that time in; it was just unreasonable. 
7 But Mr. Bostwick to make a motion, and you 
8 stipulated to it, and maybe there was a stipulation and then 
9 a motion was made, but as I reviewed the file this morning, 
10 to take this case from the Murray Circuit Court up here, it 
11 had nothing to do with this. It could have been adjudicated 
12 there. All it was there for was the question of whether the 
13 reasonable work was done by him in the installing of that 
14 cooler. But anyway, it came up here. The attorneys fees 
15 went boom, boom, boom, and that's why I say I should have — 
16 when I saw it, I should have stuck it back to the Murray 
17 Circuit Court. 
18 But I didn't review the file at that point, so I 
19 was not really aware of it. 
20 So as I say, I'm — I don't know how I can set 
21 aside those attorneys fees now, but I'm of that opinion. 
22 MR. BOSTWICK: Your Honor, as a clarification, are 
23 you indicating then that First General is responsible for the 
24 underlying judgment as well as the attorneys fees? 
25 THE COURT: Yes, but I'm saying the attorneys fees 
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1 are unreasonable. Again, I'm not inferring that you didn't 
2 do that work. I think it was forced on you, but I mustn't 
3 allow them to stand. 
4 Now, as far as the additional attorneys fees, I'm 
5 denying those additional attorneys fees on two grounds: I 
6 don't think they're reasonable, and the main basis there is 
7 that this went to the jury and Mr. Bostwick may be absolutely 
8 right; he said he was reserving it. I can't say if he did or 
9 didn't. I don't remember. 
10 If he says that's the case, I certainly am not 
11 doubting his word; but I think when it goes to the jury, he 
12 has an obligation to project what the attorneys fees are 
13 going to be and to allow that to be brought out before the 
14 jury, for the jury to consider an award, which it did not do, 
15 and therefore I think the issue is moot. 
16 MR. BOSTWICK: Your Honor, as a clarification 
17 again, that supplemental fees figure was including the post-
18 trial efforts as well, or — are you denying those? 
19 THE COURT: I am. 
20 MR. BOSTWICK: On the same basis, that we should 
21 have projected those? 
22 THE COURT: Yes. Now, the question of the 
23 apportionment of costs between First General and Bear 
24 River — 
25 MR. BOSTWICK: And Bear River and Perkins. 
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1 THE COURT: — sorry, Bear River and Perkins, I use 
2 the term "apportionment," and that's what Mr. Campbell 
3 argues, that there shouldn't be any, and Mr. Heath says if 
4 there's going to be any, they should be apportioned. 
5 I don't — I'm not of the opinion that Perkins 
6 completely prevailed in this case pursuant to the rule. I'm 
7 also of the opinion, and I absolutely know that a judgment 
8 was rendered against Bear River; therefore, I am going to 
9 order that the costs be apportioned in this matter as far as 
10 the judgment is concerned between Bear River and Perkins. 
11 And, of course, the Court has not been called upon 
12 to tax the costs completely; I think that maybe some have 
13 been filed, and I would have to review that. 
14 But if counsel cannot get together on that, I'm 
15 going to state the guidelines for you. 
16 MR. HEATH: Could you give us a guideline of a 
17 percentage? 
18 THE COURT: No, I don't think I can give you a 
19 percentage. I guess that what you argued, Mr. Heath, was 
2 0 that it would be apportioned as far as the two were concerned 
21 as to what part of it was for reasonable rental value of the 
22 home and what their claim was for the other. No, I just say 
23 arbitrarily — . 
24 MR. HEATH: Are you saying that we should then come 
25 back to court to apportion costs if we can't agree on it, on 
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1 a motion to tax costs? 
2 THE COURT: Yes. Let me state this: I'm looking 
3 probably at something about 25-75, or 40-60 as a percentage. 
4 I would also give you some direction; I will allow costs for 
5 witness fees, for filing charges, for depositions taken of 
6 other parties' clients or experts, if they're absolutely 
7 necessary. 
8 I will not allow expert witness fees, I will not 
9 allow all the deposition fees of all the people taken. 
10 MR. HEATH: That could be an issue. Tell us again 
11 the deposition fees you will allow. Other parties? 
12 MR. CAMPBELL: The Court told you, and we can get 
13 the record. 
14 THE COURT: Let me state this: But you'll have the 
15 right to bring this before me if you want to, and I'll look 
16 at it then. But here's the way I generally look at these 
17 matters. And I'm not saying I would rule out any argument, 
18 and I'm not absolutely ruling now, but I would allow any 
19 filing fees. I would allow deposition costs for opposing 
20 parties or opposing parties' expert witnesses. I would not 
21 allow expert witness fees. 
22 I would not allow copying costs, things of that 
23 sort. Now, I say that's the general guideline which I more 
24 or less follow. If you bring it before me, I would have to 
25 take a look at it and make my decision on an individual case. 
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1 MR. BOSTWICK: Your Honor, one more clarification, 
2 with regard to First General's fees of $10,658, included in 
3 the costs for First General are costs according to these 
4 guidelines that — . 
5 THE COURT: No, the costs — now what did the jury 
6 do on costs on that? I guess they weren't asked. 
7 MR. CAMPBELL: They weren't asked. 
8 MR. BOSTWICK: They were included in the affidavit 
9 of $52,000 including the costs. 
10 THE COURT: I would award taxable costs to — . 
11 MR. BOSTWICK: According to these guidelines? 
12 THE COURT: Yes, to First General. 
13 MR. HEATH: I take it -- . 
14 MR. CAMPBELL: Excuse me. 
15 MR. HEATH: I understand, then, the Court is 
16 denying Perkins' motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
17 verdict? 
18 THE COURT: Yes, I'm denying the judgment 
19 notwithstanding the verdict or the motion for new trial on 
20 the grounds as stated, which are already in the record. 
21 MR. CAMPBELL: Except as to attorneys fees of First 
22 General, and what you find there is that the attorneys fees 
23 ought to be $10,000? 
24 THE COURT: Yes. 




























THE COURT: That's on the basis that they were just 
not reasonable attorneys fees in view of the amount claimed. 
MR. CAMPBELL: So the judgment is really remitted 
to that extent? 
THE COURT: It is. 
MR. CAMPBELL: I think the Court has the right, 
inherently has the right to remit a judgment. 
MR. HEATH: The only remaining thing, Your Honor — 
and I don't mean — was the Court going to make a statement? 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. HEATH: Would the Court direct one of us to 
prepare the judgment? 
THE COURT: That was my statement. Who is going to 
prepare it, the order of the hearing? And I'm talking about 
an order of the hearing here today. 
MR. HEATH: Your Honor, I'd be happy to do it, 
except I'm not — . 
MR. CAMPBELL: Let him do it. He has all the 
money. 
MR. HEATH: I think I would prefer, Your Honor, 
that Mr. Bostwick or Mr. Campbell do it. 
MR. CAMPBELL: I'll prepare a form of the judgment, 
Your Honor, as to the order denying the motion for judgment 
NOV, new trial, except as to attorneys fees for First 



























there a reason for a bifurcated judgment? 
THE COURT: I would rather have one order with 
everything included. j 
MR. CAMPBELL: I can do — we can get it around to 
counsel. J 
THE COURT: Get it agreed to. Let's don't make 1 
another $5,000 in attorneys fees on this. 
MR. CAMPBELL: Right. 
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 1 
(Whereupon, at the hour of 9:35 a.m., the 
proceedings came to a close.) 
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